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The More, the Merrier? The Effects of EU Enlargement on 
European Integration 

by 
Ruxandra Paul 
Professor Cathy Johnson, Advisor 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the 
Degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honors 
in Political Science 

Williams College, 2005-2006 To my beloved parents, Doina and Tony 
Contents 
Introduction: The Mysteries of European Enlargement .............................4 Chapter I: The Enlargement Menace? A History of European Integration ......41 Chapter 11: A New Hope: Debunking the Myth of the "EU Generation Gap" ...71 
Chapter 111:The Union Strikes Back .The Procrustean Bed of Enlargement 
Negotiations....................................................................................90 Chapter IV: Attempting Comparison .Hey EU. What Kind of Political Animal 
Are You? ......................................................................................114 
Conclusion....................................................................................161 
Appendixes...................................................................................167 
Bibliography.................................................................................170 


INTRODUCTION 
The Mysteries of European Enlargement 

In the aftermath of World War 11, European leaders decided to secure peace among their countries and stimulate prosperity by uniting the continent economically and politically. Not only did the project of building a united Europe facilitate Germany's reintegration in continental and transatlantic relations, but also it allowed Western European countries to consolidate a common front with the United States in the context of the emerging Cold War. In 1950, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman suggested integrating Western European coal and steel industries. Pursuing his proposal, six countries (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 195 1. ECSC member states delegated decision-making power in these two strategic industries to a supranational independent body, the High Authority. This pooling of sovereignty and the resulting modest transfers of power marked the beginnings of European integration. As Desmond Dinan notes, the ECSC was "politically important and institutionally innovative, but economically insignificant."' To benefit more from integration, the Six created in 1957 the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The three communities merged in 1967 forming the European Community (EC), the European Union's direct ancestor. 
The Rome Treaty establishing the EEC emphasized in its Preamble the signatories' commitment to "lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the 
Dinan, Desmond, Europe Recast: A History of European Union, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004; p. 64. 
peoples of ~uro~e."~ 
This provision prefigured two distinct directions for the 
Community7 s future development: 
1) European integration, i.e. in order to achieve an ever closer union, member 
states will continue to delegate more power in an increasing number of areas 
to European institutions; and 
2) European enlargement, i.e. in order to achieve European union, other 
European countries will join the Community and participate in collective 
decision-making. While the former dimension of Community development was explicitly accentuated, the latter remained implicit, yet just as essential. After all, a European Community of six countries that originally did not even include the United Kingdom would have produced little effect in international politics had it claimed to speak for the entire continent. 
Thus, the official direction the European Community has pursued from its birth assumes that integration and enlargement can and should go hand in hand. Many scholars dismiss this idea as mere "official rhet~ric,"~ 
warning that ample enlargement (particularly towards Southern and Eastern Europe) may compromise the EU's capacity to f~nction.~ 
Such apprehensions are not surprising. By definition, regional integration provides common rules, regulations and policies for a particular region. 5 As Zielonka remarks, "one does not need to be a disciple of Max Weber to acknowledge that ambitious projects of political, economic and military integration 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, full text available at: 
http://www.europa.eu.int~abc/obj/treaties/edentoc05.htm 

Zielonka, Jan, "How New Enlarged Borders W~ll Reshape the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3, September 2001; p. 510. 
Hildebrandt, Antje, What Is Special about Enlarging the European Union Towards the East? A Comparison With the Southern Enlargement, Bank of Finland -Institute for Economies in Transition, BOFIT, No. 13,2002; p. 15. 
Mattli, Walter, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; p. 44. 
can only work in a relatively homogenous en~ironment."~ 
Successive rounds of enlargement have increased the EU's heterogeneity, and future expansions will generate similar effects. Ostensibly, this should have profoundly negative repercussions on integration. Numerous politicians and journalists have fostered such expectations concerning the enlargement's consequences among European citizens. For instance, in the 1990s, British Prime Minister John Major "supported enlargement in the hope that widening would weaken the EU," which "hardly endeared him to the Central and Eastern Europeans, who wanted to join a strong EU and had few qualms about voluntarily sharing sovereignty."7 
In practice, widening and deepening have proceeded in parallel in the last fifty years. Successive waves of enlargement increased the Union's membership from the initial six to the present twenty-five (see table 1). Romania and Bulgaria are currently completing the accession process and will join the EU in 2007 or 2008. Other countries have started negotiating (e.g. Croatia, Turkey). Meanwhile, integration has progressed as well: the European Community became the European Union through the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). Members have formed a single market and adopted a common currency. They established a customs-free area, and harmonized some of their social and environmental legislation. Also, they started to coordinate their foreign and security policy, as well as collaborate in justice and police matters. Before Maastricht, the EC had doubled its membership, which did not prevent it from making the historical transition from Community to Union. Can the EU accommodate diversity without diluting or compromising integration? Can the old adage "the more, the merrier" be applied to the European project? 
zielonka, 2001; p. 515. 
Dinan, 2004; p. 274. 

Table 1:The EU's Increasing Membership 
Original Member States (1957) Belgium, France, (;crmany, Italy. Luxembourg, the Netherlands First cnlargelilent (1 973) Britain, Denmark, Ireland Second enlargement (1981) Grcece 
Third enlargenlent (1986) Spain, Portugal Fourth enlargement (1995) Austria, Finland, Sweden 1;ifth enlargement (2001) Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia. Slovakia. Cyprus. Malta The present thesis examines the relationship between the two facets of the "ever closer union" -expansion and the pooling of sovereignty -and argues that European enlargement does not dilute integration, but can (and often does) strengthen the latter in many respects, as historical analysis demonstrates. As integration advances, the EU affects the lives of European citizens more directly and in more ways. EU membership confers rights and imposes responsibilities. Governments abide by European principles and policies. Legislatures adopt European laws and executives implement them. Domestic courts decide cases based on European legislation that often takes precedence over national laws. Employers and businesses must respect European guidelines concerning workers and products, as well as keep an eye on the interpretations of EU legislation that the European Court of Justice formulates. European citizens travel without visas in the part of the continent where member states have abolished internal borders to create the so-called Schengen space, and workers can freely seek employment. Less affluent countries receive money from the Union's structural funds. The relationship between integration and enlargement defines the EU's future, a future which shapes the daily lives of an increasing number of Europeans. In January 2004, the EU had a population of 456.4 million, after the ten joining members from Central and Eastern Europe added their 74.1 million people to the EU15 
population. The Euro Zone alone had a population of 308.4 million.' These people are 
not only citizens of their democratic countries, but also European citizens according to the Treaty of Maastricht. They vote to elect their national representatives to the European Parliament. Also, democratically elected national governments appoint ministers who participate in collective decision-making in the Council of Ministers. 
While non-controversial EU laws conferring rights to European citizens do not always receive media coverage or public attention, anti-EU protests of trade unionists or farmers in France or Germany occasionally take over the news. The EU's influence on domestic political and economic affairs is a matter of interest for every European, and enlargements typically generate concern and diverse fears among European citizens. Apprehensions concern issues ranging from capital migration to environmental standards, from migrant workers to European security, from agriculture to human rights and political stability. Frequently, in domestic politics, a number of candidates tap into these popular fears and nurture -via populist agitation and demagoguery -nationalistic, anti-European and xenophobic sentiments to increase their personal electoral capital or that of their parties. 
In 2004, the biggest enlargement wave in EU history occurred: ten countries (eight from Eastern Europe, plus Cyprus and Malta) joined the Union. The full impact of this political decision on integration remains unclear, but could be anticipated if one identified the typical effects of enlargement on the pooling of sovereignty. Analyzing the relationship between enlargement and integration, the two dimensions of EU development, constitutes the object of this thesis. My work tries to determine whether the EU's official vision that deepening and widening can proceed simultaneously is accurate and justified. This thesis will explore past phenomena and 
Eurostat News Release, "European Demography in 2003," Internet source: http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/cache/ITYPLIC/3-31082004-BPlEN13-3 1082004-BP-EN.PDF 
clarify contemporary realities, as well as potentially serve to anticipate the 
implications of future enlargements. 
Any scholarly attempt to anticipate the future of the old continent or the future configurations of the international political arena must consider the spectacular developments in EU governance. As Andrew Moravcsik notes, "over the past half- century, the EU successfully expanded its substantive scope and institutional mandate until it now stands without parallel among international institution^."^ A geo-political entity developed in the globalization era, the EU has reshaped fundamental notions such as nation-state, national regulatory autonomy and sovereignty. Its contributions will define the directions in which European and international politics will evolve in the twenty-first century. 
The integrative process is extremely complex. EU integration has two complementary facets: pooling of sovereignty and flexibility. Flexible policy- coordination schemes allow individual countries to opt out of certain initiatives pursued by a majority of member states. I use the term "flexibility" instead of "fragmentation," (although Moravcsik uses them interchangeablylO) because the former conveys the idea that, in the EU context, opt-outs often benefit integration more than harm it. Flexible mechanisms enable a majority of member states to cooperate despite the opt-out of one country. For instance, the European Monetary Union functions today and includes the Euro despite the British refusal to adopt the common currency. The 1985 Schengen agreement allows citizens to travel freely between signatory countries, despite the fact that Ireland and the UK opted out (whereas Norway and Iceland, both non-members, participate). The Maastricht Treaty 
Moravcsik, Andrew, "Federalism in the European Union: Rhetoric and Reality", in Nicolaidis and Howse (eds.), The Federal Vision, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; p. 161. lo Moravcsik, Andrew (ed.), Centralization or Fragmentation? Europe Facing the Challenges of Deepening, Diversity, and Democracy, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998. 
itself could be adopted as a whole even though the UK initially opted out of the Social 
Protocol (as soon as Labour replaced the Conservative cabinet, Britain adopted the Social Protocol). In sum, had opt-outs and reservations not been possible, the hesitations of one country (older or newer as an EU member) could have impeded the progress of integration. Policy integration brings benefits for insiders and creates relative disadvantages (negative externalities) for countsies that opt out." Consequently, disadvantaged outsiders generally find themselves under increasing pressure to catch up with the more integrated group of EU members. For example, this is currently the case with Central and Eastern European countries that aspire to join the Euro zone. 
While differentiated integration has been officialized in the text of European treaties, this principle essentially creates opportunities for existing members to pursue the pooling of sovereignty in the future; it does not, however, allow new members or candidates to seek exemptions from existing EU legislation. On the contrary, in the pre-accession period, joining countries have faced an ever-stricter set of requirements imposed by European institutions as conditions for membership. Among the key principles that have traditionally guided EU enlargements, the following ranks first: "no permanent opt-outs for new members."12 In the last decade, enlargement has been characterized by a rigid conditionality that protects integration: newcomers must adopt and implement the entire body of European legislation (acquis communautaire). Transition periods have been drastically reduced or even completely eliminated, as EU institutions force joining countries to adapt as rapidly as possible to Union 
l1 Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, p. 13; also p. 42: "The demand for regional rules, regulations and policies by market players is a critical driving force of integration." l2 Peterson, John, and Elizabeth Bomberg, "Northern Enlargement and EU Decisionmaking" in Laurent, Pierre-Hemi and Marc Maresceau (eds.), The State of the European Union, Vol. 4: Deepening and Widening, Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998; p. 59; and also Preston, Christopher, "Obstacles to EU Enlargement: The Classical Community Method and the Prospects for a Wider Europe," Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3, September 1995; p. 452. 
standards. All in all, in practice, flexibility is an option open to states that want to 
advance integration in new areas; the principle does not benefit joining countries that attempt to secure exemptions from existing rules and legislation during pre- enlargement negotiations. 
Where is European Integration Theory When You Most Need It? 
Despite their impressive and ever-increasing number, European integration approaches and theories have failed to formulate theoretically rigorous or empirically supported analyses of the relationship this thesis explores. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier note, for example: "it is striking that EU enlargement has been a largely neglected issue in the theory of regional integration."13 Nevertheless, before presenting my own argument, I will summarize the main theoretical arguments in integration theory, to provide a general framework for identifying and classifying dominant explanations or expectations concerning enlargement and its implications. While comprehensive theoretical surveys require entire volumes due to the high number of approaches and subdivisions, overlaps and grey areas,14 some landmarks are necessary. With the risk of oversimplifying, I will adopt the classification used by Daniel Kelernen in his lectures on European integration15 and group approaches in three schools: supranationalism, intergovernmentalism and institutionalism. 
Supranationalist theories, usually united under the broad label of neo-functionalism, identify supranational institutions and interest groups as the key actors 
13 Schimmelfennig, F., and U. Sedelmeier, "Theorizing EU Enlargement: Research Focus, Hypotheses, 
and the State of Research" in Journal of European Public Policy, 9 (4), 2002; p. 501. 
14 For a complete analysis and discussion refer to Rosamond, Ben, Theories of European Integration, 
The European Union Series, New York: St. Martin Press, 2000; and Wiener, Antje and Thomas Diez 
(eds.), European Integration Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
l5 Kelemen, R. Daniel, Lectures on European Integration, Oxford University, Michaelmas Term, 
October 2004. 

in European integration.16 Neo-functionalism claimed that, once integration began in a 
few strategic sectors, it would expand through functional spillovers to other sectors, with the sponsorship of supranational institutions. For instance, integration of the coal and steel industries would generate pressures to integrate related economic sectors such as energy policy, transportation or environmental standards. The inevitable consequence was a "gradual and progressive entangling of national econ~mies,"'~ which would, in turn, lead to political integration. EU institutions seek to maximize their power, whereas interest groups pursue material self-interests. Two main causal mechanisms explain the progress of integration: supranational entrepreneurship and functional spillover. 
Supranational entrepreneurship means that European "Frankenstein"-like institutions, once created, gain a will of their own and develop ties with sub-national, national and transnational interest groups to circumvent national governments. Indeed, neo-functionalism underscores that this entrepreneurship eventually triggers a transfer of individual and interest group loyalties from national to European institutions. The concept of spillover derives from functionalist approaches: essentially, once states begin to cooperate in one policy area, the initial cooperation generates pressures to integrate other related areas to increase efficiency and benefits. For example, the Schengen space in which citizens can move freely from one member state to another would create pressures to collaborate in related sectors such as policing and external border control. In neo-functionalist terms, integration "spills over" from the integrated policy area to related non-integrated sectors. 
l6For more detailed descriptions of neo-functionalism refer to works by Haas, Ernst (The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957,Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958; Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and Internatiorzal Organization, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964);Lindberg, L.N., and Scheingold S.A. (Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970),or Schmitter, P.C. ("Three Neo- Functional Hypotheses about European Integration," International Organization, 23 (I), 1969). l7 Rosamond; p. 51. 
Supranationalist theorists perceive integration as an ongoing process. While 
functionalists understood the pooling of sovereignty as more or less inevitable, very few neo-functionalists believe in automatic progress. Developments between EU intergovernmental conferences (IGCs or treaty rounds) constitute the main empirical focus of supranationalist theories. 
Although even the critics of neo-functionalism acknowledged its merits,'' its limitations appeared obvious to everyone including neo-functionalists themselves, soon after the Community's establishment. According to Haas and Lindberg, "the spillover hypothesis seemed to suggest that integration was a linear, progressive phenomenon; that once started, dynamics would be set in place to continue the m~mentum."'~As early as the mid 1960s, the road towards union looked bumpier than previously thought. Member state governments proved to be alive and kicking, still retaining control over the European project. 
In 1965,France withdrew its Brussels representative boycotting discussions of new EC policies. Walter Hallstein, the President of the European Commission at the time, had proposed an increase in Commission powers as well as a replacement of unanimity with qualified majority voting in many commercial decisions. Fearing that the empowerment of European institutions would undermine national sovereignty, President Charles de Gaulle strongly opposed both initiatives. Hallstein tried to compromise. The deadline for an agreement on permanent financial arrangements concerning the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was looming. Due to the approaching presidential elections in France, de Gaulle wanted this agreement that benefited French farmers. Hallstein thought de Gaulle would compromise on the issue 
l8 Moravcsik, Andrew, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach to the EC," Journal of Common Market Studies, 31, no. 4, 1993; p. 
474. 
l9 Rosamond; p. 63. 

of Community power, but instead France responded to pressures by withdrawing its 
representative from negotiations. The "empty chair" crisis lasted until 1966 when the Luxembourg compromise endorsed the right of every member state to veto European proposals it deemed detrimental to its 'vital national interests.' 
Integration did not proceed gradually and linearly, but instead discontinuously, in spurts, with stumbles and periods of stagnation. Before the ECSC's success, attempts to establish a European Defense Community and a Political Community had failed. Moreover, neo-functionalists had overestimated the extent to which individual and interest-group loyalties would transfer to European structures: citizens continued to feel strongly about their elected national officials and generally ignored the "faceless bureaucrats" in Brussels. Nationalism refused to wither away: politicians such as Charles de Gaulle and Margaret Thatcher successfully defended national interests despite all supranational pressures. More recently, a new rise in radical nationalism has generated panic among European democracies. In 2000, Jorg Haider's extreme-right Freedom Party joined the People's Party to form a coalition government in Austria. Two years later, Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of the French extreme-right party Le Front National, qualified in the 2002 run-off of the presidential election against the incumbent Jacques Chirac. 
Emerging as a reaction to supranationalism, intergovernmentalism contested the idea that integration progresses linearly, spreading from one policy area to another and circumventing the member states' control. This school argued that sovereign states remain the key actors in European integration and showed that reality had contradicted neo-functionalism. Sovereign states pursued European integration as a means to maximize their security andlor defend their economic interests. When countries shared interests or secured tradeoffs, the European pooling of sovereignty could advance. The central mechanism was the intergovernmental bargaining between powerful states, which determined the future directions of integration." Intergovernmentalist analyses concentrate on IGCs and treaty negotiations. Given that cooperation is voluntary, that vital decisions take place in a non-coercive unanimity voting system, and that resort to qualified majority voting occurs only to increase the efficiency of bargaining, European institutions constitute a structure that merely facilitates negotiation by "providing a set of passive, transaction-cost reducing 
The European Council illustrates the argument that intergovernmental bargaining drives integration. This structure formed in 1974 institutionalized the informal meetings gathering the heads of government and foreign ministers of all member states. Although initially not a part of the EC's official framework, the European Council asserted itself over time. The Single European Act (SEA) officially acknowledged the Council's role and allowed it to initiate European legislation. Ex Art. D (currently Art. 4 TEU) states: "The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political guidelines thereof." Article 13 TEU enables th.e Council to shape the principles and rules for the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. According to Craig and de Bdrca, the European Council "plays a central role in setting the pace and shape of Community policy, establishing the parameters within which the other institutions 
20 For more information on intergovernmentalism, refer to the works of the school's leading scholars: 
Hoffmann, Stanley ("Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western 
Europe," Daedalus 95, 1966, and The European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe, 1964-1994, Boulder, CO: 
Westview, 1995); Moravcsik, Andrew (The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from 
Messina to Maastricht, London: UCL Press, 1998); Milward, Alan (The European Rescue of the 
Nation State, London: Routledge, 1992), etc. 
21 Moravcsik, 1993; p. 517. 

operate."22 The European Council has become a catalyst for calling the 
intergovernmental conferences that precede major treaty amendments. 
While intergovernmentalism brings political leaders, people and state interests back into analyses of European integration, it suffers from inherent limitations stemming from its perception of European institutions as a passive framework. Consequently, this approach cannot account for the evolution of the ECJ and its activism: "The expansion of judicial power in the EC presents an anomaly for the functional explanation of delegation as a deliberative means by national governments of increasing the efficiency of collective decision-making.?'23 The Court, for instance, has actively promoted the supremacy of European legislation over domestic law. Also, intergovernmentalism cannot account for the increase in law-malung powers of the European Parliament that has occurred at the expense of the intergovernmental Council of Ministers. There is no plausible explanation for justifying why states would suddenly agree to give a European assembly the right to influence decisions made by the representatives of national governments. Indeed, European institutions proved more active in pursuing their own empowerment than intergovernmentalists were ready to acknowledge. 
More recently, institutionalism has emerged as an attempt to reconcile supranationalism and intergovernmentalism by acknowledging the importance of both European institutions and sovereign states in the pooling of sovereignty. Lee Miles explains that the more sophisticated and flexible policy options currently available to EU decision-makers, as well as the "ambitious enlargement agenda since the early 1990s" caused this shift away from the Grail of 'grand theory': EU scholars gave up searching for "any single 'meta-theory' that can claim to effectively explain all 22 Craig, Paul, and de Biirca, GrGnne, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 3rdedition, Oxford 
University Press, 2002; p. 73. 23 Moravcsik; p. 513. 
aspects of the integration process and nature of the Union. In practice, the 
contemporary preference has been to advocate the usage of 'middle-range' theoretical approaches that focus on some of the dynamics associated with the The institutionalist label, hence, covers an amorphous group of theoretical approaches that have little in common apart from this general intention. As Kelemen noticed, most contemporary students of European integration identify themselves as 




institutionalist^.^^ 
Historical institutionalists, for instance, are in fact "neo-neo-functionalists" (as Schmitter characterized them in the creative and polysyllabic tradition of European theory jargon) who claim that while states do initially control the integration process, they subsequently lose this predominant power over policy- making and cannot regain it later. The impossibility to regain power appears because a) EU institutions are partially autonomous; b) government leaders have restricted time horizons and concentrate almost exclusively on short-term goals; and c) reform is blocked by institutional barriers, sunk costs and rising price of exit.26 
Institutionalization theorists rely on a descendant of the neo-functionalist "spillover": the "loop of institutionali~ation."~~
They argue that increased interaction drives integration forward. If cross-border European exchange increases, the demand for supranational rules and institutions increases as well. New supranational rules 
24 Miles, Lee, "Theoretical Considerations" in Neil1 Nugent (ed.) European Union Enlargement, 
Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; p. 253-254. 
25 Kelemen, Daniel, Lectures on European Integration, Oxford University, Michaelmas Term, 2004. 
26 For more details on hstorical institutionalism refer to the works of Pierson, Paul ("The Path to 
European Integration: A I-Iistorical Institutionalist Analysis," Comparative Political Studies 29 (2), 
1996); Marks, G., Hooghe, L. and Blank, K. ("Europeali Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. 
Multi-Level Governance," Journal of Common Market Studies 3413, 1996). 
27 For explanations of institutionalization theory refer to the works of Stone Sweet, Alec, Wayne 
Sandholtz and Neil Fligstein (eds.), The Institutionalization of Europe, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001; and Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, "Integration, Supranational Governance, and the 
Institutionalization of the European Polity," in Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (eds.), European Integration 
and Supranational Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 

shape the context for ongoing debates, while state and non-state actors adapt their 
preferences, strategies and behaviors to the rules 
Finally, rationalist institutionalists interpret the process of European integration as a series of rational-choice interactions. This branch of institutionalism that, as Schmitter noticed, "overlaps loosely with liberal intergovernmentalism28 focuses on the strategic interaction between national governments and EU institutions in the context of existing rules. Sovereign states have exogenously defined policy preferences, while EU bodies act according to institutional self-interest. Rationalist institutionalists aim at describing how integration works (e.g. policy making, implementation, adjudication, etc.). 29 
None of these theories and approaches has answered the question that constitutes the object of my thesis: how does EU enlargement impact on integration? From the neo-functionalist camp, Philippe Sch~mitter writes: 
neither functionalism nor neofunctionalism nor neo-neofunctionalism has or had anything to say about enlargement. Expansion into additional functional tasks, yes; extension into additional territorial units, no. Had their basic assumptions been taken seriously, they would have been immediately proven wrong in predicting who would choose and be chosen to participate in the regional integration of Europe. Switzerland, for example, should long have been a member of the EEC/EC/EU and Greece should not have joined.30 
From the intergovernmentalist camp, Frank Schimmelfennig notes: "enlargement has not been a major empirical subject of liberal intergovernmentalist analysis."31 Most 
28 Schmitter, Philippe C., "Neo-Neofunctionalism" in Wiener, Antje, and Thomas Diez (eds.), 
European Integration Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004; p. 48. 
29 For more information on rationalist institutionalism read Tsebelis, G. and Garrett, G., "The 
Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union," 
International Organization, 55(2), 2001, p. 357-390; Hix, Simon, The Political System of the European 
Union, Basingstoke: Macrnillan, 1999; Kelemen, Daniel, "The Structure and Dynamics of EU 
Federalism," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 36, No. 112, FebruaryJMarch 2003; Pollack, Mark, 
"The New Institutionalism and EU Governance: The Promise and Limits of Institutionalist Analysis," 
Governance, 9(4), 1996, p. 429-458, and The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency 
and Agenda-Setting in the EU, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002; etc. 
30 Schmitter, Philippe C., "Neo-Neofunctionalism" in Wiener and Diez (eds.), European Integration 
Theory;p. 70. 
31 Schimmelfennig, Frank; "Liberal Intergovernmentalism" in Wiener and Diez (eds.), 2004; p. 86. 

attempts to assess the enlargement's impact on integration restrict themselves to 
enumerating the consequences of one or two enlargement rounds, and then predicting the effects of future rounds (Tsoukalis, ~ildebrandt,~~ 
etc.). Although recent evaluations benefit from the availability of more empirical data, some scholars still explore the subject mostly in a speculative fashion, often relying on metaphors rather than concrete evidence to support their hypotheses (e.g. Zielonka claims that the EU is evolving towards the framework of a "neo-medieval empire"33; Heather Grabbe explains how enlargement changes the "constellations of Europe" in different decision-making areas34; etc.). To produce rigorous arguments, authors frequently concentrate on the consequences of enlargement on one dimension of integration or on a limited category of consequences that adding countries to the EU has on the substance of integration (Schulz and ~iini~~~; etc.). These sector analyses 
~olub~~; provide insight on some facets of the relationship between enlargement and integration; however, they remain unable to present the big picture or reveal something about the general phenomena occurring. 
Coping with Absences, Synthesizing Apprehensions.. . 
While enlargement literature insists on the implications of expansion for joining countries, very few scholars examine the consequences of enlargement on the 
32 Tsoukalis, Loukas, The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement, London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1981;Hildebrandt, What Is Special about Enlarging the European Union Towards the 
East? A Comparison With the Southern Enlargement, Bank of Finland -Institute for Economies in 
Transition, BOFIT, No. 13,2002. 
33 Zielonka, Jan, "Introduction: Boundary making by the European Union" in Zielonka, Jan (ed.) 
Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union, London and New 
York: Routledge; 2002. 
34 Grabbe, Heather, The Constellations of Europe: How Enlargement Will Transform the EU, Centre 
for European Reform, London: CER. 2004. 
35 Schulz, Heiner and Thomas Konig, "Institutional Reform and Decision-Making Efficiency in the 
European Union," in American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 4, October 2000. 
36 ~olub,Jonathan, "In the Shadow of the Vote? Decision Making in the European Community," 
International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 4, Autumn 1999. 

Union itself. My thesis attempts to fill in this gap. Its tentative conclusion that enlargement does not dilute integration contradicts conventional wisdom and current dominant explanations. In the remaining part of this introductory chapter, I summarize the main arguments advanced in common wisdom that oppose my hypothesis, question or refute them, and finally outline my argument and introduce the case studies that will serve to demonstrate it. 
Since my thesis examines the way in which the EU functions (policy-making, the pooling of sovereignty) in relationship with the successive waves of enlargement, some may inscribe it within the rationalist institutionalist approach; however, I will also reveal the ways in which the entrepreneurship of European institutions has influenced the negotiations and accessions of new states to the EU, and how these institutions have capitalized on enlargement as an opportunity to promote integration (a line of action that could be traced to the neo-functionalist school). To explain why the Union has pursued enlargement and integration as related directions of development, I will concentrate on the shared interests of member states. To evaluate the contributions of different states (old and new members) to the progress of integration, I will focus on intergovernmental conferences and treaties. These two final dimensions of my argument echo the intergovernmentalist tradition. 
In sum, since existing theoretical approaches have failed to formulate their perspectives on the subject of this thesis, I attempt to break away from their excessively rigid straightjackets. I derive and combine various relevant elements that have been included and analyzed in neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism and rationalist institutionalism in order to examine enlargement and its consequences comprehensively, from a fresh perspective. In other words, my thesis adopts the lens of common sense instead of the artificial, cumbersome and, until now, ineffective 
theoretical filters that obscure more than facilitate understanding in the case of 
European enlargement. 
John Major must have been rather disconcerted when he realized that adding members to the EU in the 1990s failed to disrupt integration. His initial expectations aligned with conventional wisdom. Increasing heterogeneity in a multi-member entity that h-ies to integrate should reduce the pooling of sovereignty, generate stalemate in decision-making bodies, or even trigger the dissolution of supranational institutions. Conventional wisdom usually advances five arguments that I briefly present and evaluate below. 
One claim is that enlargement should dilute integration because new members do not usually commit to integration as strongly as old members, or because joining countries do not have the capacity to abide by already existing European standards. Referring to the Intergovernmental Convention that preceded the Single European Act of 1986, Dinan claims that "a wide rift had opened between the original member states, which (despite differences over policy and procedure) were developing a greater commitment to European integration, and the later arrivals, which had never subscribed to European integration in the first place."37 The new members' alleged lack of commitment causes difficulties and crises, blocking intergovernmental bargaining and hampering the European Commission's legislative attempts to drive integration forward. I refer to this first claim as the dark myth of the "EU Generation Gap." 
A second claim is that, even if newcomers are generally committed to integration, enlargement increases the diversity of preferences and the number of member state governments coordinating their policies, which generates gridlock. As 
37 Dinan, Desrnond, "Reflections on the IGCs" in Laurent, Pierre-Hemi and Marc Maresceau (eds.), The State of the European Union, Vol. 4: Deepening and Widening; p. 26. 
Schmitter argues, "the sheer number of prospective members [...] threatens to overwhelm the European institution^."^^ Adding new members increases the number of countries able to veto proposals and impede European law-malung. This can suffocate policy areas requiring unanimity in the Council of Ministers. Thus, an enlarged EU increases the chances that legislative initiatives will be vetoed by some relatively disadvantaged member state. Enlargement could slow down the pace of legislative integration: prolonged stalemate could degenerate into severe decision- making crises, which member states could on1:y overcome by diluting integration. 
A third argument is that European enlargement increases competition in old member states due to the free movement of workers, goods, capital, etc. This causes public dissatisfaction in old member states, where interest groups pressure government officials and EU representatives to refrain from engaging in further integration. In this reasoning, the deleterious impact results not because joining countries fail to commit strongly enough to integration, but rather because non- competitive old member states are reluctant to pursue integration in an enlarged union.39 ~n illustration recently used in support of this claim is the rejection of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in France and the Netherlands (two of the original six EC members) in 2005, in two national referenda. 
A fourth argument derived from conventional wisdom is that enlargement will cause conflicts over redistributive transfers of funds, especially when joining members are less developed than the rest of the EU. This creates pressures between the least affluent Member States (e.g. Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece) and new 
38 Schmitter, Philippe, "Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help of New Concepts," in 
Marks, G., Scharpf, F.W., Schmitter, P.C., Streeck, W., (eds.) Governance in the European Union, 
London: Sage Publications, 1998; p. 141. 
39 Moravcsik, Andrew, "Europe's Integration at Century's End in Moravcsik, Andrew (ed.), 

Centralization or Fragmentation? Europe Facing the Challenges of Deepening, Diversity, and Democracy, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998; p. 36-40. 
members (e.g. Eastern European countries). "If the size of the budget remains the 
same, [Southern member states -Spain, Portugal and Greece] understand that they will receive less from it. Some of them would even become net contributors.. . Whatever the outcome of this budgetary discussion, it is clear that the new enlargements will transform the current north-south division (...) into a north-south- east one.. . [Tlhis will increase the potential for conflicts in the EU.. . ,340 An inability to reach consensus over who gets what in an enlarged EU could lead to diluted integration. 
Finally, the fifth claim is that enlargement prevents the European identity from consolidating. Any notion of "us" vs. "them" needs time to crystallize. When it is unclear who is an insider and who is an outsider, or when outsiders become insiders all the time, any sense of collective identity is broken.41 In neo-functionalist terms, enlargement reduces the likelihood of a transfer of loyalties from the national to the European level. For Zielonka, "it is clear that the admission to the EU of several new states from the east and southeast will only co~nplicate the process of creating a European demos, usually seen as a precondition for creation and legitimization of a truly European state."42 This inability to create a European demos could decrease the possibility that EU member states develop conxnon interests and continue to harmonize policies in an increasing number of areas. 
Although plausible on their surface, the above arguments fail to take into account the characteristics and particularities of the EU as a geo-political entity: the voluntary nature of membership, the functioning and preferences of European 
40 Kerremans, Bart, "The Political and Institutional Consequences of Widening: Capacity and Control 
in an Enlarged Council" in Laurent, Pierre-Henri and Marc Maresceau (eds.), The State of the 
European Union, Vol. 4: Deepening and Widening; p. 100. 
41 Zielonka, Jan, Lectures on European Integration, Oxford University, Oxford, UK, Hilary Term, 
2005. 
42 Zielonka, Jan, "How New Enlarged Borders Will Reshape the European Union," 2001; p. 514. 

institutions, the paramount importance of pre-accession negotiations with candidate countries, the fact that enlargement breaks institutional inertia and represents an opportunity for Union reform, or the fact that the effects of enlargement often cannot be entirely disentangled and isolated for analytical purposes from the broader phenomena associated with globalization. Furthermore, most claims rest on the unsubstantiated assumption that newcomers will act as a bloc once they join the EU, since they are allegedly homogeneous in terms of policy preferences. Hildebrandt, for instance, asserts: "An alliance of new member states from the east might also arise due to similar interests they share, in particular because of their lower income levels and dominant agrarian sectors."43 In her detailed analysis of the last wave of enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, Heather Grabbe contradicts this premise and concludes that new members do not form an 'eastern bloc' that votes together, because the joining countries' views and interests are in fact far from identical. "The December 2003 European Council confirmed that co-operation among the newcomers is unlikely to strengthen. They failed to present a common front despite the new members' attempts to form a ~oalition."~~ 
Aside from this inaccurate premise underlying most of them, each of the five statements deriving from conventional wisdom suffers from other significant flaws and omissions. The first claim ignores the fact that the candidate countries themselves initiate enlargement by applying for membership. An initial commitment to integration clearly exists since joining the Union is voluntary. Also, during negotiations and accession, the countries' capacity to adopt EU legislation and standards increases, due to the financial and technical assistance newcomers receive 
43 Hildebrandt, Antje, What Is Special about Enlarging the European Union Towards the East? A 
Comparison With the Southern Enlargement; p. 14-15. 
44 Grabbe, Heather, The Constellations of Europe: How Enlargement Will Transform the EU, Centre 
for European Reform, London: CER. 2004; p. 55. 

from old members and Union institutions. Grabbe points out that, "generally, the new 
members tend to be more pro-reform than manly of the older member-states."45 
Pre-enlargement empirical studies concerning the preferences of acceding Central and Eastern European countries have concluded that "the candidate countries are clearly more enthusiastic about centralized EU decisions than current member states."46 Ahrens and Meurers, for instance, analyze twenty-five key policy areas.47 Their results indicate that candidates prefer EU decision-making to national decision- making in twenty-one of the twenty-five examined areas; in comparison, older members favor decisions at the European level for only eleven sectors. The joining members' technical difficulties in adjusting to European requirements may actually bolster rather than obstruct integration, as they can trigger increases in EU authority: "A natural explanation for [the result of Ahrens and Meurers' study] is the candidates' desire to have certain issues administered by EU institutions, where national authorities do not have the capacity yet."48 
The second argument does not take into account the particularities of EU decision-making. If gridlock occurs in the Council of Ministers or the European Parliament, this does not block the activity of the Commission or the European Court of Justice (both bodies are supranational and committed to promoting integration). As many institutionalist scholars note, gridlock in the legislative branch of government 
45 Grabbe, The Constellations of Europe; p. 46. 
46 Ahrens, Joachim and Martin Meurers, "Beyond the Big-Bang Enlargement of the EU: Preferences 
and the Need for Flexibility," Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development, Institutions in 
Transition 2003; Internet resource: http://www.gov.si/umar/conference/2003/papers/~ens-
Meurers.pdf; p. 20. 
47 The 25 examined policy areas were: agriculture & fishing; currency; environment; regional aid; 
foreign policy; immigration; unemployment; justice; health and social welfare; education; police; 
defense; exploitation of human beings; information EU; organized crime; juvenile crime; urban crime; 
drugs; humanitarian aid; poverty/social exclusion; political asylum; accepting refugees; research; 
cultural policy; and the media. 
48 Ahrens and Meurers. ibidem. 

often leads to increases in bureaucratic and judiciary di~cretion.~~ 
In the EU, stalemate 
in law-making could give the European Commiission and the Court of Justice more discretion to stimulate integration through their decisions and interpretations of existing EU laws. 
Enlargements typically entail institutional modifications and reforms. Some adjustments give representation to newcomers, while simultaneously ensuring a fair and proportional influence for old member states. Such changes can generate a more time-consuming law-making process. For instance, the Treaty of Nice established three criteria for adopting legislation in the Council: weighted votes, majority of countries and majority of the population.50 Although this formula represented the best compromise member states could reach, the triple majority requirement renders it more difficult for the Council to produce legisliation. It calls for a qualified majority slightly larger than before (73.91%),an absolute majority of countries and, at a country's request, a 62% majority of the EU population. 
Also, by empowering the European Parliament, Nice increased the number of institutions that actively participate in decision-making. Under the reformed codecision procedure, the EP and the Council have essentially equal legislative power. Although the move from unanimity to qualified-majority voting (QMV) in a large number of issues has somewhat accelerated the EU's legislative process, "the increase in power of the EP has added another layer of complexity and another veto player to the legislative process."51 Some scholars argue that the shift from unanimity to QMV in the Council constitutes an inefficient strategy for avoiding stalemate, 
49 Kelemen, R. Daniel, "The Structure and Dynamics of EU Federalism," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 36, No. 112, FebruaryIMarch 2003 
Tsebelis, George and Xenophon Yataganas, "Veto Players and Decision-Making in the EU after Nice: Policy Stability and Bureaucratic/Judicial Discretion," Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2002; p. 283. 
Kelemen, Daniel, "The Structure and Dynamics of EU Federalism"; p. 197. 
since, in practice, whenever country representatives discuss a legislative proposal, 
they try to achieve consensus before voting, regardless of the voting procedure required by the Treaty. Overall, conclude Tsebelis and Yataganas, "Nice produced a legislative system with high viscosity."52 
The empirical studies of Golub (1999; 2002) show that, paradoxically, successive enlargements did not increase decision-making time, but instead reduced it by stimulating the replacement of unanimity with qualified-majority voting. QMV, as Golub and Schulz and Konig (2000) prove, had positive effects on European law- making. These scholars conclude that it was not enlargement, but rather the EP empowerment achieved through the institutional reforms of 1987 and 1992, that encumbered European policy-making. These nnodifications were necessary given that the EU does not focus only on rapid law-making, but also on democratic values and legitimacy. Schulz and Konig conclude that these are "the costs of increasing the democratic accountability of EU institutions in terns of decision-malung efficiency."53 
Increasing the number of countries capable of vetoing legislative proposals can cause deadlock in Council, due to the triple-majority requirements. Comparing the EU with a federal polity, Kelemen notices that the "fragmentation of power at the federal level influences the means by which authority is transferred to the federal level. As the number of veto players or the size of the majority necessary to pass legislation increases, legislation becomes more difficult to enact."54 Member states try to reach consensus before voting, but an enlarged Union will reach agreement with more difficulty. To avoid costly, prolonged and often fruitless negotiations, 
52 Tsebelis and Yataganas, 2002; p, 304. 
53 Schulz, Heiner and Thomas Kijnig, "Institutional Reform and Decision-Making Efficiency in the 
European Union"; p. 664. 
54 Kelemen; p. 189. 

government representatives on the Council may stop trying to achieve consensus and 
simply resort to voting instead, as a less time-consuming decision-making strategy. Hence, QMV could gain a significance and substance it has never had before. 
Even if Union heterogeneity or Parliamentary powers increase to a point where legislative decision-mahg becomes more time consuming, this slowdown will not necessarily have a negative impact on integration. A slackening in legislative decision-making tempo could increase executive and judicial discretion (the Commission and the ECJ). Yet, these are precisely the two "most far-reaching commitment institutions of any recent regional integration scheme," indeed, the institutional catalysts of European integration, according to ~attli.'~ 
The "stickiness" of legislation and treaty provisions affords the European executive and judiciary "considerable discretion and [allows] them to work to expand the scope of EU a~thorit~."'~ 
The third argument does not stand, because it identifies the wrong causes for noticeable realities. Competition has been increasing in old member states not as a result of enlargement per se, but primarily as a consequence of globalization. The phenomenon is not unique to the EU; in fact, similar realities and public reactions can be noticed in the United States. Popular dissatisfaction about unemployment in France can be attributed more to the large and constantly increasing number of immigrants from Northern Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) than to the relatively modest movements of Southern or Eastern ~uro~eans.'~ 
The connection between increased competition and EU enlargement is overplayed at the level of popular perceptions 
55 Mattli; p. 100. 
56 Kelemen; p. 197. 
57 Observateur OCDE Nr. 243,"Migration dans 1'Europe Clargie," Direction de l'emploi, du travail et 
des affaires sociales; May 2004;p. 28 -Internet source: 
http://www.observateurocde.org/news/fullstory.php/aid~l010/~gration~dans~l%92Europe~%E9largie 

.html 
because national governments use the Union, in general, and enlargement, in 
particular, as convenient scapegoats for public dissatisfaction, instead of assuming responsibility and seeking solutions. The refrain that European politicians embrace when they address their national audiences seems to be: whatever IT is, blame IT on enlargement! 
Studies examining the effects of previous enlargements have shown that widespread fears about the impact of EU expansion on national economies were greatly exaggerated and largely unfounded. For instance, after Greece, Spain and Portugal joined the Union, no waves of migrant workers disrupted the economies of old member states, despite the fact that the Mediterranean newcomers were significantly less affluent than older members. The Economist points out the following in relation to Central and Eastern European enlargement and the transition periods imposed to joining ex-communist cou~itries: "Spain and Portugal have set an encouraging precedent. They, too, started off with a seven-year transition period on the free movement of labour, but fears of a flood of migrants pouring into France and Italy were soon found to be misplaced, as were fears of a backlash against migrant labour."58 
Also, attributing the failure of the Constitution for Europe solely (or even primarily) to popular resistance to integration in an enlarged EU is overly simplistic. A complex set of more or less interrelated factors brought about the French "Non" and the Dutch "Nee7' in the respective referenda. While the menace of excessive enlargement has been invoked to persuade voters to oppose the Constitution, this element should be understood in its intricate interaction with other factors. 
58 Survey: European Union Enlargement -"Reasons of State," The Economist, May 17,2001; Internet source: http://www.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?story~id=622780 
Electorates often express their frustration with national politics and the parties in power by rejecting EU proposals in referenda, without paying attention to the actual substantive content of the documents, simply because European initiatives have been previously negotiated and approved by distrusted political elites. In an analysis of the popular protest movement that accompanied the rejection of the Constitution for Europe in the 2005 referenda in France and the Netherlands, BBC's world affairs correspondent, Paul Reynolds, remarked that the vote "appeared to have little to do with the constitution itself," and that among the primary causes for rejection were the widespread "distrust of the political elite" and the fact that "the constitution is an impenetrable document besides which the Da Vinci Code is simplicity itself."59 
In fact, had the document been more comprehensible, European citizens would have realized that the modifications it proposed were far from ground-breaking. The common mistake underlying both rejections was the widespread idea that this was a very important treaty. If anything, the Constitution for Europe was a symbolic document; in practice, European treaties already function as a de facto constitution of the European Union. Most new principles included in the document were simple codifications of already functioning unwritten (customary) European lines of policy- and law-making. More broadly, in the rigorous terms of international law, the title of the document itself indicates a symbolic rather than actual significance: this was clearly not a Constitution for Europe (although this was the short name by which the document has been referred to); instead, it was just another treaty, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for ~uro~e.~' 
59 Reynolds, Paul, "People's Protest EU-style," BBC News, June 1,2005; Internet source: http://news.bbc.co.uMl/hi/world/europe/4600099.stm 60 Conclusions of the Round Table -Discussion on the French and Dutch Referenda, Oxford University, Oxford, UK; May 2005; participants Dr. Stephen Weatherill, Dr. Daniel Kelemen, Dr. Jan Zielonka. 
Attempting to identify the "fuelling force" behind the rejection, Stephen 
Mulvey noted: "France and the Netherlands in 2005 clearly have some things in common, including a poorly performing economy and a deeply unpopular government -in the Dutch case, the most unpopular government on re~ord."~' In the Netherlands, Michiel van Hulten, the leader of the Better Europe foundation and an ex-member of the European Parliament, emphasized that citizens rejected the Constitution not because they opposed the idea of a united Europe per se, but to express their dissatisfaction with the fact that the EU is developing as a project of the elites: "the message from France and the Netherlands is that they are unhappy with the way Europe is being built (...).People are unhappy with the fact that Europe is a project of the elite, not the ordinary people."62 
The fourth claim is also questionable. While arguments over redistributive transfers do occur, old members and candidate countries settle these conflicts during negotiations for accession. Usually the EU will allow for long transition periods and temporarily limit benefits for joining members (e.g. direct payments to farmers in Central and Eastern European joining members were phased in over a ten-year period starting at 25% of EU level in 2004 and reaching 100% in 2013). 
Finally, the fifth claim deriving from conventional wisdom fails to take into account the EU's possible directions for future development as a geo-political entity. While it is true that a coherent and strong European demos does not exist, the conclusion that the EU suffers from a severe identity problem stems from the fact that political analysts fail to acknowledge the degree to which the European integration project differs from other regional integration schemes and from emerging federal arrangements (confederations, federations). The mistaken stances result from the '' Mulvey, Stephen, "Varied Reasons behind Dutch "No"," BBC News; Amsterdam, June 1,2005; 
Internet source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world~europe/460173l.stm 62 Mulvey, Stephen; ibidem. 
incapacity to "mentally supersede the limits imposed by the nation-state upon our 
habitual ways of thinlung about 
Zielonka emphasizes that enlargement reduces the EU's chances to become a Westphalian type of state64; however, such statements should not delude anyone into thinking that the European project has ever evolved towards that framework in the first place. While a European identity may exist in a cultural sense, it does not exist politically, especially not in the sense of a connection between a unified European identity and the EU. Loyalty transfers, the shifts in public allegiance from domestic to European institutions that neofunctionalists 1ik.e Ernst Haas predicted, did not occur. Citizens remain essentially ignorant about EU governance and its intricate mechanisms. Although constituencies in each EU country directly elect the members of the European Parliament, voter turnout remains low, and candidates predicate their election campaigns on domestic rather than European issues. While this may change in the future due to the entrepreneurial efforts of European institutions, populations in old member states seem less thrilled about ideintifying themselves as European than the citizens of joining countries. 
The lack of a European demos does not prevent the EU from representing a successful integration scheme. Abandoning the Westphalian state paradigm and advocating for an open-minded analysis that encompasses 'post-sovereign, polycentric, incongruent, neo-medieval' arrangements, Schmitter claims that the most probable trajectory for the EU is one leading to an entirely new geo-political structure, a condominio. Schmitter defines a condominio~as the exact opposite of a centralized Eurocracy, characterized by clearly defined membership and territorial boundaries, and accumulating organizationally distinct but politically coordinated functions 
63 Schrnitter; 1998;p. 131 64 Zielonka, 2001; p. 5 15. 
around a single nucleus of authority. Condominio is "the most unprecedented, even 
unimaginable outcome" for the Euro-polity, an entity based on "variation in both territorial and functional con~tituencies,"~~ 
a set of multiple, superimposed and partially overlapping Europes with "dispersed (.. .) domains" and "incongruent memberships."" 
Kalypso Nicolaidis argues that the EU has "established itself as a new kind of political community: one that is defined not by a uniform identity -a demos -but by the persistent plurality of its peoples"67 [demoi-the Greek plural form]. Consequently, one should not perceive enlargement as a process that inherently dilutes integration. Certainly, adjustments are needed to accommodate divergent national interests and reach agreements on controversial issues, but this has been a characteristic of European integration since its beginnings. Coining a new term to describe the Union's uniqueness, Nicolaidis writes: 
The EU is neither a union of democracies nor a union as democracy; it is a union of states and of peoples -a "demoicracy"-in the making. It appeals to a political philosophy of its own -transnational pluralism -rather than to some extended notion of the nation-state.@ 
An important qualification is necessary. While the absence of a European demos does not directly hamper the functioning of the Union, extremist politicians resort to anti-EU demagoguery and stir up xenophobic sentiments in connection to the transfer of power from the national to the European level and the free movement of European citizens within the Schengen zone, respectively. In domestic politics, nationalist rhetoric frequently uses enlargement as a scarecrow, a second-best only to globalization. In that limited sense related to extremist political discourses and the 
65 Schrnitter; 1998; p. 136. 
66 Schmitter; ibidem. 
67 Nicolaidis, Kalypso, "We, the Peoples of Europe.. .," Foreign Affairs, 83, Vol. 6, 
November/December 2004; p. 101. 

Nicolai&s; ibidem. 
perceptions they try to instill and fuel among certain segments of the national 
electorates, adding new members to the EU may be used by radical politicians as a tool to increase apprehension and other negative reactions to the idea of an ever-closer and ever-larger Europe. As the Economist pointed out, Jorg Haider, despite eventually declaring himself in favor of EU enlargement, stirred up xenophobia and anti- European feelings in his electoral campaigns iin Austria. In the context of the simultaneous phenomena of globalization and European integration, populist agitation at the domestic level might constitute a potential obstacle to the future progress of economic and political interdependence in Europe. The Economist quoted Angelika Volle of the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin, who worried that enlargement might produce a "Haiderisation of European politics,"69 an excessive revival of the European nationalisms. 
Contrary to Volle's fears, the most recent wave of enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe has not triggered any obvious upsurge in radical nationalism or anti-EU feelings. However, the full impact of EU expansion on popular perceptions will only become evident over the next years, after the transition periods that temporarily limit the citizens7 freedom of movement between new and old members states come to an end. At any rate, diue to the current absence of empirical data and the ensuing difficulties in differentiating between the consequences of EU enlargement and globalization in the post-Cold War era, a thorough study examining the way in which enlargement influences popu~lar perceptions of European integration, on the one hand, and political discourses (in particular, populist demagoguery and nationalist rhetoric), on the other, falls beyond the scope of this thesis. 
69 Survey: European Union Enlargement -"Reasons of State," The Economist, May 17,2001;Internet source: http://www.economist.cods~~veys/&splaystory.cfm?story~id=622780 

Structure 
To demonstrate that enlargement does not dilute European integration, this thesis relies on four tests: 
1. 	
a historical analysis of the relationship between enlargement and integration from the beginnings of the Community until the present stage of political and economic Union (this test establishes a general timeline for understanding the parallel advanceiment of enlargement and integration -the latter measured as European formal authority); 

2. 	
a comparative analysis of old and ]new member contributions to European integration (this test debunks the "European Generation Gap" myth); 

3. 	
an analysis of the accession process (this test examines how enlargement shapes acceding members, on the one hand, and the Union itself, on the other); and 

4. 	
an attempt to examine and anticipate the impact of enlargement on integration from a broader comparative perspective, predicated on defining the EU as a geo-political entity (this test tries to identify equivalents of the integration-enlargement relationship in polities that resemble the EU, in order to draw lessons about the pos,sible consequences of increasing membership). 


The first substantive chapter analyzes European treaties and their contribution to integration. There have been five major treaties in EU history apart from the TEC: the Merger Treaty (1968), the Single European Act (1986), the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht, 1992), the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty of Nice (2001). These major reforms of European legislation provided opportunities for member states to consolidate integration, accelerate it or, alternatively, to slow its 
pace down. Taking the treaties as historical landmarks, I examine the effects of 
enlargement on European formal authority and structure my discussion around three analytical categories that reflect the evolution of integration: expandinglreducing European powers; creating new institutions/dismantling existent institutions; and reforming decision-making processes. Did addling new members to the Union lead to a reduction of EU authority? Did Treaties that succeeded enlargement transfer power from European institutions back to national governments? Did member states dismantle supranational decision-making bodies? If so, there would be evidence for a correlation between enlargement and disintegration. However, if Treaties, regardless of whether the Union had previously enlarged or not, systematically increased the pooling of sovereignty and set up new supranational institutions; if supranational voting mechanisms (QMY)replaced intergovernmental schemes (unanimity) in European decision-making; if the European project continued without significant disruptions; then there is little historical evidence of a correlation between enlargement and EU disintegration. 

Table 2. The Evolution of Integration: European 
Treaties and Amendments 

I. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Rome Treaty) -1957 
11. The Mereer Treatv -1968 
111. Single European Act (SEA) -1986 
IV.
Treaty on European Union (Maastricht 

V. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) -1997 


I VI. The Treaty of Nice -2001 I 
The second substantive chapter challenges the popular myth concerning the "EU Generation Gap." According to this legend, old members are always more committed to integration than new members. To debunk this central pillar of integration folklore, I examine comparatively the record of old and new members in 
terms of favorable attitudes towards European integration. My hunch is that the old 
members' record is far from spotless, while newcomers often make significant contributions to advancing the pooling of sovereignty. If new members contribute to increases in EU powers by adding their preferences onto the European agenda, enlargement has actively stimulated progress in integration. Furthermore, if new members support the pooling of sovereignty in areas in which old members oppose it, again enlargement is more beneficial than harmful to EU development. 
The format, process and outcome of accession negotiations constitute the object of the third chapter. Schmitter points out that neo-functionalists could derive the following prediction from the actual experiences of expansion: "enlargement attenuates and delays the probability of spill-over -unless such a spill-over in task or authority is built into the negotiations surrounding the accession process as a means of compensating existing members or accommodating new ones."70 My claim that adding countries to the EU does not dilute integration would be supported if an analysis of pre-accession negotiations and post-accession developments demonstrates that bargaining strategies applied by old member states and European institutions protect integration. 
What provisions facilitating post-enlargement integration could reveal in the negotiations a concern to accommodate new members? Such measures would attempt to help joining members overcome the gap between them and the old members, or to force new members to adopt European standards. What provisions could compensate existing members? Intergovernmentalism offers an answer. Mattli argues that non- members become interested in acquiring EU membership due to the negative effects of European integration on the outsiders7 economies and the persistent 'performance 
'O Schmitter, 2004; p. 70. 
gap' between members and non-members. "Outsider governments are willing to pay 
the price of integration, i.e. reduced autonomy, to the extent that membership will improve their economic performance and thus their chance of retaining power."71 Moravcsik relates the interest for accession to economic concerns also, as he analyzes the British accession in his book The Choice for ~uro~e.~~ 
Applying bargaining theory to Eastern enlargement, he argues elsewhere that "applicant countries have consistently found themselves in a weak negotiating position vis-8-vis their EU partners, and accordingly have conceded much in exchange for membership."73 While enlargement benefits both old and new members, joining countries generally gain more as they establish a relationship of asymmetrical interdependence with the more developed cou~ntries in the Union. For these superior benefits derived from EU capital and the single market, new members have to pay a "price": accepting a set of tough conditions to avoid exclusion from the club. These conditions "include not only the adoption of the acquis communautaire [European legislation] but also initially lower subsidies from the EU budget [than the subsidies received by old members] and transition periods on some rights such as the free movement of labour."74 
Therefore, if during negotiations the EU makes take-it-or-leave-it offers to candidate countries that differ economically and politically from member states, these strict accession requirements minimize the negative impact that enlargement may have on integration. In fact, the less developed (and less affluent) the country, the stricter and less generous the offer it receives upon accession should be. Strict 
"Mattli's conclusions summarized by Schimmelfennig, 2004; p. 86. 
72 Moravcsik, Andrew, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998. 
73 Moravcsik, Andrew, and Milada Vachudova, "Bargaining Among Unequals: Enlargement and the 
Future of European Integration" in EUSA Review; 2002; 15 (4), 1; p. 3-5. 
74 Schimmelfennig; 2004; p. 87. 

requirements, as well as financial and technical assistance, would reduce the absolute 
differences between new and old members; whereas the fewer advantages offered to joining countsies upon accession would decrease the difference in benefits between old and new members. Hence, old members would perceive a lesser relative disadvantage and focus instead on the absolute benefits enlargement brings. This is precisely the compensation I attempt to demonstrate. 
Consequently, my third chapter analyzes the extent to which negotiations for the last enlargement (Eastern European countsies) reduced differences between new and old members before the former joined the Union. It also compares these negotiations with those preceding other expansions. If via negotiations, the EU imposed stricter requirements and offered Eastern European countries less generous incentives to join, then pre-enlargement bargaining has counterbalanced and eliminated some negative consequences that excessive heterogeneity could have had on integration. The more the relationship between joining and old members is one of asymmetrical interdependence, the stricter I expect the requirements to be. 
Finally, my fourth chapter approaches the relationship between enlargement and integration from a wider comparative and interdisciplinary perspective that combines political science with history and legal studies. This chapter attempts to define the EU as a geo-political entity by comlsaring and contrasting it with other political forms, present and past: international organizations, federations, confederations, empires. If the EU can be classified under an existing category, we can derive lessons about the effects of enlargeiment on integration from equivalent processes of territorial expansion. Since European integration has often been associated with the centralization process in a federation, this chapter includes an 
analysis of enlargement and integration from the perspective of comparative federalism. Finally, the analysis detaches itself from the Westphalian state paradigm 
to examine the unique features of the EU from a more flexible pre-Westphalian and post-modern perspective. 
Had the initial community of six not decided to enlarge, the European project would have been inherently limited. The EU could not have gained its current influence in the international political arena. Had old member states established a "fortress Europe," the Community would have remained a regional integration project dominated by France and Gemany. Europe could not have progressed from Community to Union: it would have been ludicrous for such a small group of states to claim it represented an entire continent. The "ever-closer union" has opted for enlargement and pursued it as complementary to the pooling of sovereignty. My thesis explores the consequences and implications of this choice for an enlarging and evolving united Europe. 
CHAPTER I 
The Enlargement Menace? A History of European Integration 

Had the European Union just emerged as a structure or had its membership remained constant, the lack of experience with. territorial expansion would impede attempts to analyze the impact of enlargement on the pooling of sovereignty. Thankfully for this thesis, half a century of European integration history, in which the Union's membership increased through several waves of accession from the initial six up to the present twenty-five states, provides insights on some possible effects of expansion. Yet one of the main obstacles to drawing lessons from the past results from the difficulty to identify a reliable measure for integration. This Achilles' heel of integration theory is commonly known as the dependent variable pr~blem'.~' Since political science has not developed until now a set of indicators for the European pooling of sovereignty, I follow the example of numerous scholars who use the formal authority of European institutions as the most reliable measure for integrati~n.~~ 
In the ECIEU, institutions have represented a key to successful integration. Jean Monnet, one of the Community's founding fathers, believed that "only institutions grow wiser; [because] they accumulate collective experience."77 
In March 1957, the prime ministers and foreign ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands gathered in Rome to sign the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (TEC). This document represented the fifth attempt to establish a community of Eiuropean countries in the 1950s, and became the foundation on which the European integration process later developed. The subsequent treaties of the "ever-closer Union" emerged as amendments to the 
75 Rosamond, Theories of European Integration; p. 11. 
76 Desmond Dinan; Ben Rosamond; Simon Hix; Andrew Moravcsik; Kalypso Nicolaidis etc. 
77 Monnet, Jean, Memoirs (translation R. Mayne), New York: Doubleday and Company, 1978;p. 393. 

Rome Treaty. They expanded European powers, added new institutions to the original framework, reformed decision-making processes or even reconfigured the entire European project, as was the case with the Treaty of Maastricht. Indeed, treaties constitute the landmarks of integration history: they mark moments when member states evaluated the EC's past performance and decided on the future directions of European cooperation. 
EU treaty reforms derive from national and European assessments of progress and modify the Community's structure, authority and prospects for development based on the member states' preferences. As such, amendments constitute potential opportunities for integration as well as disintegration, for centralization as well as fragmentation. If enlargement generally hampers integration, an analysis of EU treaties should reveal disruptions in the states' willingness to pool sovereignty and coordinate their policies after each expansion. If, however, adding new members to the Union does not have such direct and clear effects, EU history indirectly supports the assertion that enlargement does not dilute integration. 
This chapter presents a synopsis of European integration history to reveal whether or not the successive enlargements disrupted the development of the Union's formal powers. To describe how EU formal authority has evolved from the establishment of the European Community until the present, I use the six European treaties as main landmarks: the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (TEC; Rome, 1957); the 1968 Merger Treaty; the Single European Act (SEA; Brussels, 1986); the Treaty on Europeain Union (TEU; Maastricht, 1992); the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997); and the Treaty of Nice (2001). 
I structure my discussion of European formal authority in integration history around three analytical categories: expandinglireducing European powers; creating 
new institutions/dismantling existent institutions; and reforming decision-makmg 
processes. Each represents a central dimension of integration that has evolved from the Treaty of Rome up to the present. In this chapter, I trace the chronological evolution of these categories talung the six European treaties as primary landmarks and adding other relevant documents to the analysis in cases when modifications occurred during the periods between major treaties. 
Did the members of an enlarged Union1 usually opt for a slow-down in the pace of integration? Did Treaties following enlargements dilute integration in some policy areas? Did member states decide to weaken or completely dismantle European institutions as a result of enlargement? Did coiuntries substitute intergovernmental voting mechanisms (e.g. unanimity voting) for supranational decision-making schemes (e.g. qualified majority voting)? Did they shift power from supranational to intergovernmental European institutions? If these phenomena occurred systematically in the post-enlargement periods, then historical evidence indicates a strong correlation between adding new members to the Union and the dilution of integration. If, regardless of enlargements, treaties increased the EU's formal authority, then there is little proof supporting the hypothesis of a causal relationship; i.e. that increases in Union membership generate severe disintegration. Apart from showing that enlargement has not led to disintegration, I describe the sets of international circumstances (e.g. economic, political, social elements) unrelated to the EC/EU7s increasing membership that contributed decisively to stagnation. 
The overview of the three analytical categories will provide the big picture of EU evolution. I complement my analysis of the first category (expandinglreducing European powers) by a second type of overview that shows how member states have delegated over time increasingly more powers to European institutions in a representative set of policy-making areas. I use the data compiled by Philippe Schmitter in his seminal "Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help of New Schmitter examines the levels of authority retained by states andfor delegated to European institutions in a representative set of policy areas grouped under four titles: economic issue areas, socio-cultural issue areas, political and constitutional issues and international relations/external security issues. He gives scores from 1 to 5 to each policy sector. A score of "1" indicates an issue area in which all policy decisions remain at the nationial level. A score of "5" marks an area where all policy decisions are delegated to the EC level. Intermediary scores show variations on this continuum, with a "3" indicating policy decisions at both national 
and Community level. Schmitter assesses these levels of authority in six different years in EU history: 1950, 1957, 1968, 1970, 11992, and 2001. 
I develop Schmitter's table by adding more recent data for 2004, as well as for other policy areas:9 and use the revised table to assess the effects of European enlargement. Any severe disruption in the progress of integration would appear on the chart as a decrease in the score given to one or more policy areas. If scores are more likely to drop after enlargements than in periods of constant membership, then increasing membership may play a role in reversing the pooling of sovereignty. Conversely, if scores do not decrease after necv members join the EU, then the tentative conclusion of this thesis is supported. 
Schmitter, Philippe, "Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help of New Concepts," in Marks, Gary, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), Governance in the European Union, London: Sage Publications, 1998; p. 1125-6. 79 The added information is compiled from HIX,Simon, The Political System of the European Union, 2nd edition, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005; p. 20-21; and Donohue, J. D. and Pollack, M. A,,"Centralization and Its Discontents: The Rhythms of Federalism in the United States and the European Union" in Nicolai'dis, Kalypso and R. House (eds.), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union, Oxford :Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Expanding/Reducinn European Powers 
The history of integrating and expandiiig European powers began long before the Rome Treaty. In the interwar period, as the traumatic recollection of the Great War haunted the world, the idea of building a united Europe emerged as a possible strategy to secure peace and stability on the continent. In 1923,the Pan-Europa movement led by count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi published an influential book (Pan-Europa)calling for a federal union of European states centered on France and Germany. Although ephemeral, the Pan-Euroya movement proposed a theoretical solution that grew more plausible and appealing as a result of World War 11: a united Europe could snip in the bud the virulent nationalism of European countries, thereby annulling potential sources of future conflict on the Old Continent. 
In the early Cold War era, many feared1 German resurgence, internal Communist subversion or external Soviet aggression. "Coping with the consequences of the war and an emerging threat from the East, Western European countries desperately sought economic recovery, political stability, and military security."80 Looking for a common strategy, the United States and Western Europe rediscovered and revived -the former enthusiastically, the latter reluctantly -the concept of European unity and interdependence. The US supported the idea of a united Europe to "enhance regional security and accelerate ecoriomic recovery, although Europeans were ambivalent about sharing national sovereignty."81 
To foster cooperation, America granted aid through the Marshall Plan only when Western European countries submitted joint assistance requests. "US policy and 
80 Dinan, Desmond, Europe Recast: A History of European Union, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004; p. 13. Dinan, Desmond, Europe Recast; idem. 
the Marshall Plan pushed Europe towards an integrated and multilateral future.. ."82 Responding to US insistence that Europe should develop its own integration plan, France came up with an original initiative, the Schuman Declaration of May 1950, which proposed the establishment of a European coal and steel organization, with a clear supranational rather than intergovernmental profile. The approach combined economic, political and social objectives. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) would ensure "the modernization of production and the improvement of its quality; the supply of coal and steel on equal terms to the French and German markets 
[.. . and] to those of the [other] member countries; and the equalization as well as the improvement in the living standards and working conditions in those industries." Schuman connected the initiative to ambitious plans for future European integration, declaring that the Community would "lay the first concrete foundation for a European Federation which is so indispensable for the preservation of peace."s3 
Negotiations began in 1950. The ratification started in 195 1, and the Community started functioning in August 1952. Its primary goal was creating a single market in coal and steel by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers, such as price fixing, turnover and sales taxes, subsidies, etc. European authorities did not intend to establish an unregulated market: they tried to improve productivity, rationalize distribution, safeguard employment, equalize working conditions and minimize economic dislocation. 84 
In parallel with the negotiations for a coal and steel organization, the Six drafted an accord to establish a European Defense Community and a European 
82 Killick, John, The United States and European Reconstruction, 1945-1960, Edinburgh: Keele 
University Press, 1997; p. 185. 
83 Schuman, Robert, "Declaration of 9 May 1950," in The Origins and Development of European 
Integratiorz: A Reader and Commentary, Peter M.R. Stirk and David Weigall (eds.), London: Pinter, 
1999;p. 76. Text of the Schuman Declaration: Stirk and Weigall (eds.), The Origins and Development 
of European Integration; p. 75-6. 
84 Dinan, Desmond, Europe Recast; p. 52. 

Political Community. Those initiatives, however, were defeated by the French 
National Assembly's failure to ratify the Defense Community treaty in 1954. Instead of using the EDC as a vehicle for rehabilitation, Germany acquired NATO membership and received the right to remilitarize under the umbrella of the intergovernmental Western European Union in 1955. 
Later in the decade, the ECSC member states wanted to maximize their economic benefits. Moreover, pressure from the Soviet Union was increasing. The Six decided to pursue integration by creating two ]new European communities: a European Economic Community that would establish a customs union (the forerunner of the common market), and a European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Representatives from all member states signecl the two treaties in Rome in 1957, and the communities started functioning a year later. 
The TEC revolutionized European politics: it included provisions for a customs union (to be established by 1968), a common commercial policy, a common agricultural policy, a common transport policy, competition policy, macroeconomic coordination, and limited monetary cooperatioln. Both France and Germany supported the idea of common market: France insisted on integrating agricultural markets and Germany advocated for a common industrial market. The treaty also marked the beginnings of European integration in terms of social policy: a provision called for the establishment of a European Social Fund to contribute to retraining and other assistance to workers.85 The TEC included tentative provisions on the free movement of persons, services and capital among member states. 
In the 1960s, the European Community started to forcefully assert its presence in the international political arena. In the Kennedy Round of the General Agreement 
85 Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 77. 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, 1967), the Community was already acting as a bloc that advanced a common EC negotiating position defending the common agricultural policy and industrial tariff cuts. The EC signed association agreements with Greece and Turkey (calling for a customs union and, in the case of the former, eventual membership), as well as with seventeen African countries and Madagascar (establishing a free trade area and granting aid through a development fund). 
The Community abolished internal tariffs on industrial goods by 1968 and established a common external tariff. To fight economic instability, the Six launched in 1971 a plan for economic and monetary union (Em)with a target date of 1980. The EMU aimed at setting fixed exchange rates, a common monetary policy, and a single monetary authority. 
Politically, the Community initiated European Political Cooperation in 1970 to improve the flow of information among member states on foreign policy matters and help them to formulate joint positions.86 After the Helsinki Accords, Political Cooperation allowed the Community to acquire a prominent political profile at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, where EC member states coordinated their positions. 
At the time of the first enlargement, the EC faced unfavorable international circumstances. The international monetary crises of the early 1970s as well as the oil crisis of 1973 destabilized the fledgling economic and monetary union. By that point, there had been intra-Community dissensions about European institutions and their functions; the necessity of economic convergence; and the desirability of a common currency. Germany and the Netherlands insisted that economic policy convergence had to precede monetary union; France and Belgium, the countries with chronic 
86 Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 142. 
balance-of-payments deficits, claimed that monetary union would trigger economic 
convergence. International troubles accentuated internal conflicts. "Recession and spiraling inflation hastened economic divergence among member states.7787 Nevertheless, in 1973, member states reiterated their commitment to EMU and its established timetable. As they failed to keep up with the schedule, EC leaders had to admit in 1974 that "internal and international difficulties have prevented the accomplishment of expected progress on the road to EMU."" 
Following the oil crisis, energy policy also languished, as member states failed to find a path to common action. The Commission submitted to the Council the First Guidelines for a Common Energy Policy in 1968, and in the early 1970s, after British insistence, the 1972 Paris cornmuniquC called for "the Community institutions to formulate as soon as possible an energy policy guaranteeing certain and lasting supplies under satisfactory economic condition^."^^ 
Despite unfavorable circumstances, the Community made substantial progress in many policy areas: customs, industry, social, environmental and regional policy. European customs legislation developed in 1968-1969 after the completion of the customs union. The Council adopted an action program for industrial policy and a program on the harmonization of member states' laws to promote and maintain the common market. A social action program, adopted in 1974, promoted employment, the improvement of living and working conditions, worker participation in industrial decision-making and equal treatment of men and women in the workplace. The EC developed its first Environmental Action Program in 1973, and a second one followed in 1977, as the environmental movement gathered momentum throughout Western 
87 Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 145. 
European Commission, Eighth Report on the General Activities of the European Communities, Luxembourg: European Communities, 1975;p. 297. s9 European Commission, Sixth Report on the General Activities of the European Communities, Luxembourg: European Communities, 1973;p. 6-9. 
Europe. Enlargement brought regional policy up to the fore, as Italy and the Commission allied with Britain and Ireland to press for the establishment of a European Regional Development Fund that became operational in 1975. Common regional policy helped to reduce wealth disparities within and among member states that EMU would otherwise aggravate. At the Paris summit of 1972, member states agreed to give "a high priority.. . to the aim of correcting, in the Community, the structural and regional imbalances which might affect the realization of economic and monetary union."90 Through the regional development fund, EC members learned to collaborate under the Commission's aegis to develop regional policy at the European level. 
The early 1980s reversed the economic recovery in Europe. The fall of the shah of Iran (1978) generated a second oil crisis. Economic downturn in the US compounded hardships. East-West tensions augmented. Yet, the Community managed to "lay the foundation for the acceleration of integration that followed later in the decade (...). National leaders looked increasingly to the EC for solutions to their problems [and] the Commission pursued an aggressive strategy to restructure European industry and complete the internal market."" In these times of "Euro- pessimism," Greece's accession to the EC provided a morale boost. 
As EMU stumbled, the European Monetary System went into operation in 1979. It aimed at reducing exchange rate fluct~uations among currencies to fight inflation, increase investment and improve economic performance. It did so by introducing an artificial European currency unit (ECU) made up of a basket of participating currencies, weighted according to their values. The exchange rate mechanism used a parity grid and a divergence indicator based on the ECU. 90 European Commission, Sixth Report on the General Activities of the European Communities, 
Luxembourg: European Communities, 1973; p. 6. 9 1 Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 168. 
Currencies could fluctuate against each other within a band of +I-2.5 percent of their 
value. Meanwhile, the Regional Development Fund helped Italy and Ireland cope with the impact of EMS participation through larger financial assistance. 
Consensus among member states on the desirability of deeper market integration led to the first substantive treaty reform. The Single European Act relaunched integration by giving authority to (lommunity institutions in numerous new policy areas. The most important developments concerned economic integration and the establishment of the single market. The document set the year 1992 as a deadline for completing the single market and connected this goal with achieving greater economic cohesion and a stronger social policy at the European level. This legal framework empowered the Community: European institutions regulated the internal market, and cohesion became a "vital instrument of economic and political integration."" The SEA resuscitated the goal (sf European monetary union. At that moment, the mention of monetary policy "seemed no more than symbolic,7793 
but later this facet of economic integration became central to the European project. 
Economic developments aside, the SEA brought environmental policy into the treaty, as well as strengthened the common research and technological development policy. It legitimized cooperation on foreign policy (via European Political Cooperation), although decisions in this area remained essentially intergovernmental. Later, political cooperation gradually evolved to become the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the framework of the European Union established at Maastricht. 
The SEA included a few declarations dealing with the specific concerns of some newer member states; however, these te~nporary exceptions did not debilitate integration. For instance, Ireland won a derogation from the single market for its frail 
92 Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 221. 93 Dinan, 2004; p. 214. 
insurance industry. Portugal insisted on including in the final document the idea that 
changes in decision-making caused by the SEA "must not damage sensitive and vital sectors of the country's economy."94 Though apparently hampering, this provision merely officialized a previously unwritten fun~ctioning principle in the EC. Overall, these qualifications are insignificant relative to the SEA'S key role in advancing integration. They did not disrupt European decision-making. On the contrary, European leaders became increasingly more aware that integration required a significant degree of flexibility: the EC's success depended on accommodating the members' interests, while simultaneously promoting cooperation and the harmonization of policies. In that sense, newel- members prevented premature rigidity from paralyzing European institutions. 
The Treaty of Maastricht (1993) reconfigured European politics. Not only did it radically increase the Community's formal authority, but it transformed it into a new and "impressive political entity: an organization of European states with strong federal attribute^"^^: the European Union. The Treaty on European Union delegated more powers to European institutions and structured collective authority into three clusters of policy areas symbolically referred to as the "pillars" of the Maastricht architecture: Community affairs, Common Foireign and Security Policy, and Justice and Home Affairs. 
The first "pillar" included all matters pertaining to economic integration and the single market. The TEU set a timetable for the ex-phoenix bird of European integration, the Economic and Monetary Union, with 1999 as the final deadline. Transcending its series of successive collapses and resurrections, EMU resulted within the Union in the adoption of a single monetary policy and a single currency, 
94 Single European Act; Internet source: http://www.europa.eu.intlabc/obj/treaties/edentocll3.htm 95 Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 233. 
both controlled by European institutions and a continental system of banks. Euro 
banknotes and coins were introduced in January 2002. 
European Political Cooperation was restructured as the second "pillar," the common foreign and security policy, still an essentially intergovernmental sphere of European decision-making. Maastricht introduced cooperation on justice and home affairs as the third "pillar" of thc Union's framework. Member states decided to cooperate more closely on immigration, asylum, policing and judicial affairs. The TEU also conferred collective institutions sublstantive authority in fields such as culture, education and health, although it circumscribed these new powers. The Treaty strengthened environmental policy that had been established as a field of Community competence through the SEA. Maastricht also created the concept of Union citizenship that, combined with the abolition of internal borders, later contributed to the free movement of people among member states. 
Most importantly, the TEU institution~dized flexibility via a principle that allows member states to cooperate more closely in certain policy areas, without engaging all EU members in the initiative. In I3U-jargon, flexibility is called differentiated integration. Dinan remarks that "differentiated integration had long been mooted as a solution to the recalcitrant member states' unwillingness to go along with new policy initiatives. Now, for the first lime, the EU enshrined the principle and endorsed the practice of member states either choosing or not being obliged to participate in core a~tivities."~~ 
Britain, for instance, opted out of the Social Protocol. Later on, when a Labour cabinet replaced the Conservatives, the UK adopted the Protocol. While flexibility may seem disruptive to the pooling of sovereignty, it actually allows a majority of member states to integrate policies in new areas and 
96 Dinan, 2004; p. 258. 
more intensely among themselves, despite the resistance of other countries that desire to preserve current levels of integration. This facilitates the Union's progress in sectors in which a small number of states could obstruct progress by vetoing reform. Through the Treaty of Amsterdam, differentiated integration was institutionalized and ceased to be an ad hoc arrangement. 
EU empowerment continued with the 'Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) in 1997, although Union membership had increased two years before with the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden. The ToA incorplorated in the Community pillar provisions concerning the free movement of persons (e.g. visas, asylum, immigration and judicial cooperation in civil matters), thereby transferring authority from national to European institutions. It introduced in the E,U framework the 1985 Schengen Treaty on the gradual abolition of internal border checks. The Union assumed new attributions: promoting equality between men and women, competitiveness, and high levels of environmental protection and improvement. Member countries set as a goal the establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice. To achieve it, European institutions committed to encouraging states to resort to police and judicial co- operation in criminal matters, and to collaborate in preventing and fighting against racism and xenophobia. European-level common action targeted key national and transnational problems like corruption, fraud, terrorism, drug and arms trafficking, trafficking in persons and offences against children." At Amsterdam, the EU officially engaged to defend the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
97 Data about expansion of Community competences is taken from Craig, Paul and Griinne de Blirca, EU Law: Texts, Cases and Materials, 31d edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Table 3: Issue Areas and Levels of Authority in Europe 
I I. Economic issue areas 
3. Ca~italflows 	1 1 1 1 4 4 
11.Industry  1  2  2  2  2  3  3  
12. Money/credit  1  1  2  2  2  4  4  
13. Foreirm exchange/loans  1  1  2  2  2  4  4  
14.Revenue/taxes  1  1  2  2  2  3  n/a  
15.Macroeconomic  1  1  2  3  2  4  n/a  
II. Socio-cdtural issue-arenas  
1. Work condtions  1  1  2  2  2  3  3  
2. Health  1  1  1  1  2  2  3  
3. Social welfare  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  
4. Education and research  1  1  2  2  2  3  n/a  
5. Labor-management relations  1  1  1  1  1  3  n/a  

I 
IV. International relations/extemal 

securitv issues 
1. 
Commercial negotiations 1 1 3 4 4 4 4 

2. 
Economic-militam assistance 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 

3. 
Diplomacy and IGO membership 1 1 1 1 2 4 4 

4. 
Defense and war 	1 1 1 1 2 2 2 


1 5. Humanitarian and development aid 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 
1:All policy decisions at national level 
2: 02y some policy decisions at EC level 
3: Policy decisions at both national and EC level 
4: Mostly policy decisions at EC level 
5:All policy decisions at EC level 
*: 
0 	Schrmtter, Philippe, "Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help of New Concepts," in Marks, Gary; Fritz W. Scharpf; PUppe C. Schrnitter; and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), Governance in the European Union, London: Sage Publications, 1996; p. 125-6. 
Hix, Simon, The PoliticalS_&em dthe European Union, 2nd edtion, Basingstoke, Hampshtre: Palgrave Macrmllan, 2005; p. 20-21. 
The Treaty of Nice focused on preparing EU institutions for coping with the 
structural and technical difficulties that enlargement towards Eastern Europe was expected to generate. As such, Nice did not increase or decrease the powers of collective institutions. Institutional developments will be analyzed later in this chapter. 
Overall, empirical data about the Union's evolution indicate that enlargement has neither discontinued, nor reversed integration in policy areas where member states had previously pooled sovereignty. In fact, integration levels have generally increased in policy areas entrusted to the Community. Power has accrued over time to European institutions (see Table 3). This table compiling data gathered by Schmitter, Hix, Donohue and Pollack covers 29 different policy areas assessed at seven distinct moments in EU history. Scores given on the national-European continuum (see table legend) show that member states have delegated increasingly more power to European institutions. Patterns do not appear to be disrupted by enlargements, since scores usually continue to increase. 
One can notice, however, a tendency of the scores to plateau after a policy area reaches a superior level of integration. This phenomenon does not occur due to successive enlargements, but rather to the mernber states' unwillingness to surrender decision-making authority to European institutions in all sectors and types of decisions. Such reluctance does not necessarily depend on whether the countries opposing further delegation of power to col1ec:tive fora are old or new EU members. Most importantly, the data indicate that in these 29 key areas of European integration, states have very rarely decided to regain power. Even in cases when the score dropped from one selected year to the next, states seem to delegate again the higher level of authority to European institutions in subsequent years. For instance, in the 
energy sector member states had exclusive powers in 1950. They delegated a limited 
amount of decision-making to European institutions in 1957, but then returned to exclusively national decisions as a result of international economic crises. With the Maastricht Treaty, member states shifted back to a situation in which some authority was given to the Union, and in 2004 policy decisions are made at both the national and European levels. 
As noticeable from these surveys, European authority has systematically increased as national governments have pooled sovereignty in more policy areas. Enlargements have not led to disruptions: if th~e EU's evolution slowed down or stagnated at any moment or in any policy area, usually this occurred due to international economic and political difficulties or to disputes within the Community that involved old and new members alike (or, in some cases, only countries from the initial Six). The second chapter of the present thesis develops the analysis of increasing European authority by assessing the respective contributions of old and new members to the advancement, stagnation or dilution of integration. 
CS.eutin,:/ni.~imui~tli~~g

European Zl~stitirtions 
Within this dimension of integration, progress seems astonishing as well, given the fact that the European project started developing institutionally only half a century ago. From the virtually powerless Consultative Assembly and the symbolic Committee of Ministers in the Council of Europe (created in 1949) to the numerous strong EU institutions influencing domestic artd international politics today, the united Europe has come a long way. Successive enlargements did not disrupt the integrative process by triggering the collapse of the Community's institutional structure or dismantling any European decision-malung bodies. Typically, European institutions 
are long-lived and, in the rare cases when they cease to exist, this happens because 
they merge or evolve to become stronger structures. 
After World War 11, European cooperation was purely intergovernmental. Organizations such as the Council of Europe or the Organization for European Economic Cooperation paid lip service to the idea of integration, while limiting their scope to that of consultation fora. As Western European states became increasingly aware that common problems require commo~l solutions, they started establishing supranational bodies to which they delegated authority in one policy area (e.g. the European Coal and Steel Community, Euratorn, the Western European Union, etc.). As collective objectives developed and diversified, member states merged existing institutions in one complex multi-functional system, the European Community that later evolved into a Union. 
The Rome Treaty established the European Economic Community, whose basic institutional framework still constitutes the skeleton of the European project today: the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the Common Assembly and the European Court of Justice. The Commission is a supranational body functioning independently from national governments that initiates, implements and upholds Community legislation. The Council of Ministers represents the EC's main decision-making body. It assembles the member states' government ministers and meets regularly in a number of configurations (e.g. finance ministers, agriculture ministers, foreign affairs ministers, etc.) to enact legislation. The Council makes decisions, according to relevant treaty articles, by unanimity, qualified majority voting or simple majority voting. 
The Common Assembly, the European Parliament's direct ancestor, initially had a purely consultative function and did not directly influence legislation. Later, however, in the framework of the European Community and the European Union, a supranational and integration-committed Parliament became a co-legislator with the intergovernmental Council of Ministers. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the European equivalent of a constitutional (supreme) court: it interprets treaties and secondary legislation, adjudicates disputes concerning EU law, enforces judgments against member states in infringement cases, interprets and judges the validity of acts performed by Community institutions, and interprets the statutes of bodies established by the Council. 
Apart from this central institutional framework, the Rome Treaty also established a European Investment Bank to provide advantageous loans for regional development and modernization projects. 
In the years following the Treaty of Rome, existing institutions spawned other institutions as they organized their functioning. The Commission established departments (in Euro-jargon: directorates-general) that corresponded to its primary activities and responsibilities; directorates-general produced directorates and 
division^.^^ As integration progressed, the Co~nmission established new departments 
to "reflect real or anticipated increases in Community competence."99 ~ational 
governments created a Committee of Permanent Representatives (known by the French acronym Coreper) made of senior officials who linked the Council with the 
Commission by exchanging national positions on Commission proposals and preparing Council meetings. 
A truly innovative document from the institutional point of view, the Merger Treaty of 1968fused the three European Communities that had existed in parallel: the Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community and the Atomic 98 For more information on these structures, refer to Stevens, Anne, Brussels Bureaucrats? The 
Administration of the European Union, London: Palgrave, 2001; p. 26-42. 99 Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 117. 
Energy Community. The Merger Treaty created the European Community (EC), an entity that encompassed all the functions of its predecessors. Institutionally, the document was revolutionary in European politics because it created a supranational nucleus of decision-malung, i.e. a unique group of European institutions that controlled several policy areas. Subsequently, whenever member states wanted to initiate European cooperation in a new sector, they did not establish a different international organization or Community. Instead, they simply amended European laws to delegate new powers to existing EC institutions. After 1968, member states have collectively pursued the pooling of sovereignty, policy harmonization and international cooperation within this institutional framework. Ever since the Merger Treaty, this feature has facilitated the diversification of European powers; the European Union itself inherits this primary trait from its predecessor. 
Despite three enlargements (Britain, Ireland and Denmark in 1973; Greece in 1981; and Spain and Portugal in 1986), the EC's institutional structure expanded through the Single European Act. The SEA empowered the European judiciary by establishing a system based on two levels of jurisdiction. At the first level, the document created a Court of First Instance to reduce the burden of cases that almost suffocated the ECJ after its increased activisn~ in the preceding years.100 The CFI hears in first instance all cases brought to it by individuals and member states (with certain e~ce~tions).'~' 
Some cases heard by the Court of First Instance can be appealed to the ECJ on points of law. At the second level, the European Court of Justice maintains its authority as the equivalent of a "European supreme court." 
loo As the ECJ asserted its primacy over national courts and its essential role as an interpreter of 
Community legislation, European citizens increasingly appealed to it and invoked their European rights 
often against national laws. 
lo' The areas within CFI jurisdiction are agriculture, state assistance, competition, commercial policy, 
regional policy, social policy, institutional law, trademark law, transportation, and statute of officials. 

The SEA legitimized the European Council as an official institution 
participating in European decision-making. The European Council had functioned since 1974 as an informal (though regular and influential) reunion of all national leaders (presidents or prime ministers) assisted by their foreign ministers. The SEA introduced in the European institutional structure a body that has remained intergovernmental until today; nevertheless, this legitimization and absorption into official decision-mahng forced the European Council to communicate and cooperate more openly with the EC. Absolute regulatory autonomy was becoming pass6 for the national governments on the Old Continent. 
At Maastricht, the broadest institutional revolution occurred: the Community became the European Union, not only an economic union, but also a geo-political entity. The entire institutional structure was reorganized under three pillars: Community affairs, Colnmon Foreign and Security Policy, and Justice and Home Affairs. European institutions were thereby given authority to promote the integration project in a multitude of new directions only remotely related to the initial objective of common market. 
Member States created an independent European System of Central Banks (consisting of the European Central Bank and national central banks) to lead and support the finalization of Economic and Monetary Union. The TEU also established an office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman, who investigates complaints about maladministration in the institutions and bodies of the European Union (only the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance, when acting in their judicial role, do not fall under his jurisdiction).lo2 The creation of il European Committee of the Regions 
lo2 Information from the European Ombudsman website: http://www.euro- ombudsman.eu.int/glance/en/ default.htm 
"symbolized the member states' recognition of another level of governance in the EU a level separate from yet connected to national and European structures. 
TABLE 4: EUROPEAN UNION AGENCIES'~~ 
lo3 Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 258. 
104 This table was compiled by Daniel Kelemen and presented during a series of lectures on EU 
integration at Oxford University, October 2004. 

The Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice focused more on reforming existent 
institutions rather than on creating new structures. Nevertheless, issues pertaining to the third pillar (judicial and police cooperatioil) required the establishment of new institutions. As a result, EUROPOL, an agency for cross-border police cooperation became operational in 1994; and EUROJUST, the EU's structure for criminal justice cooperation and coordination was launched in 2001. Furthermore, following an Anglo-French call for the Union to develop itlj capacity for autonomous military action within the "second" pillar (CFSP), the EU established a Rapid Reaction Force in 2003.1°5 
Also, in the post-Cold War era, the EU developed significantly as a structure by establishing a multitude of agencies. This type of European institution emerged in the mid 1970s, but reached the peak of its development after Maastricht. Table 4 above offers a representative list of the most important CommunityIUnion agencies and specifies the primary function of each agency, as well as the location and year when it became operational. 
Institutionally, enlargement has not oblstructed integration so much as to trigger the collapse of European-level bodies. To the contrary, the number of collective institutions has increased and, as a survey of the first analytical category indicated, member states have delegated increasingly more authority to the ever- diversifying European level of governance. Moreover, the European project transcended its initial condition of regional anrangement for economic integration, restructured its institutional framework and transformed itself into an unprecedented geo-political entity: the European Union. 
'05 The Rapid Reaction Force is a structure able to deploy within sixty days a number of sixty thousand troops, with necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, and remain in the field for at least one year (Bulletin EU 12-1999). 


Decision-Making ~echanisrns'~~ 
Yet, it is still necessary to clarify whether, within European institutions, decision-making has become more detached from the national interests of any one member state (usually defended through the possibility of veto). Are more decision mechanisms supranational (based on majority voting), or has the Union returned to intergovernmentalism (unanimity) possibly in response to enlargement? "A blend of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism characterized the functioning of the Community from the beginning," as Dinan relmarks.lo7 This section tries to determine if and how the proportions of supranationalisrn and intergovernmentalism in the EU cocktail have changed as a consequence of enlargement. 
From the beginning, the European Commission and the Parliament emerged as supranational institutions (independent in their functioning from national governments, although both initially appointe~d by member states) and ardent promoters of integration. Originally, the European Parliament had a limited legislative role through the consultation procedure, whiclh required that the Council consult Parliament in a small number of areas (in fact, Council usually ignored the Parliament's opinions). Yet, the Parliament established committees at the European level of governance to report on Commission proposals and Council decisions. At the same time, the Commission declared that it perceived the Parliament as an institutional ally and a potential source of legitimacy for European governance.108 The Court of Justice also developed an extremely strong supranationalist profile, as it 
lo6For a comprehensive overview of decision-making processes, refer to Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave IMacmillan, 2005; and Wallace, Helen; William Wallace and Carole Webb (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Communities, New European Union Series, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 107 Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 57. 108 For an account of the Parliament's inaugural sessior~ (in which the Commission made this statement) and the early institutional developments in the EC, refer to Camps, Miriam, "The First Year of the European Economic Community," Policy Memorandum no. 17, Center for International Studies, Princeton University, Nov. 1958. 
decisively contributed to asserting the primacy of European legislation and developed its role as a supreme court of the united Europe. 
The Council of Ministers remained the intergovernmental bastion in Community governance. In its framework, decisions can be adopted by unanimity, simple majority vote or qualified majority vote (a super-majority). Even in Council policy-making, therefore, one can analyze decisions on a procedural continuum that expands between the extremes of intergovern~nentalism (reflected in unanimity voting) and supranationalism (reflected in majority voting). Unanimity reflects an intergovernmentalist approach, as any membe:r state can veto a proposal. Qualified majority indicates a more collective-oriented stance, as a minority of states can block a proposal. Finally, the simple majority voting procedure applied to decision-making in a specific policy area marks a predominantliy supranationalist perspective on legislation at the European level, as only a majority of countries can block an initiative. 
In 1966, after France generated the "empty chair" crisis (see introduction), the Luxembourg compromise enabled member states to invoke vital national interests to stop the Council from deciding by QMV. Inevitably, this enhanced intergovernmentalism in the Council, as there were no specified guidelines for defining a member state's "vital interests." The Luxembourg compromise hampered decision-making for a long time. 
Meanwhile, however, European supranational institutions developed their spheres of influence. Through a series of resoliutions in the 1960s, Parliament asserted its presence and even managed to insinuate itself into policy areas from which it was originally excluded. For instance, Parliament persuaded the Council to establish joint committees as part of the institutional infrastructure of the EC's association 
agreements. The ECJ developed strilungly. In two landmark cases (1963 and 1964), 
the Court established the key supranationalist principles on which Community legislation rests: direct effect and supremacy. In Van Gend en Loos,'09 a Dutch transport firm brought a case against Dutch customs for collecting duty on a product imported from Germany, in breach of Europe,an common market provisions. The Court asserted that the EC "constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights," and ruled that the Netherlands were in breach due to the direct effect of Community law. In Costa v. EN EL,"^ the Court upheld the supremacy of 13C law over national legislation. 
The 1970s saw the introduction of a system of "own resources" to fund the EC, based on three sources of revenue: tariffs on industrial imports, levies on agricultural imports, and a value-added tax. Parliament gained budgetary authority (previously the power of the purse belonged entirely to the Council). In June 1979, the first direct elections for the European Parliament were held in all member states. In 1981, the Parliament started the practice of voting on the incoming Commission, thus setting a precedent for acquiring formal investiture powers later. At the same time, however, the establishment of the intergovernmental European Council undermined the Commission's power as the sole initiator of legislative proposals. 
If the Single European Act reinforced the intergovernmental dimension of the Community by legitimizing the European Council, it strongly reinforced the supranational facet of decision-making by increasing the powers of the European Parliament. Until then, despite the fact that national representatives were directly elected, the EP's function had remained basically consultative. The SEA introduced the cooperation procedure that gave the EP a voice in European legislation (the right 
lo9Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Adrninistratie des Belastingen [I9631 ECR 1. 'lo Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL [I9641 ECR 585. 
to a second reading) for some single market measures. Parliament also gained a new 
power of assent for accession and association agreements. The SEA also reformed decision-making by extending the use of QM'V instead of unanimity to cover most measures concerning the single market in the Council of ~inisters.'" This modification enhanced the supranational facet of European law-making as it suggested that the common market will be coinpleted even though some member states may oppose it. 
The Treaty on European Union included substantial innovations in terms of decision-making mechanisms, again accentuating supranational characteristics. First, the Parliament's legislative role was strengthened as the Treaty introduced the co- decision procedure, which enables Parliament to participate in law-making as the Council's equal. Co-decision gives Parliament the right to a third reading of draft legislation and the possibility to establish a conciliation committee in which representatives of the Council and Parliament attempt to find a compromise solution at the final stage. Second, Maastricht empowered the EP by increasing the scope of the cooperation procedure. Third, the treaty extended the use of QMV for most policies included under the Community pillar. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam increased the use of QMV in the Council and strengthened the legislative power of the Parliament by extending the applicability of the co-decision procedure. This occurred as a result of reorganizing the first and third pillars: many policy areas included under ''Justice and Home Affairs" were transferred to the Community pillar and, thus, made the transition from unanimity to QMV as decision-making mechanism. The issues remaining under the third pillar led to its reconfiguration under the name "Police and Judicial Cooperation." "'For a complete and detailed description of the Community/Union's intricate decision-making 
procedures, see Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union, 2ndedition, London: Palgrave, 2005. 
Finally, the Treaty of Nice contributecl to limited decision-making reform in 
preparation for the massive Eastern European enlargement. It changed the voting weights of member states and allocated votes to the new countries. It extended the use of QMV, allocated Parliamentary seats to the candidate countries and increased the membership of the European assembly to 732. Nice changed the Commission's composition to one representative commissio~ier per member state, a modification leading to a more equalitarian approach to supranational decision-making in the Commission, as the advantage of powerful members over smaller and weaker ones is greatly reduced. 
The analysis of this third dimension of European integration shows that the experience of previous enlargements has neve:r constituted a factor that severely damaged the EU's supranational dimension (a facet typically associated with integration itself). At most, a combination of causes may have led to certain enhancements of intergovernmentalism, with enlargement only playing a very limited part among the factors involved. Nevertheless, progress in the increase of European supranational institutions has been constant, and has taken the form of either empowerments of the Parliament, or reductio~i of the possibility to veto in the Council, or Commission entrepreneurship, or ECJ activism. 
This analysis of integration based on three analytical categories (expandinglreducing European powers; adding new institutions/dismantling existent institutions; and reforming decision-making processes) shows that the Union has become substantially stronger throughout its history (see Table 5 for a treaty by treaty synthesis). Once member states delegated a competence to European institutions, they never used treaty amendments to attempt to regain it, not even after enlargements that rendered the EU more heterogeneous. European bodies have never been dismantled to 
reverse the pooling of sovereignty. Decision-making reforms have systematically 
replaced unanimity with QMV, and generally enhanced the powers of the European Parliament, a supranational body that favors increases in integration. 
Table 5. The Evolution of Formal Authority: Three Analytical 
Categories and th~e Six Treaties 

I. The Treaty  Expanded competences  Created the EC  -- 
Establishing the  institutional  
European Economic  framework  
Cornrnunitv -1957  
11. The Merger Treaty  -- Fused the  -- 
-1968  institutions of the  
three European  
Communities  
111. Single European  Expanded competences  Added new  Increased EP  
Act (SEA) -1986  institutions  powers and use  
of QMV  
IV. Treaty on  Expanded competences  Created the  Increased EP  
European Union  European Union  powers and use  
(Maastricht Treaty) - and added new  of QMV;  
1992  institutions  introduced  
dfferentiated  
integration  
V. The Treaty of  Expanded competences  -- Increased EP  
Amsterdam (ToA) - powers and use  
1997  of OW.  
VI. The Treaty of  -- -- Increased use of  
Nice -2001  QMV  

A multi-faceted analysis of EU formali authority does not indicate that enlargement has had significant negative effelcts on the pooling of sovereignty. Yet, this conclusion does not reveal anything about the relative contributions of old and new member states to integration. It could be that old member states managed to pursue integration despite the joining members' effort to weaken EU institutions. In this case, adding new members to the Union vlould have, in fact, diluted the substance of integration. However, if new members actively contribute to increasing European authority, then enlargement can stimulate the l?ooling of sovereignty. This is the topic on which the present thesis concentrates in its next chapter. 
CHAPTER I1 
A New Hope: Debunking the Mytb of the "EU Generation Gap" 

The European Union lacks a seductive founding myth. There is, however, a dark legend that compensates for this absence in the European collective imaginary. Numerous European integration theorists, assisted by journalists and politicians, have sown apprehension among Euro-enthusiasts by spawning and fueling a terrible prophecy of dissolution intrinsically connecte~d to enlargement. I call this gloomy legend of the united Europe the "EU Generation Gap," and, to reassure the misled and fearful, attempt to debunk the myth in this chapter. 
What exactly is the "EU Generation Gap"? The myth tells us about a fearless group of countries that "shared the common objective of uniting (...) their national structures, competences, and resources" to transcend the nation-state, a group that defined itself as a "homogeneous organization."112 Depending on when the story is told (typically before an enlargement), this brave group of old member states has six, nine, ten, twelve or fifteen members. Whenever other countries join the Community, this harmonious and peaceful paradise of integration is threatened. In an enlarging Union, the myth goes, the young and restless new members constantly disturb the tranquil and committed old members from their integrative endeavors, menacing the very existence of the EU as a geo-political entity. The lack of commitment among newcomers is so severe that an "EU Generation Gap" separates young members from the dedicated veterans of integration. 
There is a desire to justify concealed a.t the deep core of every legend, and the myth of the "EU Generation Gap" does not deviate from the general rule. To put it 
Balazs, Peter, "Strategies for the Eastern Enlargement of the EU: An Integration Theory Approach in Laurent, Pierre-Henri, and Marc Maresceau (eds.) THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Vol. 4: Deepening and Widening; Boulder, London: Lyune Rienner Publishers, 1998; p. 82-83. 
plainly, this story is nothing but a convenient :strategy to avoid responsibility. If 
policies and decision-making are integrated at the European level, there also has to be a European scapegoat. Something goes wrong in the Union? Citizens are unhappy? Institutions are too slow? Government officials are hesitant? Whether you are a government representative from a Western European country or a European institution, there is one catholic solution that alllows you to avoid responsibility for all problems: whatever IT is, just blame IT on the younger generations of member states! Whatever IT is, blame IT on EU enlargement' 
The myth rests on two premises: 
a) the older the member state, the more committed to integration it is; and 
b) new member states do not contribute to the pooling of sovereignty; on the contrary, they perturb it and impede the otherwise rapid progress of integration (favored by older member states) from occurring. 
To debunk the myth of the "EU Generation Gap," I attack these two premises. To question the validity of the first, I adopt ark intergovernmentalist perspective and analyze a number of key situations concerning a variety of representative European policy areas (economic integration, social policy, common defense, political cooperation, etc.) in which the old generation (the initial Six) betrayed integration without scruples to pursue national interests. 'To question the validity of the second premise, I present the ways in which each enlargement has stimulated integration through the direct contributions of the joining countries. To conclude, I also assess the indirect ways in which adding new members to the EU has strengthened European integration. 
A Nc~cessary Bit ofDisc~~~chunt~nent: iona Keu1i:;tic Porlrait of the Old Ge~~erut 
Throughout the EU's evolution, several scholars have warned against taking for granted the homogeneity of veteran Community members in terms of preferences, commitment to the idea of united ~uro~e,"~ 
structure or economic performance.114 Implicitly denying that an initial ideal of integration existed, Dinan describes the beginnings of the European Communities in the post-WWII era as "practical solutions to concrete and complex challenges, rather than an overarching philosophical framew~rk.""~In fact, the united Europe lacks a nice founding story due to Western European ambivalence. If anything, the United States initiated European integration and reinforced it through the European Recovery strategy and financial assistance, despite Western European reluctance. The Foreign Assistance Act of April 1948 enacted the Marshall Plan and asserted in its "Declaration of Policy": 
Mindful of the advantages which the US has enjoyed through the existence of a large domestic market with no internal trade barriers, and believing that similar advantages can accrue to the ciountries of Europe, it is declared to be the policy of the people of the US to encourage these countries [receiving Marshall aid] through a joint organization to exert common efforts.. . which will speedily achieve that economic cooperation in Europe which is essential for lasting peace and recovery."6 
Michael Hogan describes the idea of European integration as "a grand design for remaking the Old World in the likeness of'the ~ew.""~ 
The initial members' hesitant attitudes confirm that the pooling of sovereignty was imposed upon them rather than self-initiated. France launched Eu1:opean integration as a result of American pressure. US secretary of state Acheson told his ambassadors in Europe that 
Dinan, Desmond, Europe Recast. 'I4 Tsoukalis, Loukas, The European CommuniQ and its Mediterranean Enlargement, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981; p. 251. 115 Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 321. "6 Internet resource: text of the act available at http://www/let/leidenuniv.nl/history/rtg/ resl/marshall/htm. 117 Hogan, Michael, The Marshall Plan: Amenca, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987; p. 53. 
the solution to the Ruhr problem and the Gernnan question "lay in French hands."l18 In 1949, Acheson insisted that the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, come up with a solution by May 1950. Triggering the establishment of the Coal and Steel Community, Acheson urged Schuman: "I believe that our policy in Germany.. . depends on the assumption by your country of leadership in Europe on these problems."119 On May 9, 1950, the Schuman Declaration proclaimed the principles and values on which European integration ha:; developed ever since. 
France did not treasure economic and/or political integration as goals in themselves. In fact, this representative of the first and oldest generation caused the only two major crises that almost brought about the collapse of the fledgling European Communities in their first decades of existence. The French parliament failed to ratify the treaty for a European Defense Community and the related initiative for a European Political Community in 1954. At the time, the defeat of the Defense Community "seemed (...) to deal a near-fatal blow to prospects for further integration," turning supranationalism into a "dirty word."'20 Miraculously, European integration survived the shock. Later, France stumbled again on the path leading to a united Europe, as the 1957 Treaty of Rome ?net stiff resistance in the French National ~ssembl~,"'~~ 
when the French were insisting that the entire Western Europe should adopt France's much-vaunted social model. Following a series of concessions and "protective measures" for the affected French industries, France accepted the Treaty. 
U.S. 
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1949, Vol. 4, Washington, DC: Department of State, 1986; p. 470. "9 FRUS, 1949, Vol. 3; p. 624-625. I2O Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 63. 12' Leibfried, Stephan and Paul Pierson, "Social Policy: Left to Courts and Markets?" in H. Wallace and W. Wallace (eds.) Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; 

p. 
270. 


The second crisis, however, endangered the European Community not through 
a related initiative, but from within. In 1965, protesting a set of Commission proposals that aimed at empowering the Community (e.g. allowing the EC to acquire its own resources, transferring budgetary authority from national parliaments to the European Parliament, increasing the authority of the Commission, increasing the use of qualified majority voting in the Council, etc.)., Charles de Gaulle withdrew the French representative from the Council of Ministers. The so-called Empty Chair crisis ended in 1966 when the Six hammered out the Luxembourg Compromise. According to this agreement, the Council would never decide a matter by qualified majority voting when a member state claims that its vital national interests are at stake. Basically, the Luxembourg Compromise asserted a member's right to veto legislative proposals even in situations when, according to the Treaty of Rome, the Council had to resort to QMV. The consequences of the Empty Chair crisis and its resolution debilitated integration and ushered in a period in EU history known under suggestive names such as "Euro-sclerosis," "Euro-paralysis" or "Eur~o-slump." Dinan explains: 
Because there was no objective measure of what constituted an important national interest, governments used the term loosely, often under domestic political pressure. The Luxembourg Compromise therefore cast a long shadow over legislative decision-making and elevated the national veto to a sacrosanct principle.122 
The other initial Community members did not cause disturbances anywhere comparable to those France generated in econ~omic integration, European institution- building and political cooperation (for that matter, no country belonging to the newer generations of EU members ever managed to disrupt integration to such an extent, either). However, other members of the golden and sparse first generation did resist the pooling of sovereignty in particular policy areas and to a lesser extent. For 
122 Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 108. 
instance, during the first decade of European jntegration and in stark contrast with its 
later stance, the Netherlands deeply distrusted supranationalism in the negotiations for establishing the Coal and Steel Community. Pidenauer's biographer, Hans-Peter Schwarz, characterized the Dutch position as "an unfortunate mixture of trade calculations, aversion to French or German hegemony, openness to British influence, and deep concern about the prospect of being absorbed into larger units."123 Usually, however, among the original six members, the smaller states (Belgium, Benelux, Italy and, eventually, the Dutch) were typically more committed to the "ever-closer union." It was the European "Franco-German axis" or "core Europe" (as it is called today in the language of the Generation Gap legend) that created most frictions. 
Even when the Six boasted about their commitment to integration, pompous declarations seldom amounted to more than paying lip service to a profitable (though hard to implement) policy line. Partially espousing the EU Generation Gap myth, Dinan describes the atmosphere preceding negotiations for the Single European Act as follows: "A wide rift had opened between Ithe original member states, which (despite differences over policy and procedure) were developing a greater commitment to European integration, and the later arrivals, which had never subscribed to European integration.. . >>I24(Ireland is singled out as a notable exception among the joining countries.) Dinan notes, nevertheless, that "for all their determination, the [position of the Six and Ireland] before and during the IGC [i.e. intergovernmental conference] was surprisingly weak." Prior to the conference, "Mitterrand's involvement in Community aff,airs (if not his commitment to European 
123 Schwarz, Hans-Peter, Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, 
Revolution and Reconstruction, Vol. 1: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, 
Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995; p. 613. 
lZ4Dinan, Desmond, "Reflections on the IGCs" in Laurent, Pierre-Henri, and Marc Maresceau (eds.) 
THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Vol. 4: i3eepening and Widening; Boulder, London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998; p. 26. 

integration) noticeably waned." At the same blme, the German Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl was "surprisingly unassertive immediately before and during the IGC."'~~ 
Dinan makes absolutely no attempt to explain this change of heart. It just happened; and the contrast between the loquacious "determination" of the Six and their unwillingness to act does not seem to seriously undermine the stability of the European myth. Essentially, Dinan and other supporters of the EU Generation Gap legend (politicians, journalists and scholars) r~efuse to acknowledge and analyze the fact that old member states were willing to sa,y a lot, but systematically hesitated when they had to transpose their pompous declarations into practice. Consequently, in the illustrative case of the SEA, new member:; and the Commission actually assumed leadership in treaty reform and policy integration to compensate for the initial members' obvious lack of enthusiasm. 
The old members7 resistance to liberalization shows that the old generation has not always been eager to achieve a European customs union. Non-tariff barriers 
(e.g. different national rules concerning product standards) impeded the free movement of goods throughout the 1960s. "The Commission began the laborious process of harmonization, but soon ran into national resistance.77126 
In transport policy, some of the original Six also opposed integration. Germany and France tried to impede the establishment of a European transport market due to their long tradition of market regulation. The Commission, supported by the Netherlands and Britain, attempted to abolish trade barriers and establish a European transport market.127 Members agreed upon a package deal in 1993, when pro-regulator Germany accepted liberalization in exchange for concessions. In telecommunications policies, the UK 
125 Dinan, "Reflections on the IGCs"; p. 27-28. 
126 Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 114. 
lZ7 HCritier, Adrienne, Policy-Making and Diversity in Europe: Escape from Deadlock, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999; p. 33. 

and the Netherlands supported the idea of free market services, whereas France and Gennany "insisted on the natural monopoly nature of telecommunications and their public-service obligations."128 Thus, Britain, (arelatively younger Community member, promoted free-market goals and liberalization, despite the resistance of old Community members. 
Numerous other relevant moments can be included in this long list of hesitations and obstacles: France's lack of support for supranational integration in foreign and security France and Itally's failure to respect their commitments under the Stability and Growth Pact of 1997; Germany's reserve concerning the finalization of Economic and Monetary Union; etc. In sum, the old members' record in terms of commitment to integration is very far from impeccable. Old member states have never been animated in their pursuits by the noble goal of European integration, as the legend has it. Instead, they have simply attempted to use the pooling of sovereignty as a tool to advance their national interests. Declarative commitments often came down to little more than empty wiords when national benefits were at stake. Therefore, the first premise of the EU Generation gap legend does not stand. 


Younger Members: the 'Other' Contributes to European Intenration 
This and the following sections of this chapter focus on the more or less direct ways in which enlargement has enhanced European integration. In this section, I analyze direct contributions and show that joining members have added their priorities onto the Community agenda, initiating cooperation in new areas and fostering progress in already integrated sectors. The overview of the enlargements' impact on the pooling of sovereignty contradicts the second premise of the EU 12' HCritier; p. 39. 
Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias, "Explaining Government Preferences for Institutional Change in EU Foreign and Security Policy," in International Organization 58, Winter 2004, p. 141. 
Generation Gap myth. Old members are not the sole contributors to the advancement of the united Europe; new members provide novel and valuable opportunities in the EU' s development. 
The first wave of enlargement added to the Community two Euro-skeptic states (the UK and Denmark) and a "believer in European integrati~n"'~~ 
(Iseland). Despite their initial reservations towards ~upr~anationalism, 
the two relatively reluctant new members quickly understood its virtues amd started using the available opportunities to their own advantage. The new interests that joining countries wanted to defend and pursue within the Community framework triggered the development of integration itself, adding dimensions to the European project and fueling evolution in stagnating areas. 
The only net contributor to the Community budget apart from West Germany at the time,l3l the UK concentrated on regional (as opposed to agricultural) funds to support its industrially declining regions. This was a strategic move, from the British perspective. Because it imported more agricultural products than other member states and had a small farm sector, "Britain [contributed] relatively more in agricultural levies to the Community's budget and [got] back relatively less in agricultural ~ubsidies."'~~
To increase its share of received European funds, the UK assumed leadership in developing a new area of Community power: regional policy. Britain and Ireland joined Italy and the Commission in the effort to establish a European Regional Development Fund that would provide assistance to the EC's poorer regions. Their endeavor was successful, and the Fund became operational in 1975. Before the first enlargement, Italy, although a.ssisted by the Commission, had 
130 Dinan, "Reflections on the IGCs"; p. 26. 
13' Kaiser, Wolfram, "What Alternative is Open to Us?" in Wolfram Kaiser and Jiirgen Elvert (eds.) 
European Union Enlargement: A Comparative Histoy, Routledge Advances in European Politics, 
London and New York: Routledge, 2004; p. 25. 
132 Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 149. 

repeatedly failed to achieve this, due to opposing old members. Hence, the accession of Ireland and Britain boosted a previously paralyzed area of Community power. Joining countries brought with them a different view of regional disparities,'" as well as their own interests to receive more European funds. 
The first generation of new members also contributed to European integration in other ways. The UK advocated for Europeam liberalization and for a rapid completion of the internal market. Ireland helped to develop redistributive policies, supported the common agricultural policy and encouraged the use of qualified majority voting in the ~ounci1.l~~ 
Denmark supported the common agricultural policy; however, the Danes insisted that their traditional (national) commitment to social policy and the pursuit of greater equa1il.y between the various groups of population be respected.135 
Denmark initially rejected the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum by a very thin margin (50.7 to 49.3). Scholars often present this as a proof of resistance to integration; yet, Denmark's rejection should be seen in a broader perspective. Although Maastricht was rejected by a razor-thin margin, this vote drew attention upon the ever-increasing feeling among European citizens that Community decision- making lacked transparency and democratic legitimacy. The Danish referendum institution warned against the dangers of ignoring the importance of transparency and the democratic connection between European citizens and Community institutions. 
Broad commitment to integration was not the main issue in the Danish case. If anything, Denmark's population can be considered much more committed to and 
133 HCritier, Adrienne, Policy-Making and Diversity in Europe: Escape from Deadlock; p. 64. 134 Moxon-Browne, Edward, "From Isolation to Involvement" in Kaiser, Wolfram, and Jiirgen Elvert (eds.) European Union Enlargement: A Comparative History, Routledge Advances in European Politics, London and New York: Routledge, 2004. 135 Laursen, Johnny, "A Kingdom Divided in Kaiser, Wolfram, and Jiirgen Elvert (eds.) European Union Enlargement: A Comparative History, Routledge Advances in European Politics, London and New York: Routledge, 2004; p. 42. 
aware of European integration than the citizens of older member states. The Danes 
had voted in a referendum to join the EC in 1972 (a respectable 63 percent voted in favor; the turnout was 90 percent), whereas France joined in 1957 by parliamentary ratification without consulting the population.136 Through the rejection of Maastricht in the first referendum, Denmark sent a strong warning about the EU's democratic deficit. "Many Danes rightly complained about the incomprehensibility of the treaty (...).More broadly, Community leaders grasped that Denmark's rejection of the treaty was symptomatic of widespread popular dissatisfaction with the institutions and procedures of European integrati~n."'~~ 
The united Europe needed to open up to its citizens, and the first enlargement cast light o:n institutional shortcomings and the need for reform. 
The Community's southern enlargements further developed areas of European authority, due to the joining countries' interest and determination to achieve European social and economic cohesion through the regional funds policy. Mediterranean states also wanted to initiate a common security policy. While each of the acceding members contributed to integration in a variety of ways, Spain's stance proved decisive in the remarkable transformation of the Community into an economic, political and social union in the late 1980s anld early 1990s 
The EC's social dimension and a renewed sense of collective responsibility for regional development emerged, as Spanish insistences led to the introduction of a European Cohesion Fund. At the same time, !Spain aligned with and even surpassed older members in numerous matters pertaining to economic integration and political union: it supported all three pillars of the future union. Spain promoted monetary union; advocated for the development of a common foreign and security policy, 
13kaursen,"A Kingdom Divided"; p. 46. 137 Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 259. 
including initiatives for a European defense13"; as well as supported cooperation at the 
European level in police and judicial matters.] 39 At Maastricht, Prime Minister Gonzales introduced the concept of European citizenship in the Treaty on European Union; this unique feature of the emerging gelo-political Union established a direct and substantive connection between Europeari institutions and citizens. In 1992, Spain joined four states of the initial Six (i.e. France:, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg) to create Eurocorps, a defensive structure that has already deployed troops and police on peacekeeping missions to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Eurocorps assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in August 2004. Within the CFSP pillar, Eurocorps directly commands the 5,000-man Franco-German Brigade, the Multinational Command Support Brigade, and EUFOR, which took over from SFOR 
in Bosnia in December 2004.'~' 
The other two Meditenanean newcomers also contributed to the advancement of integration. Portugal pressured for social cohesion and openness in European policy-making, demanding "more public participation in the reforms that were talung place within the EU."'~~ 
Initially more reserved towards integration, Greece has adopted a very strongly pro-integrationist stance since the 1990s, "consistently advocating deeper, more rapid and compreheiisive, pro-federalist policy initiatives (...) that [enjoy] widespread support both froin the body politic as well as from the vast majority of the Greek Greece supported economic convergence, 
13' De la Guardia, Ricardo Martin, "In Search of Lost Europe," in Kaiser and Elvert (eds), European 
Union Enlargement: A Comparative History; p. 106. 
139BarbC, Esther, Lapolitica europea de Espana, Barcelona: Ariel, 1999;p. 42-57. 
140 CIA World Factbook; Internet resource: http:llww~i.cia.govlcia~publications/factbooWgeos/ee.html 
14' Pinto, Ant6nio Costa, and Nuno Severiano Teixeira, "From Atlantic Past to European Destiny," in 
Kaiser and Elvert (eds), European Union Enlargement: A Comparative History; p. 125. 

Ifantis, Kostas, "State Interests, External Dependency Trajectories and 'Europe'," in Kaiser and Elvert (eds), European Union Enlargement: A Comparative History; p. 70. 
14' 

common security policy and agricultural po1ic:y. Mediterranean countries as a group 
also advocated for "an expansion of EU competence over co-ordination to promote tourism."'43 The new members helped the Union develop closer relations with Latin America and Northern Africa. 
The fourth enlargement towards Central and Northern Europe consolidated and stimulated EU empowerment in areas such as internal market, liberalization, institutional transparence, human rights, environment, social policy, foreign and security policy. Financially, it added three net contributors to the Union's budget. Austria wanted to belong to the 'inner core' of the Union, economically at least,144 and so did Finland, who decided to participate in the EU unconditionally and became a "model pupil" of integration.'45 At the same time, Austria and the Nordic countries shared a tradition of neutrality deriving from their previous position in the Cold War. Austria acted as a "trailblazer for other neutrals7' (Gehler; p. 133)and had a strong interest to participate in the internal market. Sweden ardently supported free trade, the EU's role as a peacekeeping force, bureaucratic and political transparence, equal rights for men and women, higher environmental standards and worker protection.'46 
Austria, Sweden and Finland insisted (even during pre-accession negotiations on maintaining high standards in the areas of health, safety and environment. Within the EU, they continued to promote higher standards in environment and social policy. Consequently, this group of newcomers contributed significantly to each European treaty after their accession. After the United States rejected the Kyoto protocol in 
143 Moravcsik, Andrew and Kalypso Nicolaidis, "Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, 
Influence, Institutions," in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1999); p. 64. 
144 Gehler, Michael, "A Newcomer Experienced in Ew-opean Integration," in Kaiser and Elvert (eds), 
European Union Enlargement: A Comparative History; p. 144. 
145 Ojanen, Hanna, "If in 'Europe', then in its 'core'?" in Kaiser and Elvert (eds), European Union 
Enlargement: A Comparative History; p. 150. 
146 Gussarsson, Maria, "Combining Dependence with Distance," in Kaiser and Elvert (eds), European 
Union Enlargement: A Comparative History; p. 170-188. 

2001, the European Union became a leading player in international environmental 
policy as a result of the newcomers' contributions. 
During the drafting of the Amsterdam Treaty, these states fostered reform with ambitious proposals. Based on a Swedish initiative, Amsterdam included a new Title VIII on employment. Finland initiated consumer protection policy. Sweden submitted proposals on employment. Both Nordic countries designed environmental proposals.147 The newcomers supported the use of QMV in areas such as worker information and consultation, and training anld reintegration of persons that have trouble enteringlreentering the labor market. Overall, Central and Northern European joining members initiated five new topics: solcia1 security and protection of workers; protection of workers when the employment contract is terminated; collective interest representation; employment of third-country nationals; and financing measures to integrate the excluded. 
Politically, as a group, Austria, Sweden and Finland advocated for more openness and transparency in EU decision-making, as well as additional empowerment for the European Parliament to solve the problem of democratic deficit. They insisted that the Union should not only enlarge further towards Central and Eastern Europe, but also build new links with Russia and open up to developing countries. The members of the fourth enlargement group have advocated for a strong 
148. .
regional policy ,in other words, they support a delegation of authority from national governments to sub-statelregional structures coordinated by European institutions (i.e. less intergovernmentalism and more multi-level governance). 
147 Moravcsik and Nicolaidis; p. 71. Cameron, Fraser, "The European Union and the Fo'urth Enlargement," in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 33, Annual Review (August 1995);p. 30. 
14' 

Given their tradition of neutrality, Austria, Sweden and Finland have revived 
and developed the EU's mission to promote peace and stability in Europe. 149 A Swedish-Finnish proposal strengthened the E1J's involvement in the peacekeeping (via the so-called Petersberg tasks). Before th~is commitment to humanitarian and crisis management missions, member states ulsed to engage in unilateral policies and failed even to consult with other EU partners.150 The Swedish-Finnish proposal fleshed out the Union's second pillar, the Conmon Foreign and Security Policy. Older and younger members contributed to the European Security and Defense Policy project, launched in 1998 by the declaration of Saint Malo, a document in which a member of the first round of enlargement (the UK) and one of the initial Six (France) affirmed that the EU should develop the "capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces." After Kosovo, the 1999 European Council Cologne summit proclaimed ESDP as one of the Union's objectives. The EU declared its military capacity operational in 2001.I5' 
The Treaty of Amsterdam emphasized the member states' commitment to establish "an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime."152 Finland assumed the responsibility to flesh out this vague idea and focused during its presidency of the Council (during the second half of 1999) on developing the third pillar of European integration -justice and home affairs. Under Finnish leadership, the Council produced at the October summit the "Ten Milestones of Tampere," a 
'49 Cameron; p. 19. 
lS0Zielonka, Jan, Explaining Euro-Paralysis: Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics, 
Macmillan: Houndsills, 1998, St Antony's Series; p. 7. 
l5' Declaration occurred at the Laeken Summit in Belgium; the Union can mobilize 60, 000 troops 
within 60 days and sustain the deployment of forces for at least one year. 
lS2 Amsterdam Treaty, text available online at http://euu-opa.eu.int 

document named after the city in which the event took place. The Milestones gave 
concrete meaning to the aspiration towards the area of freedom, security and justice: they included a common asylum and immigration policy; better administrative, judicial and police cooperation to fight organized crime; and fair treatment of resident third-country nationals.lS3 

Trading Horses: The Indirect Benefits of European Enlargement 
Apart from the direct, voluntary contributions of younger members to integration, enlargement has reinforced the pooling of sovereignty indirectly through beneficial side-effects and trade-offs between old members who strongly favored enlargement and other members of the old geineration who were less enthusiastic about it. 
Typically, enlargement has constituted a political imperative for the united Europe. For instance, in the Community's early days, Belgium and the Netherlands "in particular were wary of possible French or Franco-German hegemony in the EC.U154 For that reason, they supported Britislh accession as a guarantee of equilibrium, a natural counterbalance to the Franco-Gesman axis. The Community's first enlargement diminished apprehensions among smaller member states, fostered stability and increased the political profile of the integrating Europe. 
In other cases, through enlargement, tlhe Community protected itself from exterior dangers such as political conflicts and economic instability on its borders. The Commission stated this explicitly in its composite report on applicant members, after the intergovernmental conference of 1996-1997: "Enlargement is both a political necessity and a historic opportunity for Europe. It will ensure the stability and security 
'53 Bulletin EU 6-1999. 
154 Desmond Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 99. 

of the continent and will thus offer both the applicant States and the current members 
of the Union new prospects for economic growth and general well being."155 The EC's southern enlargement consolidated demlocracy in the region and reinforced liberalism. After the Cold War, enlargement became again a political priority and a moral obligation. In the 1990s, expansion to include Central and Eastern Europe emerged as a widely accepted Community goal around which the idea of a common foreign and security policy crystallized again and developed. 
Enlargement also stimulated pre-enlargement reforms that aimed at securing more integration before the accession of new member states. Kaiser and Elvert note: With increasingly different historical experiences, economic structures and political priorities in the EU, all enlargements have led to a search for new unity in diversity and a greater deepening of integration. The prospect of Northern enlargement (...), for example, strengthened the determination of Jacques Delors (...) and other leading federalists such as the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (...) to sign and ratify the Maastricht Treaty to secure a higher level of integration before negotiations could be further complicated 
by the inclusion of new members.156 The Union's expansion became an important element in the usual horse-trading among old member states. For example, Eastern enlargement has been connected to finalizing a central component of integration: the Economic and Monetary Union. France supported monetary union. Germany still hesitated about accomplishing EMU, because, "by agreeing to a single currency, Germany would be giving up the mark and surrendering control over European monetary At the same time, Germany could gain very much if Central and Eastern European countries joined the Union. Naturally, a deal resulted, and "the decisive factor (...) was Germany's informal but firm insistence that rapid enlargement to a fe~w east European countries be considered 
Bulletin ofthe European Union, no. 12 (1995), Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg. 15%aiser, Wolfram, and Jiirgen Elvert (eds.), European Union Enlargement: A Comparative History; 
p. 2. 
15' Dinan, "Reflections on the IGCs"; p. 33. 

a quid pro quo for EMU."'^' In other words, had it not been for this enlargement- 
based trade-off between France and Germany, one of the most prominent dimensions of European integration, the monetary union emd common currency, might not have been achieved (or, in the best-case scenario, it: would have been accomplished after a long delay). 
One could try to defend the EU Generation Gap legend by arguing that, in some cases, newcomers have slowed down integration. This thesis does not claim that such situations cannot possibly occur. It rather refutes the widespread belief that old member states are a homogenous group committed to integration, whereas new members usually impede deepening. Country preferences (national interests) can vary as a result of changing leadership on national political arenas. Furthermore, the degree to which a country is committed to co-operation and European integration varies from one policy area to another. The UK supports liberalization, but at the same time, due to the fact that it has distinctive preferences aind a viable unilateral policy, it advocates for preserving unilateral veto in common foreign policy.159 Germany opposes liberalization of sectors such as telecommunication and transport policies, which does not prevent it from being the most adamant promoter of greater EU involvement in the sphere of coordinated immigration. 
Despite these complexities, integatio~i and enlargement have proceeded in parallel, and widening did not have the deleterious impacts on deepening that many scholars predicted and expected. "[Tlhe European integration dynamics have [sic!] led to a 'deepening' of the EU despite its greater heterogeneity, allowing the necessary adjustments inside the EU for each enlargement. So far 'widening' has not 
Moravcsik, Andrew, (ed.) Centralization or Fragmentation? Europe Facing the Challenges of Deepening, Diversity, and Democracy, "Europe's Inte<gation at Century's End", 1998; p. 39. 
Moravcsik and Nicolaidis; p. 64. 
prevented 'deepening', but even brought it about in different ways."'" This is precisely the relationship between enlargement and integration that this chapter has revealed by challenging the widespread myth of the European Generation Gap. My message is quite simple: old members should not be idealized, and newer members should not be demonized. Enlargement is far from representing the most severe threat that endangers European integration, and most importantly, as Baldwin remarks, Eastern European enlargement remains "an essential pillar in Europe's post-Cold War architect~re."'~' 
160 Elvert, Jiirgen, "A Fool's Game or a Comedy of Errors?" in European Union Enlargement: A 
Comparative History; p. 205-206. 
16' Baldwin, Richard, et al., "The Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlargement: The Impact on the EU 
and Central Europe," in Economic Policy, Vol. 12, No. 24 (April 1997);p. 168. 


CWAPTEX 111 
The Union Strikes Back -The Procrustean Bed of Enlargement 
Negotiations 

While this thesis may argue effectively that enlargement per se does not automatically dilute the substance of integrati~on and may present convincing evidence from European Community history to support its point, this claim alone does not reduce the possibility that adding new members to the EU may, under particular circumstances, endanger the pooling of sovereignty. If existing members and Union institutions cannot counter or, at least, control and diminish the possibility of such occurrences, the European project remains extremely fragile in the confrontation with successive waves of enlargement and shifting historical circumstances. Since old member states, EU institutions, scholars and government officials systematically connect the enlargement menace to increased heterogeneity, this chapter analyzes the mechanisms that the old generation of member states and European institutions use to ensure that the EU can cope with the presence of new members, remaining -as its motto In varietate concordia asserts -"united in diversity." Basically, this chapter shows the ways in which existing members and European structures diminish the disintegrative potential that adding atypical and diverse new members to the Union would otherwise generate. 
The relationship between the EU and its member states is bidirectional: they mutually influence and shape each other. Specifically, in connection with the Union's enlargement, joining members contribute to tlhe European project (as Chapters I and I1 of this thesis reveal); at the same time, old members can influence and even mold new members. At no point in time is the Union more capable of remodeling a state and influencing its policy lines and administrative: structures than during the process of 
negotiation for membership in the pre-accession period. Joining the EU is the prime 
time for giving new members extreme makeovers and defining their relations with the united Europe and individual old member states for the first years of membership. In terms of integration, there are two radically different types of perceived menace that cause enlargement-related apprehensions among old members: 1) Joining member states may prove unalble or unwilling to integrate at the existing Community levels (at least in a certain number of policy areas) andlor 
2) 	Joining member states are more capable and eager to integrate than old members would want them to be; thus, in sectors where joining countries are relatively successful when compared with the EU, the newcomers' influence would endanger the Union's "sclerotic where protectionism and inefficiency persist up to this day, witlh the implicit or explicit blessing of EU institutions. According to the nature of these radic,ally dissimilar threats, two classes of 
defense strategies/mechanisms emerged to diiminish any unfavorable consequences that enlargement may have on the pooling of sovereignty and the current configuration of power in the Union, from the old member states7 perspective. All mechanisms are primarily and most effectivelly applied in the pre-accession period. Like Procrustes who forced travelers to lie down on a bed and "adjusted" the person's dimensions to fit those of the bed, European institutions and old member states can shape the profile of joining countries before enlargement by applying two classes of strategies: 
16' Grabbe, Heather, "What the New Member States Bring into the EU in Neil1 Nugent (ed.), European Union Enlargement, Basingstoke and New 'York: Palgrave Macrnillan, 2004; p. 72. 
1) Strategies to ensure that enlargement does not obstruct or dilute integration in 
policy areas where existing member states want to maintain the status quo or 
even increase the pooling of sovereignty; and 
2) Strategies to ensure that enlargement does not stimulate the advancement of 
integration and does not increase pressures for reform up to levels that the old 
member states deem undesirable and contrary to their national interests. Both classes of strategies take advantage of the power asymmetry separating the old and young generations of members. This asymmetry has, especially in recent years, after the dismantling of the Iron Curtain, "tilted [the balance of power] very heavily towards the EU side"163 and placed EU members in the driver's seat in negotiating the accession of other countries. Indeed, the Union currently controls the accession process and the outcome of negotiations with candidates for membership so intensely that many scholars have wondered whether the "process really merits the description of 'negotiations. 39,164 
Attempting to deduce the main neo-fumctionalist expectations about the impact of enlargement on European integration, Sch~nitter affirms that adding new members to the Union can have negative effects on integration if it attenuates or delays the probability of spill-over. As the scholar points out, neo-functionalists would anticipate post-enlargement dilutions of integration "unless (...) a spill-over in task or authority is built into the negotiations surrounding the accession process as a means of compensating existing members or accommodating new ones."165 In theory, one could argue, as the Union developed over time, integration-protective devices have been gradually built into the ever stricter terms of accession agreements. As Nugent 
163 Nugent, Neill, "The Unfolding of the 10+2 Enlargement Round in Neill Nugent (ed.), European 
Union Enlargement, 2004; p. 53. 
164 Nugent, idem; p. 52. 

Schmitter, 2004; p. 70. 
remarks, negotiations with Central and Eastern European candidate countries mainly 
consisted of "the applicant states trying to satisfy the EU that they had both incorporated the acquis into national law as required and had suitable administrative structures and arrangements in place to be able to fully apply the acquis." Joining members had "no choice but to transpose virtually all of the 80,000pages of the legislative acquis" and to develop the administrative capacity to implement it. "Applicants had to adopt the EU a requirement that represents a built-in compensation for existing members. The fact that new members gain access to cohesion and regional funds, European agricnltural benefits and other types of assistance seems to support the neo-functionalist hypothesis: new members receive compensations for pooling sovereignty. Acceding countries secure transitional arrangements in sensitive sectors to facilitate their adjustment to EU standards, a further proof that the Union attempts to accornmodate the newcomers7 interests. Finally, EU institutions actively collaborate with applicants and assist them in meeting the requirements for membership. 
At a closer look, however, the intergovernmental dimension of enlargement negotiations becomes striking. In practice, there has never been anything automatic, in the pure neo-functionalist sense, about negotiations for accession and their outcomes. Most decisions result from prolonged intergovernmental bargaining among old member states that attempt to reach a compromise while defending their national interests. The less powerful and affluent the joining state, the less heard its voice is during the negotiation process, and the less in~fluence its preferences have on the final outcome of the bargaining. For countries with weak economies, available benefits are greatly reduced (this is fair, some argue, because the less developed a candidate, the 
'" Nugent, 2004; p. 53. 
more it will benefit from EU membership). Offered opportunities for adjusting to 
European standards, policies, and legislation ;also become fewer. Furthermore, old member states often pursue national interests at the expense of future opportunities for integration, especially in areas where the new members' higher standards or superior levels of performance could become catalysts for European reform. 
This chapter examines the ways in which pre-enlargement bargaining counterbalances and eliminates some negative consequences that excessive heterogeneity could have on integration. It analyzes the nature and outcomes of the negotiations preceding the EU's successive einlargements to show that the Union and its member states have systematically assumed an increasingly more rigorous control over enlargement as the candidates applying for membership have become increasingly more different from old member states. The chapter shows how the two classes of strategies have been applied in pre-.accession negotiations to control the terns of EU expansion and diminish enlargement-related apprehensions among old members: strategies to secure integration in areas where old member states favored the status quo or the prospects for delegating more authority to European institutions; and strategies to prevent further integration from occuning in areas or directions that old member states considered contrary to thei~r national interests. 
To secure and stimulate integration, European institutions and old member states have resorted to a combination of harsh conditions for accession (high standardslinflexible requirements) and assistance (both financial and technical) to help joining members adjust to the Community model. To prevent undesirable integration in sectors and directions that could hurt their national interests, old members have restricted the newcomers' opportunities to benefit from their comparative advantage, by offering them less; substantial benefits, restricting their use of Community rights, delaying the joining members' integration through long transition periods, etc. 
The availability of two classes of strategies that stimulate/consolidate integration or, alternatively, diminish potential for integration according to the old member states' interests turns pre-accession bargaining into a Procrustean bed for joining members. When candidates for EU miembership are weak, existing members and supranational institutions gain decisive power over negotiations and their outcome. The Procrustean bed ensures cohesion and long-term protection of EU decision-malung, as it controls the tempo of integration so that this pace is neither stagnating, nor slowing down, nor accelerating excessively. On the one hand, if integration were diluted by enlargement, the lJnion would suffer. On the other hand, if the pooling of sovereignty advanced too fast despite the old members' opposition, the Union would eventually collapse from within, torn apart by the conflicting interests of its member countries. To the extent that we perceive the classes of enlargement- related strategies that regulate the tempo of integration as part and parcel of the expansion process, we can argue that enlargement has acquired a built-in mechanism for ensuring cohesion in the Union and, in the long run, for protecting integration itself. 
Promoting Integration: Reducing Heterogeneity by Harsher Conditions and Assistance 
Currently, in order to preserve the exiisting levels of integration, old members and EU institutions request candidates for acc:ession to adopt the entire bulk of Community legislation (the acquis communautaire). The EU explicitly formulated this and other guidelines after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in anticipation of the European enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe. For the first time in 
Community history, the 1993 Copenhagen summit laid down the conditions that 
countries aspiring to membership had to meet. Why did this enlargement lead to a concrete formulation of requirements for accession, and how did the Union go about adding new members before Copenhagen? 
During the Cold War, enlargement was officially regulated by the "very open Article 237"167of the Rome Treaty, which simply stated: "Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community.. . The conditions of admission and the adjustment to the Treaty necessitated thereby shall be subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant States." This reminds of the misleading openness implied by the 1950 Schuman De~l~aration, 
a document which claimed that the Franco-German-centered coal and steel community would be "open to the participation of the other European countries." 
The two official statements must be interpreted within the broader historical context of post-World War I1 Europe in which they were designed. The slightly disingenuous tone created an illusion of openness around the emerging European Communities. In fact, Eastern Europe was excluded from participation by virtue of the Cold War; Spain and Portugal were isolated because of General Francisco Franco and Antonio Salazar's dictatorships, respectively; some Nordic countries had rejected supranationalism in the late 1940s; and other Scandinavian and Central European countries had decided to remain neutral on a divided continent to avoid conflict with an aggressive Soviet Due to this geopolitical configuration, accession represented a real option only for a small groiup of Western European countries that, for the most part, shared the characteristics and interests of the initial members, as well as their vision of European integration. At the time of the Schuman Declaration 
167 Nugent, "The Unfolding of the 10+2 Enlargement Round"; p. 35. Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 46-47. 
and Rome Treaties, the concrete circumstances in the international arena inherently 
protected European integration, as they rendered impossible enlargements that could have entailed excessive increases in heterogeneity among Community members. Therefore, formulating specific criteria for membership in the early years of the uniting Europe would have been premature and superfluous. The assumption was sufficient: "a democratic political system was a necessary qualification for entry."'69 
At the time of its accession, Britain was already perceived as an insider, despite de Gaulle's repeated vetoes on the British application for membership. After Georges Pompidou became the President of France, enlargement occurred quasi- automatically as a matter of fact, despite the unsurprising debates that surrounded the precise terms of the agreement. Controversial issues ranged from the future of New Zealand butter in England to the Common Agricultural Policy and from Commonwealth sugar to the British contribution to the EC budget. Britain was an important economic power (in the EC, it became upon accession a net contributor to the budget) and, as such, it could forcefully defend its interests when negotiating with the Community. To facilitate British accession, the EC maintained a flexible position in the bargaining process and even modified a previously integrated policy upon the candidates' (read: British) request, although Britain was widely known for its characteris tic Euro-skepticism. 
Before the first enlargement, EC members had hastily and unsubtly adopted a common fisheries policy that gave member states unlimited access to each other's waters. This policy, so clearly formulated in anticipation of enlargement, incensed the British fishing community, as well as interest groups from the other two candidate countries (Ireland and Denmark). Pressured by the applicants, the Six agreed to 
'" Nugent, Neil1 ,"Previous Enlargement Rounds" in Neil1 Nugent (ed.), European Union Enlargement; p. 28. 
modify this European policy area. Fisheries were, as Dinan remarks, "the only 
Community policy that the Six agreed to change as a result of enlargement"170 (my emphasis). The three joining countries secured derogations in other sectors. Over a decade separated the first British, Irish and Danish application to join the EC from the year of accession (1973) due to de Gaulle's repeated veto on the British application. This decade facilitated adjustment, as the interval became, in practice and especially for Ireland and Denmark, a transitional period for adopting EC standards. Initially, Denmark had requested temporary regimes for the capital market and the part of its industrial sector that was lagging behind in yet, by the time of accession, these problems had been already solved. The same decade gave the Irish sufficient time to catch up, so that by 1973 Ireland was able to adapt to EC economy. However, the country still requested and received some derogations (e.g. Ireland's labor market was protected from an influx of foreigners seeking jobs for a period of five years).172 Most significantly, the EC compensated joining members by creating a European Regional Development Fund that benefited Britain and Ireland. 
With the prospects for a Mediterranean enlargement, a clearer (though still implicit) set of requirements for membership started to develop. For instance, the EC suspended its association agreement with Greece in response to the right-wing coup that ushered in a military dictatorship in 1967'. The authoritarian nature of Salazar's regime excluded Portugal from membership in the Council of Europe. The initial assumption that had surrounded the European Communities was reinforced by the 
170Desmond Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 136. 
I7l Laursen, Johnny, "AKingdom Divided in Kaiser ;md Elvert (eds.), European Union Enlargement: 
A Comparative History, London and New York: Routledge, 2004;p. 38. 
172 Moxon-Browne, Edward, "From isolation to involvement" in Kaiser and Elvert (eds.), European 
Union Enlargement; p. 57. 

power of a precedent: a country had to be democratic in order for its application for EC accession to be ~0nsidered.l~~ 
As Mediterranean dictatorships collapsed one by one and the fledgling democracies expressed the desire to join the (lornmunity, the threat of excessive heterogeneity started to crystallize. Greece, for instance, was "desperately poor, with a per capita income less than 25 percent of thlz EC average,"174 at the time of accession. Although enthusiastic about European integration, Spain and Portugal were also much poorer than all existing member states except Greece and Ireland. The balance of power in negotiations was obviously tilted towards the EU side; as a result, European institutions and old members adopted a less flexible approach in bargaining, and even the nature of desired outcomes changed. As Kostas Ifantis remarks, "while in the 1973enlargement, the transitional arraiigements were exclusively for the benefits of the candidate-states, in the case of Greece, negotiations aimed at protecting the Community from the impact of the admission of a relatively under-developed country."175 The same can be said of the old member states' line of bargaining with Spain and Portugal. While this is not an automatic built-in mechanism, it has been functioning just as impeccably. Old member :states have established a community for their own advantage, a community that helps them to pursue more efficiently their interests. Hence, old members will forcefully defend integration that serves their national interests and brings benefits. They will make sure that newcomers do not 
173 Pinto, Antonio Costa, and Nuno Severiano Teixeira, "From Atlantic past to European destiny" in Kaiser and Elvert (eds.) European Union Enlargement; p. 114. 
Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 169. 175 Ifantis, Kostas, "State interests, external dependency trajectories and 'Europe"' in Kaiser and Elvert (eds.) European Union Enlargement; p. 82; also Blacksell, Martin, "The European Community and the Mediterranean region: two steps forward, one step back" in Williams, Alan (ed.), Southern Europe Transformed: Political and Economic Change in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, London: Harper & Row, 1984;p. 268-288. 
interfere with policy areas in which member states have already pooled sovereignty and delegated authority to the European level of governance. 
Instead of allowing Mediterranean states to secure derogations from the European treaties, old member states preferred to resort to a combination of relative inflexibility in negotiation and redistributive measures. The Community protected the pooling of sovereignty against potential resistance from new members by creating in the mid-1980s the Integrated Mediterranean Programs, a set of assistance packages for existing and prospective Mediterranean member countries. Old member states also offered generous assistance for agricultural, social and transport projects in exchange for the new members' commitment to strive towards adopting the Community model as soon as possible. 
The EC collaborated with candidates, offering them not only money, but also guidelines to follow in adjusting to the European model. European institutions gladly assumed leadership and structured negotiatio~is in chapters corresponding to individual policy areas. In order to close each chapter, candidates had to follow the recommendations of European institutions and demonstrate progress in domestic reforms. For instance, the Spanish Restructuring and Reindustrialization Law passed in 1984 despite trade union opposition and lalbor disputes. The act benefited from EC guidelines on the chapter of industry and represented a major step towards adapting to Community standard^.'^^ 
This mixture of general inflexibility in negotiations and assistance for adjustment/compensation in exchange for accepting integration has remained a constant ingredient of the enlargement process, on the EU side, ever since the accession of Mediterranean states. This trend is not particularly obvious because the 
176 De la Guardia, Ricardo Martin, "In search of lost Europe" in Kaiser and Elvert (eds.), European Union Enlargement; p. 104. 
1995 Union expansion towards Central and Northern Europe added three states that all became net contributors to the European budget and whose economic situation was comparable to that of the oldest member states. Austria, Sweden and Finland were "small demographically and well off economically," so the increase in membership was "the easiest enlargement for the EU to digest."177 The newcomers had already largely integrated their markets with the Con-tmunity through the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and later the European Economic Area (EEA). 
Even so, the combination of tactics aimed at protecting and promoting integration is noticeable in the bargaining and accession process. For instance, during negotiations, Sweden asked for the right to opt out of the third phase of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and the request was not granted178 despite the fact that older member states like Britain and Denmark had obtained this hnd of der0~ati0n.l~~ The other facet of the strategy was also present: EU members and institutions created a new category of structural funds for Arctic areas to compensate Nordic states for contributing to the CAP. 
After the dismantling of the lion Curtain, enlarging the united Europe towards Central and Eastern Europe to include ex-connmunist countries appeared as both a political necessity and an unavoidable threat to integration. The heterogeneity that new members were going to bring into the Union caused unprecedented fears. As Heather Grabbe explains, the ten new Centrall and Eastern European members were going to change the EU "by increasing its population, by increasing its economic disparities, and by bringing in more diversity" from the political and ethnic point of view. If, post enlargement, the Union's population increased by a quarter, the joining 
177 Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 269. 
178 Gussarsson, Maria, "Combining dependence with distance" in Kaiser and Elvert (eds.); p. 181. 
'79 However, Sweden did not participate in launching the third phase of EMU in 2002. In spite of the 
fact that legally it had no opt-out clause, the Swedish government consulted the population through a 
referendum that showed the opposition of the Swedes to joining EMU. 

countries' effect on the economy was less significant, as new members added just 8 per cent to the EU's GDP (at purchasing power parity). Furthermore, "the acceding states have income levels of between one-third and two-thirds of the EU average (...). However, there is a diversity of income levels among the EU-15, so the top end of the new members' incomes overlaps with the bottom of the EU-15's income range."l8' Per capita incomes in Slovenia were similar to those of Greece and Portugal; yet, incomes in Latvia were only one-third of the Union average. The candidates also had large rural populations and high unemployment rates. 
To counter the threat of extreme heterogeneity resulting from enlargement, old member states used the already classic combination of rigid negotiation and compensation. Accentuated power asymmetries between the old and new generations of members enabled the EU to assume leadership and quasi-absolute control of accession. Aid preceded inflexibility. In 1989, the Commission assumed responsibility for coordinating assistance to Central and Eastern Europe. Subsequently, the EC launched the PHARE program (Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Reconstruction of the Economy). This initiative that supported Central and Eastern European reconstruction was set up to provide urgent humanitarian assistance, develop social-market economies and help establish democratic institutions. The Community established a European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a major provider of loans to assist the extreme makeover of the former Soviet bloc. EC old members completed several bilateral trade and cooperation agreements with the fledgling democracies. At the same time, Community institutions 
180 Grabbe, Heather, "What the New Member States Bring Into the European Union," in Kaiser and Elvert (eds.); p. 71. 
began working closely with Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) to 
transform their economies and consolidate their new democratic political systems.'81 
Conditions for accession became harsher than ever and almost entirely non- negotiable. The Union "set the entrance bar high, with stringent requirements designed to ensure that applicants do not threaten or endanger existing arrangements and practices."182 The Union's unwillingness to compromise as it had done in the past transpired during the first years after the Cold War. The pan-European rhetoric of integration contrasted with reality: "When it came to concrete market access measures, the EC refused to make generous concessions for agricultural products, textiles, and steel, highly sensitive sectors politically for the EC and highly important sectors economically for the CEECS."'~~
Member states defended their national interests; European institutions defended their power. 
Preparing future enlargement at the Copenhagen summit of 1993, existent members formulated an official invitation for accession: "the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe which so desire shall become members of the European Union." The invitation came with a list of requirements that applicants had to fulfill to be considered for membership. These were the so-called Copenhagen criteria, the first such list in EU history: 
0 
Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for ;and protection of minorities; 
0 
Existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces in the EU; and 
181 Nugent, "The Unfolding of the 1042 Enlargement ]Round; p. 43. 
182 Nugent, ibidem. 
lg3 Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 272. 

Ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence 
to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union.lS4 Not only were these goals that the CEECs hald to pursue through their own efforts, but they also were the directions in which the Union constantly encouraged and stimulated their development, by providing financial aid and technical assistance. At the 1994 Essen summit, the EU launched a novel approach to enlargement that added a new dimension to the negotiations, increasing the old members and European institutions' control on the process: a comprehensive strategy ("structured dialogue," in EU jargon) to prepare joining countries for membership. These "pre-accession" preparations185 involved detailed plans and administrative road maps towards acquiring membership that covered most EU policy areas and resulted from the collaboration of heads of state and government of current and prospective members. 
In 1995, the European Council approved a detailed Commission White Paper on how to prepare candidates, sector by sector, for full participation in the single market.lX6Decidedly, little is left to chance (or joining countries, for that matter) in the process of enlargement. Since 1998, the (:ommission has even published very detailed annual reports, called Regular Reports, on the progress of applicants towards accession. Meanwhile, other pre-accession programs for financial assistance emerged: ISPA (funds for transport and environment investment support); SAPARD (for agricultural and rural development); a set of programs involving co-financing with the European Investment Bank; etc .IS7 
184 European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, Brussels: General 
Secretariat of the Council; p. 12; and Desmond Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 275. 
185 European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Essen, 9-10 December 1994, Brussels: General 
Secretariat of the Council. 
186 European Commission, "Preparing for Enlargement," COM(95) final. 
187 Nugent, "The Unfolding.. .";p. 44. 

European institutions and old member states made sure that the "structured dialogue" remained a "structured monologue" reflecting almost exclusively the EU side. This guaranteed that integration could not be affected by the interests of joining members without the consent of existing members and EU structures. From the driver's seat, old member states imposed a quick and intense rhythm for reform in the CEECs. Far from simply promulgating the ne:w laws, candidates had to "overhaul their entire administrative, legal, and economic str~ctures."'~~ 
The actual 'negotiations' remained circumscribed to the applicants' attempts to receive permission for longer transition periods for adjusting to EU policies and legislation. Again, the Union proved harsher than ever: since it wanted to reduce the length of transitions to a minimum, the EU left little room for maneuver for applicants. "The average number of transitional arrangements that was eventually 'conceded' was only between 15 or 20 per member state, with few of them lasting more than three to four years." Even when granted, most concessions were highly specific and left no room for extension or interpretation (e.g. "Slovenia may grant digressive State aid for the production of oil pumpkins for a period of 5 years from the date of acce~sion"'~~). 
Often, the EU requires CEECs to be nnore committed to European standards than the older members of the united Europe. The double standard applied after the introduction of the Copenhagen conditionality is striking. Zielonka goes so far as to argue that the Schengen acquis is a symbol of 'inequality, division, and e~clusion.''~~ While the Union offers permanent Schengen derogations to the UK and Ireland, and two non-EU countries (Iceland and Norway) participate in the Schengen system, the 
'" Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 275. 
la9 European Commission, 2003, Reports on the Results of the Negotiations of Cyprus, Malta, 
Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovenia to 
the European Union; Internet resource: http://europa.eu.int 
'90 Zielonka, Jan, "How New Enlarged Borders Will Reshape the European Union," Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 39 (3), 2001; p. 507-536. 

EU required CEECs candidates to adopt the entire Schengen body of legislation as a 
condition for acce~sion.'~' 
Over the years, the Union has developed its capacity to shape joining members and control the terms of enlargement by imposing harsh requirements for accession, and providing financial and technical assistance to newcomers. Have EU negotiators only been motivated by a disinterested desire to ensure that new members are fully committed to the idea of a united Europe and the progress of integration? The following section of this chapter shows that tliere is another seemingly paradoxical way in which old members can protect integration from the potential negative repercussions of enlargement. The Procrustearn bed of pre-accession negotiations can work in two directions: it can either protect integration at existing levels and create premises for its advancement; or it can slow integration down to prevent the Union from becoming.. . too strong for its own goodl. 
Protecting the Old Generation: Avoiding Reform and Plaving Foul 
Enlargement can either hamper or accelerate European integration. In any case, the power of expansion as a stimulus for change derives from post-enlargement heterogeneity. If, on the one hand, joining members oppose integration, the pooling of sovereignty will become more difficult in the enlarged Union. The previous section has shown how the Union has developed strategies to effectively counterbalance this threat. If, on the other hand, new states are mlore successful in certain sectors and dedicated to the goal of united Europe, their presence will act as a catalyst for reform and further integration. Yet, as the second chapter of this thesis showed, old member states usually oppose radical reforms that hurt their national interests. Consequently, 
19' Buonanno, Laurie, and Ann Deakin, "European Identity" in Neil1 Nugent (ed.), European Union Enlargement; p. 100. 
one can expect the old generation to occasionally attempt to homogenize the Union at 
its level and preserve the status quo instead of pursuing integration and accepting change for Europe's sake. Due to the existing member states' interests, the EU has remained protectionist and rigid in many areas, a situation that joining countries may be eager to modify. The most effective way to make sure this does not happen after enlargement is to shape the terms of accessioin in ways that benefit the old generation at the expense of candidate states, as well as of integration and efficiency. 
This section examines the ways in which old members try to reduce heterogeneity in the sense of limiting the potential for reform that threatens the status quo after each enlargement. It shows how the terms of accession attempt to reduce or phase in over long transitional periods the benefits and comparative advantages newcomers may possess. It explores the ways in which old members attempt to make it very difficult, if not impossible, for joining countries to compete on fair and equal terms against them in the sectors where newcomers have a relative advantage or in the areas that newcomers mostly rely on in their economies. The old generation does not only reduce heterogeneity in the Union by pressuring and assisting new members to adopt the European model; it also uses the existing power asymmetries to impose upon candidates blatantly disadvantageous deals. In doing so, old member states implicitly ensure that European integration does not take a path that they consider undesirable. Interestingly, if the Union were to engage upon such a trajectory, its power would be greatly weakened in the long run. It would run the risk of expanding its authority too fast or in areas where the most economically powerful member states oppose delegation of power. Supranational overstretch could make the Union collapse from within, under its own weight, as soon as its institutional structure would be incapable of coping with internal pressures. F'aradoxically, by obstructing integration 
and keeping new member states in a situation of weakness and relative dependence, 
the old generation may be protecting not only the national interests of its members, but also the long-term existence of the European project. 
While, during negotiations for enlargement, old member states are quick to point out and frown at the policy areas in which less affluent newcomers are lagging behind, they do not seem to like any better the sectors in which candidates are doing well. The Procrustean bed of pre-accession becomes a tool that prevents joining members from entering the European market, where and when they are likely to hurt the national interests of old members. In the case of the Mediterranean enlargement, for instance, the new members' production of fruit, vegetables and olive oil endangered similar businesses from France aind Italy previously protected under the Community aegis from outside competition. [n terms of fisheries, the EC was reluctant to give Spain unrestricted access to its territorial waters, due to the fact that the Spanish fleet was not only bigger than the combined Community fleet at that moment, but it was also well known for its "insatiable appetite"192 (i.e. the typically gargantuan volume of its captures). The Community also feared the cheap Spanish and Portuguese workers moving towards northern Europe in search of employment. 
Long transition periods protected integrated areas against rapid and radical reform. Joining members that significantly differed from the Union average were only allowed to enjoy the benefits of full membership years after their accession. For example, in Spain, a transitional period of seven years was established for the integration of Spanish agriculture in the CAP'. A supplementary extension between four and seven years was set up for the very competitive fruit and olive oil, among other products. For fisheries, Spain was granted an extremely long time to adjust its 
'92 Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 190. 
enormous fleet to Community standards: seventeen years. '" The adjustment (read: reduction) has been completed, obviously, at Spain's disadvantage. 
The bigger the power asymmetry between existing and joining members, the easier it is to notice the disadvantageous terms of accession agreements for the latter. The EU offered its worst deals to Central and Eastern European countries. Although this was to be the largest enlargement in EU llistory, old member states were 
9,194 .
"avoiding politically costly but urgently needed internal reforms In the excessively profligate common agricultural policy, the colntroversial cohesion policy and the unwieldy institutional structure. In other words, the EU was not committed to restructuring its own policies, and existing members had decided to resist the pressures for reform that resulted from adding new members to the Union. 
In the case of both cohesion and agricultural policy, existing members had three main options for coping with the pressures of enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe: 
1) increasing overall spending on structural operations and CAP; 
2) drastically reforming these Community policies to make financial assistance 
more targeted; and 
3) being less generous to newcomers than to old member states. As Nugent remarks, in both cases, the EU's approach was eventually based mainly on the third option, with Structural Fund payments to joining members both capped and phased, and with CAP support to be gradua1l.y phased-in over ten years, until 2013, when CEECs would reach the Union's levels of funding.'" The EU justified its decision by claiming that it was in the joining states' interest to restructure their 
193 De la Guardia, "In search of lost Europe," in Neil1 Nugent (ed.), European Union Enlargement; p. 
105. 
194 Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 275. 
19' Nugent, "The EU and the 10+2 Enlargement Round" in Nugent (ed.), European Union 
Enlargement; p. 14. 

agriculture and embark upon reforms as soon as possible. At the same time, however, throughout Central and Eastern Europe, people started to understand that Western European countries were taking advantage of their superior position in EU negotiations for accession to impose upon calndidates agreements aimed at debilitating candidates and maintaining certain discrepancies in the long run. 
The interests of the EU-15 took precedence almost systematically over those of new members and the cause of European integration itself. While the conditions imposed on the joining countries were extremely rigid, the EU was unusually flexible in allowing existing members to protect them.selves against the undesired consequences of enlargement. For instance, one of the Community's fundamental freedoms, the free movement of persons -"a cornerstone of the single market and a basic objective of the EU itself '196 -was sacrificed as the EU insisted on being protected from the post-enlargement risk of massive migration of people from Central and Eastern Europe to old member states. The allowed transition period for existing member states will last five years with up to seven years of delay in some cases, from the date of accession. 
Old members want to avoid the fast-growing, dynamic economies with low- cost workforces that CEECs bring into the Union. Western European countries fear the higher competition within the common market that will increase pressures for structural reform.'" The inequitable redistributive policies towards new members ensured that older and less prosperous membler states did not have to suffer important losses as a result of the newcomers' competition for Union budgetary support. While states like Portugal managed to lose their status as "an under-developed country" 
196 Dinan, Europe Recast; p. 314. 
Ig7 Grabbe, "What the New Member States Bring Into the EU," in Nugent (ed.), European Union 
Enlargement; p. 72. 

thanks to Community support,'98 they have been reluctant to give up a share of their 
European structural funds to help the building of the united Europe. France, who has benefited from generous agricultural funds since the creation of CAP, also resists any reform that could affect its European funding. Hypocritically, old member states and European institutions justified the EU's lack of generosity by claiming that joining countries do not have the institutional capacity to absorb more funding; however, the pretext is ludicrous when the real cause for this incapacity to consume allotted funds is revealed. The EU's financial and budgetary requirements are so rigid that the older member themselves (despite their developed national administrative structures) are unable to use all the allocated money as designated; they had to return, in 2001 and 2002, 15 billion and 7 billion Euros respectively in leftover funds to the EU.'~~ 
Last but not least, the EU often resorts to foul play to reduce any comparative advantages that CEECs may have on the European common market. For instance, in its pre-accession negotiations with Romania, the EU required the candidate to align its domestic prices for natural gas to the European price. Among its natural resources, Romania benefits from the availability of natural gas that allows it to cover sixty per cent of its domestic consumption from internal extraction. At the time when this price-alignment agreement was made, natural1 gas costs for a thousand of cubic meters were $60 (domestic production) compared to $140 (imported gas). Romanian negotiators accepted the deal, thinking that coping with the price difference was a reasonable compensation for other advantages. Currently, however, when imported price levels have reached $285 or even S288 per thousand of cubic meters, the idea of 
198 Pinto and Teixeira, "From Atlantic past to European destiny," in Kaiser and Elvert (eds.) European Union Enlargement; p. 125. 199 Zeff, Eleanor E., "The Budget and 'the Spending Policies'," in Neill Nugent (ed.), European Union Enlargement; p. 179;and European Parliament, "Budget Surplus," Europarl News Report, Committee on Budgets, 17 July 2003; p. 4; http://www.europa.eu.int/omk/sipade2 
imposed cost alignment strikes as extremely unfair.200 Moreover, the expected price 
for 2007 will rise to no less than $32011,000 cubic meters.201 The EU insists that Romania adopt the higher costs of imported natural gas, a counterproductive measure. No similar conditions were imposed upon more affluent and powerful countries such as Austria, which does not have to align its low domestic energy price to European levels. 
The European foul play does not stop here, however: the EU also pressured Romania to privatize its domestic natural gas industry, which basically means that this industry will be purchased and controlled in the future by Western European investors who will make a fortune by selling cheaply-produced Romanian natural gas at the higher costs of the European market.202 Basically, not only does the EU want to rid itself of the price competition coming from the more successful and productive Romanian industry, but it also wants to force the candidate for accession to cede control over one of its main natural resources to the advantage of Western European businesses. 
This is just one example of how old member states resist the competitive pressures resulting from enlargement by resorting to unfair practices and imposing their will as a part of pre-accession conditionality. The Procrustean bed functions in this case to protect the protectionism that lingers within the Union's boundaries with the blessing of European institutions, without any regard to candidate interests, economic efficiency or prospects for harmonious integration. It can be argued that, if such measures keep the powerful old member states satisfied, integration will remain at levels that are acceptable and desirable for the net contributors to the common 
200 Information from Serbanescu, Ilie, "Pretul gazelor: o murdarie fara margini a UE in Jurnalul 
National, March 20, 2006; online edition -www.jurn;alul.ro. 
'01 Bolboaca, Lrina, "Pretul gazelor scoate sindicatele in strada" in Curentul, March 20, 2006; online 
edition -www.cwentul.ro. 
'02 Serbanescu. ibidem. 

budget. Thus, the future of the Union, while inefficient, modest, and dishonest towards many new members, would be assured. Yet, once accepted into the EU, CEECs will have an opportunity to use their voting power to change the face of European integration. The Western European desire to take advantage of a power asymmetry now may lay the foundation for future conflict with consequences just as severe for old member states as those of embarking upon reform and using enlargement to create a more efficient united Europe. 
CHAPTER IV 
Attempting Comparison -Hey EU,,What Kind of Political Animal 
Are You? 

Is it a bird? Is it a plane? No, it's a.. . Union! Utmost ambiguity sunrounds the nature of the EU as a geo-political entity and complicates any attempt to understand the relationship between the simultaneous processes of European integration and enlargement. The phenomenon is bidirectional: the Union's spectacular developments in terms of integration (the continuous empowerment of European institutions) coupled with its significant territorial expansion have amplified over time the general feeling that the EU constitutes an unidentified (and unidentifiable, for that matter) political object. 
One of the European Community's founding fathers, Jean Monnet, affirmed about the European integration project: "We isre not creating a coalition among states; we are uniting people" (Nous ne coalisons pas des e'tats, nous unissons des hommes). In the Preamble of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, signatories embraced a rather unclear aspiration, unprecedented in international diplomacy: to establish an "ever closer union among the peoples of Europe." What exactly was the Union going to require? What hnd of geo-political entity was developing from this newly established European Community? How much sovereignty and regulatory autonomy were member states going to transfer to supranational institutions? 
Initially, the existence of such numerous questions concerning the EC's birth, nature and future evolution was unsusprising. As for any geo-political creature in the making, descriptive and normative discourses about the "ever closer union" remained difficult to disentangle for a while: excited scholars and ambitious politicians were more eager to discuss what the European Cornmunity could or should become, instead of concentrating on figuring out what it actually was. On the one hand, in his 1946 Ziirich speech, Winston Churchill spoke of creating the "United States of Europe." At the Congress of Europe in The Hague in 19413,Altiero Spinelli, a fervent advocate of European unity, presented "federalism as a panacea for Europe's ills, an antidote to the evils of nationalism and the corruption of modem capitalism."203 Giving revolutionary meaning to Churchill's words, Spinelli supported the idea that the "United States of Europe" should immediately and irreversibly replace the existing system of sovereign states on the Old On the other hand, Charles de Gaulle criticized supranational Europe as unrealistic and undesirable. He argued instead for a "concert of European states" where national governments coordinate their policies extensively, but did not give up their rights as sovereign entities to a European "superstate." 
In time, instead of shedding metaphors in favor of more straightforward and precise expressions, political discourses continued in the same enigmatic note. Margaret Thatcher supported the idea that the EC should be a "family of nations" allowing each Member State to maintain its own identity. In 1989, Jacques Delors asserted that it was necessary to strengthen and expand the European "joint exercise of sovereignty." Heeding his call, EC leaders lay the basis for the Union two years later in Maastricht. Currently, the European Union website itself adopts an ambiguous language to try to enlighten its curious visitors about the strange geo-political animal it presents. The EU's "official definition" echoes Thatcher's ideas, but adds a strong supranational dimension to her vision: "The European Union is a family of democratic European countries, committed to working together for peace and 
'03 Dinan, Europe Recast: A History of European Union, Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2004; p. 23. 
'04 Spinelli, Altiero, "The Growth of the European Mo'vement Since World War 11,"in European 
Integration, Haines, C. Grove (ed.), Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1957; p. 37-63. 

prosperity." The website attempts to clarify this assertion as follows: "It is not a State intending to replace existing States, nor is it just an organisation for international cooperation. The EU is, in fact, unique. Its member states have set up common institutions to which they delegate some of tlieir sovereignty so that decisions on specific matters of joint interest can be made democratically at European 
As Andrew Moravcsik notes, "over the past half-century, the EU successfully expanded its substantive scope and institutional mandate until it now stands without parallel among international institution^."^^^ A geo-political entity developed in the globalization era, the EU has reshaped fundamental notions of international politics such as nation-state, national regulatory autonomy, international law, sovereignty, international cooperation, multilateralism, international organization, supranationalism, intergovernmental institutions, government and governance, citizenship, border, regionalism, etc. Its conbributions will define the directions in which European and international politics evolve in the twenty-first century. Given its paramount importance and striking uniqueness, the European Union can offer a key to understanding current phenomena (e.g. globalization) and the post-Cold War reconfiguration of the international arena. 
The present chapter attempts to open a new path in political science by going back to the basics and concentrating on the essential questions that have been, for the past half century, neglectfully tossed aside, at worst, or answered superficially, at best. I start by challenging the notion that the: European Union is, for all practical and theoretical purposes, an unidentified/unidentifiable political object. I resort not only to political science and its subfields (international relations, comparative politics and 
'05 Europa website -Panorama of the European Union: 
http://europa.eu.int/abc/panorama/index_en.htm 
206 Moravcsik, Andrew, "Federalism in the European Union: Rhetoric and Reality", in Nicolaidis, 
Kalypso, and Robert Howse (eds.), The Federal Visi0.n: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the 
United States and the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; p. 161. 

American politics, in particular), but also to history, legal studies and anthropology to 
compare the EU as a polity with other geo-political forms -present and past -which have shaped our world. Revealing existing commonalities and emphasizing significant differences, through a rigorous cclmparative analysis of different systems of governance, I aim to cast light on the EU's sui generis nature and, most importantly, to define the Union in a way tha~t captures its uniqueness, as well as its similarities to other geo-political entities: international organizations, federations, confederations, empires. This attempt to define can, in turn, inform my analysis of the relationship between enlargement and integration by placing it in a wider comparative context from which lessons can be drawn. 
"The United States of Europe," "a concert of European states," a "superstate," a "family of nations," a "joint exercise of sovereignty". . . All these memorable syntheses reveal just how difficult it is to talk about a unique geo-political entity like the European Union using the language of the state paradigm. As Daniel Elazar affirms, statism has been the "accepted world standard for political organization, that is, the standard in Western Europe" ever since the 1648 Treaty of ~est~halia,~'~ signed as part of the arrangement that ended the Thirty Years War. To define the EU as a geo-political entity and clarify the implications of enlargement for European integration, I compare the Union not only with polities belonging to the Westphalian international system and the post-Westphalian globalizing world, but also with pre- Westphalian polities. For instance, I analyze Jan Zielonka's claim that the EU is not developing the attributes of a traditional state, and will not become a neo-Westphalian state. According to Zielonka, the EU could be described as an emerging neo-medieval empire. 
'07 Elazar, Daniel, "The US and the EU as Models" in Nicolaidis and Howse (eds.), The Federal Vision;p. 33. 
Based on this ample comparison, I attempt to find equivalents to EU enlargement in the geo-political creatures that resemble the Union most. Then, I examine the effects of territorial expansion on the integratiodcentralization of power of these similar political creatures and attempt to draw lessons about what the consequences of enlargement in the EU may be. Also, I test the claim that homogeneity among the component units of a geo-political form produces a high degree of integration. I look at the Gulf Cooperation Council, whose member states are, according to Karns and Mingst, "among the most homogeneous nations in the world,77208
and try to see whether this homogeneity led to harmony. If that is not the case, the assumption that diversity automatically leads to discord in the European Union is seriously challenged. 
I structure my attempt to define the E,U and analyze the consequences of enlargement on European integration in two approaches: the first adopts the language of the Westphalian paradigm, while the second attempts to break away from it. The first two parts of this chapter compare the evolving EU with international (intergovernmental) organizations, and with federal political systems, respectively. The following two parts attempt to break aw,ay from the reference point of the state system. Part three tries to identify the possible connections between the European project as it currently functions and pre-Westphalian polities. Part four looks at the EU as an unprecedented geo-political entity and presents the conclusions on using the compasative approach to examine the effects of enlargement on integration. 
Karns, Margaret P., and Karen A. Mingst, International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance, Boulder, CO and London: Lyrine Rienner Publishers, 2004; p. 207. 
The levels of centralization/integration of component units within polities populating the international arena can be represented on a continuum including international and national arrangements. On this scale, at the end representing the lowest degree of interconnectedness, one would find the loose structure of international organization. At the other end, one would find the unitary state. In between, one could situate the broad variety of federal arrangements, ranging from the least integrated confederation up to the most centralized federation. 
Paul Taylor defines international organization as "any institution made up of the representatives of governments, having its own constitution; with a permanent headquarters."209 Traditionally, the notion of international organization has encompassed two distinct categories of entities: intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The latter are defined as "private voluntary organizations whose members are individuals or associations that come together to achieve a conlrnon purpose."210 Due to their non-governmental nature, NGOs cannot be integrated on the continuum and, as such, fall outside the scope of the present analysis, given the European Community's beginnings as an agreement among national governments. 
Intergovernmental organizations are defined as "organizations whose members include at least three states, that have activities in several states, and whose members are held together by a formal intergovernmental agreement."211 The category includes a large variety of structures. In terms of size, they range from subregional agreements (such as the Souther11 African Development Community) to 
'09 Taylor, Paul, International Organization in the Age of Globalization, New York and London: Continuum, 2003; p. 14. 
Karns and Mingst, International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance; 
p. 10. 
211 Karns and Mingst, International Organizations; p. 7. 

regional organizations (the Organization of American States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) or global organizations (the World Trade Organization). Some have just three members (the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Benelux Customs Union), while others have more than 190members (the Universal Postal Union). In terns of focus area, some concentrate on a single purpose or function (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), while others are designed to accomplish multiple tasks (the United Nations). In terms of activity levels, some meet only once every five years (the Universal Postal Union), while others meet yearly or even more frequently (1e.g. the World Health Organization meets twice every year). 
Typically, when international organization scholarship discusses the EU, it includes it in the sub-category "intergovernmental regional organization."212 Yet, given the mixture of intergovernmental and supranational elements that characterizes European institutions, this classification seenns inaccurate even at a relatively superficial examination. Paul Taylor's very general definition of "international organization" certainly encompasses the EU, although not entirely due to the fact that it leaves out the supranational dimension. The Union was initially largely made up of national government representatives. Currently, however, the European Parliament is directly elected by European citizens. Moreover, while Commissioners are usually perceived as "government representatives" in I0 analyses, they are not. While they are appointed by national governments in coinsultation with the in-coming President 
212 For instance in Feld, Werner J., and Robert S. Jordan with Leon Hurwitz, International Organizations: A Comparative Approach, 3rdedition; Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, 1994;Paul Taylor, International Organization in the Age of Globalization; Karns and Mingst, International Organizations; etc. 
of the Commission, "they do not represent the governments of their home countries. Instead, each Commissioner is responsible for a particular EU policy area.213 
As for constitution and headquarters, the other two elements included in Taylor's definition, they do not seem helpful in differentiating between international organizations and other political entities. Indeed, the EU has more of a constitution than any other international organization (Taylor uses the term "constitution" in his definition with the meaning of "constitutive treaty or agreement"). Due to the remarkable European legislative and judiciary system, treaties function as a defacto constitution of the EU, and the European Court of Justice has assumed the role of a European supreme court. Many EU laws are directly effective and take precedence over domestic legislation. In terms of headquarters, European institutions are located all around Western Europe (Brussels, Luxem~bourg, Strasbourg, Frankfurt). The fact that the Union fulfils these two criteria cannot inform attempts to reveal the specific traits of the EU as an international organization, due to the fact that the elements of "constitution" and "headquarters," while valuable in distinguishing international organizations from less integrated and struct1.u-ed ad hoc international arrangements, do not help in distinguishing international organizations from the more powerful polities on the centralization/integration continuum. Confederations and federations have constitutions; and Washington, DC, is the "headquarters of the federal government" in the United States. 
If these criteria are unsatisfactory or insufficient for differentiating between an I0 and other polities, or for examining the si,milarities and differences between the EU and other intergovernmental organizations, it is necessary to identify the traits that characterize governance in a typical international organization. As visible from the 
213 Quotation from the official Internet portal of the European Union: Europa -Panorama of the European Union, http:lleuropa.eu.int/abc/panoramdhoworganised/index~en.htm#co~ssion 
brief overview of IGO characteristics above, political entities included under this label are very diverse; nevertheless, there should be a number of common elements that this variety of political animals shares, despite thleir ostensible diversity 
As Clive Archer notes, The traditional notion of international organizations being established between governments is based on the sovereign state view of international relations which contains three important elements: that, with few exceptions, only sovereign states are the subjects of international law; that sovereign states are equal in their standing in international law; that sovereign states are constitutionally self-contained and international law cannot interfere with the 
domestic jurisdiction of their governrnents.214 However, as Archer himself points out, there are significant differences between what this traditional notion of I0 is in theory and the realities of the international arena. Many 10s such as the International Trade Organization or the Universal Postal Union allow non-self-governing territories to become members, although technically only states recognized under international law are entitled to join. Moreover, the notion of sovereign equality of states is almost systematically overlooked in the practice of international affairs: in numerous cases, states do not have equal voting power in international decision-making (e.g., only the five permanent members on the United Nations Security Council have the power of veto). Finally, the traditional notion of I0 would exclude the possibility of binding international decisions reached by any voting procedure short of unanimity. Yet, prominent intergovernmental structures like the UN allow majority decisions and, under exce:ptional circumstances, even intervention in the domestic affairs of a member state. Al1:hough Article 2.7 of the UN Charter declares that 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
214 Archer, Clive, International Organizations, Key C'oncepts in International Relations: I, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983; p. 38. 
any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter, it continues by adding a major exception to the rule: "this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII" (the chapter of the Charter on "Actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression").215 The traditional notion of state soverei~gnty is not sacrosanct in I0 practice. As a result, many authors attempt to synthesize ithe common characteristics of this category in less restrictive formulas. Bennett, for instance, lists the following five traits as defining: 
(1)a permanent organization to fulfill a continuing set of functions; 
(2) 
voluntary membership of eligible parties; 

(3) 
a basic instrument stating goals, structure, and methods of operation; 

(4) 
a broadly representative consultative organ; and 


(5) a permanent secretariat to carry om continuous administration, research and information functions.216 These traits capture some characteristics of the European Coal and Steel Community or the European Economic Community in its original formula established by the 1957 Treaty of Rome. They both were permanent organizations with clearly defined functions and voluntary membership. The treaties establishing them set their goals, structure and modes of operation. The European Parliamentary Assembly was indeed in its early days a "broadly representa.tiveV institution circumscribed to a consultative role. Finally, the High Authority in the ECSC and the Commission in the EC could be understood as permanent secretariats in charge of the "continuous administration, research and information functions." However, from its very beginnings, the European Commission was a unique and remarkably powerful body that not only accomplished the functions of a typical 215 Charter of the United Nations; Internet resource: h~ttp://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ 
216 Bennett, A. Le R., International Organizations: Principles and Issues, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977; p. 3. 
secretariat, but also acted as a European executive and legislator (i.e. it initiated, 
implemented and upheld European legislation). Moreover, the Community had a Court of Justice that, unsurprisingly, does not appear as a characteristic of international organization in Bennett's list. Exen if the subsequent development, empowerment and emancipation of EC institutions are not taken into consideration, the European integration project still strikes m its original post-World War I1 format as distinct from the typical 10. On the centralization/integration continuum, even the initial, less integrated forms of the "ever-closer union" place above the classic international organization. 
Doubtlessly, one could argue that the United Nations deviates from the kosher I0 formula through its provisions on the maintenance of international peace and security. Still, Inis Claude's insightful remarlk on the UN's nature as an organization and the intentions of its constitutive document synthesizes the basis of the specific difference that separates the EU from the catl~gory of international organization: "The [UN] Charter left no room for doubt that San Francisco had launched a project for cooperation among independent states rather than for consolidation of the nations under a kind of ~u~er-soverei~n."~~~ 
On the contrary, in the ECIEU case, the future of the "ever-closer union" remained one of the most difficult to determine unknowns of the equation. Not only did the Rome Treaty "leave room" for doubts related to supranationalism, but it actually opened the path towards the advancement of European integration. Furthermore, if supranationalism triumphed over intergovernmentalism, it was unclear whether nation-states would be consolidated under the aegis of a "European super-sovereign" (the way Alan Milward argued in his celebrated book The European 
Claude, Inis, Swords into Plowshares, 3rded, New York: Random House, 1964; p. 64. 
Rescue of the Nation-State), or whether the very existence and persistence on the Old Continent of the Westphalian state system would be undermined by the emerging European political order (as Altiero Spinelli ;and other Euro-federalists hoped). Basically, if the UN deviates somewhat from the traditional I0 formula, placing itself a bit higher on the integration continuum, the ECSC and the EEC deviate a lot more, and the EU can be placed even higher than all1 on the scale. 
Clive Archer's discussion of the functions of international organization proves particularly useful in trying to develop a sense of how far the European Union strays away from the template of intergovernmental organization. For the purposes of this analysis, three functions seem most relevant: rule-making, rule application, and rule adjudication. 
An analysis of the rule-making function in I0 supports the idea of integration continuum on which polities can be placed. International organizations are at the low- centralized end of the continuum; yet, the border between them and the next, slightly higher-integrated category of geo-political entities, i.e. confederations, is fuzzy. Paul Tharp lists six 'confederal' principles on which most 10s have predicated their rule- 
1. 	
The rules are formulated by unanimoius or near-unanimous consensus of members. 

2. 	
Members have the practical option of withdrawing from an organization and ending their assent to the existing rules. 

3. 	
Even as members, states can assert the right to interpret unilaterally rules to which they have consented. 

4. 	
The 'executive-bureaucratic' structure of the organization has little or no power to formulate (and implement) rules. 

5. 	
Delegates to the organizations' rule-niaking bodies are instructed by their governments and do not act as independent representatives. 

6. 	
The international organization has no direct relationship with private citizens of member states. 


218 Tharp, Paul A., (ed.), Regional International Orga,aisations: Structures and Functions, London: St. Martin's Press, 1971;p. 5. 
When analyzed against Tharp's 'confederal' principles of 10,EU rule-making 
appears more strongly integrated on almost all counts. Some European rules are indeed formulated by unanimous or near-unanimous consensus of members (QMV); other rules, however, can result exclusively from the activity of supranational institutions without being submitted to the approval of member states (e.g. the Commission's directives have immediate applicability -direct effect; the judgments of the European Court of Justice automatically become rules applicable throughout the Community). 
EU members have the option of leaving the Union; however, this may be more a theoretical rather than a practical possibility. No country has ever left the Union (with the quasi-irrelevant exception of Greenland in 1982 who had never been considered a member and had indirectly joined the European Community as a Danish territory in 1973).In fact, European integration attaches each country to EU institutions and other member states in a complex interconnectedness; these ties make withdrawal from the Union very difficult ancl disadvantageous, if not practically impossible altogether. 
The Union completely strays away from the third 'confederal' principle: within the bounds of membership, states can~iot assert a right to interpret unilaterally European rules to which they have consentecl. Due to the "constitutionalization" of EU legislation, the ECJ is the only institution entitled to interpret Community laws. Dotnestic courts collaborate directly with the Court and refer cases to it to obtain official interpretations of European laws in the form of preliminary rulings, by- passing national supreme courts (Art. 234 of the EC Treaty). 
As previously emphasized, the main European executive-bureaucratic structure -the Commission -is the most pocverful supranational body of its kind. It 
has not only the power to initiate European legislation, but also that of implementing 
laws and monitoring member state compliance with European norms. When it notices violations of European laws, the Commissiori can sue transgressors before the European Court of Justice. If the member state in question is found guilty, the Court can impose sanctions or fines on them. 
Among European institutions, only the Council of Ministers is officially composed of delegates directly instructed by national governments. Otherwise, Commissioners and Euro-Parliamentarians act as independent representatives; the former are explicitly prohibited from receiving instructions from the governments of their member states. The latter have been directly elected by European citizens since the late 1970s. 
Finally, the EU has a wide range of direct relationships with the citizens of its member states. There are many connections established between the supranational level of European governance and the popula~tion. Citizens can invoke European law before domestic courts or can resort to European courts for justice. Individuals benefit from the advantages of European citizenship they can move freely and seek employment in other member states. They vote in direct elections to select their country's representatives in the European Parliament. Also, both the ECJ and the Commission "can have direct dealings with private citizens, interest groups and firms in each of the member states."219 
The analysis of EU governance against the six 'confederal' principles of rule- mabng demonstrates that the Union has a superior level of integration relative to the typical IGO. Even Archer, whose book was published in 1983, before Maastricht, 
219 Archer, International Organizations; p. 164. 
noticed the extent to which the Community surpasses and remains irreducible to the I0 category: The European Community provides the most advanced model of another type of institution when judged on the criteria of rule-making: that which has advanced beyond the 'confederal' model mentioned by Tharp and which can make its own rules independent of the wishes of the member states. This 
represents a move towards a more 'federal' model with a central rule-malung institution which the various parts (member states) are obliged to obey.220 In rule application, the profile of the typical I0 remains along the 'confederal' 
lines condensed in Tharp's principles. According to Archer, in the international political system, the function of rule application is "left mainly to sovereign states as there is no central world authority with agents to undertake the task. Under certain circumstances international organizations tak:e on aspects of applying generally accepted rules."221 In other words, these rulels are parts or derivatives of international customary law or the codified quasi-uncontroversial international law. Organizations that enforce widely accepted principles include the International Committee of the Red Cross; Amnesty International; the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN Security Council. 
As with rule-making, EU governance belongs less to the traditional 'confederal' model of I0 and exhibits more 'federal' characteristics in its rule application. Again, Archer notices the presence of exceptional traits even before the establishment of the Union: 
It is part of the task of the Commission to make sure that the laws of the Community are applied within the member countries and the Commission may take a law-breaker to the European Clourt (...). To a great extent, the actual enforcement of Community law is undertaken by the agents of the member governments -the local authorities, tlie ministries, the boards and agencies -as if it were purely domestic law. Indeed the member states have incorporated Community law into their own domestic legal framework and have accepted the authority of the Community 
220 Archer; ibidem. 
221 Archer; International Organizations; p. 165. 
222 Idem; p. 166. 

Finally, rule adjudication refers to the function of international organization to judge and provide verdicts in internationallin~ter-statedisputes. 'Confederal' principles are reflected here as well: member states generally have to consent to IGO adjudication in a case involving them as parties, before the case can be heard by an international court. European adjudication is much less permissive: member states can be brought to the ECJ without their consent. Any EU member can be tried before the European Court. The 'federal' nature of European rule adjudication derives from the constitutionalization of EU law and the emergence of the ECJ as the equivalent of a European Supreme Court. "Unlike international law, [European legislation] has direct effect on individuals and other legal persons and must be obeyed by the sovereign states that are members of the union."223 
Although he perceived the EU as "another type of institution" more 'federal' than 'confederal', Archer still includes it, without any further clarification or justification, in his survey of international organizations. This attitude is not exceptional. I0 scholars unhesitatingly place: the ECEU under the category of "intergovernmental regional organizations." However, the contrast between the EU and the other political entities classified under this label could not be starker. 
Regional organizations in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America are far less developed, although many try to emulate the European institutional structure. I0 scholars remark the discrepancy. Karns and Mingst, for example, notice in relation to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) that "Asian and Asia-Pacific regional institutions tend to be informal with few specific rules, no binding commitments, 
223 Kms and Mingst, International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance; 
p. 171. 
small secretariats, and an emphasis on conse~lsus de~ision-malung."~~~ 
In fact, this 
description reflects the 'confederal' profile of a typical 10. 
ASEAN's goal is to promote regional security and economic development, but its core principle is non-intervention. It attempts to achieve cohesion by regular consultation. Its codified rules of conduct include the nonuse of force, peaceful settlement or deferral of disputes, and regional solutions for regional problems. Its predominant approach since its establishment in 1967 has been conflict management by avoidance and by provision of a framew01.k for the amelioration of bilateral relations in the region. Some analysts admit that "historically, ASEAN has never been a regional integration project" although in 20103 two members proposed establishing a common market .225 
Facilitating intergovernmental dialogue on economic issues to sustain growth and development was APEC's key objective at the time of its establishment in 1989. Another aim was building confidence to lay the foundation for multilateral cooperation in the region. Initially, the institutional structure consisted of several informal meetings of trade and foreign affairs ministers. Later, annual summits were introduced. A small secretariat prohibited from talung any initiative started coordinating activity. APEC has three pillars: liberalization of trade and investment, facilitation of trade, and economic and techni~cal cooperation. While this structure vaguely echoes the EU's, APEC lacks the "key criterion for the existence of an international regime: agreement on core principles."226 There is serious confusion about the organization's priorities and the ways in which those goals could be achieved. 
224 Karns and Mingst, International Organizations; p. 190. 
225 Idem; p. 193. 
22G 1dem; p. 196. 

There is no I0 equivalent to the EU in Africa either, despite the more 
institutionalized regional organizations that exist there. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) established in 1964 was a loose association whose resolutions carried moral rather than legal obligations. Member states repeatedly violated OAU's principles of noninterference, territorial integrity and sovereign equality. Although in 2002 the African Union replaced OAU, the restructuring failed to bring empowerment. In 2004 the AU gathered a joint force to intervene in civil wars or prevent genocide. The 1991 treaty establishing the African Economic Community raised hopes for integration despite the OAU's unsatisfactory record. 
Of all regions, the Middle East has the weakest regional organizations and the lowest number of attempts to create structures for cooperation and policy coordination. The League of Arab States formed in 1945 remains the strongest manifestation of Arab unity and an important forum in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Helped by its institutionalized structure, the League has made some steps towards a common market (the Arab Economic Union) and established an Arab Development Bank. However, integration efforts remain very weak. 
One of the Middle Eastern regional organizations provides a very useful example for the purposes of this thesis. The {Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) shows that the relationship between integration and internal homogeneify in an international organization is not necessarily one of positive correlation. "Economically, politically, and culturally, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and [the] United Arab Emirates are among the most homogeneous nations in the world."227 This should, according to the 
227 Karns and Mingst, International Organizations; p. 207. 
common knowledge, generate a high degree of internal consensus and policy harmonization. 
The six member states of the GCC resemble one another just as much as the initial six members that formed the European Community, if not more. Despite its homogeneity, however, the Council has been plagued by internal discord and torn apart by the competing visions of its members. Kuwait wanted the Council to provide the basis for establishing a common market among the six; Oman envisioned a military alliance built after the NATO model; whereas Saudi Arabia was mostly interested in setting up an organization that could provide a loose sense of collective security, while respecting the members' right to pursue their own interests.228 In other words, while member states themselves were homogeneous, their visions about regional integration were not. The different plans merged in 1981, when the GCC was established. The new security threats in the region (i.e. the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the war between Iran and Iraq) served as powerful catalysts. The Council's mandate includes cooperation among members in economics, finance, foreign investment, trade, customs, tourism and scientific progress. The Charter does not indicate secuirity and defense as areas of cooperation; yet, members have conducted joint exercises and established a 7,000-member-strong Peninsula Shield force.229 
The Council's effectiveness as a regional organization has been frequently questioned in all areas of cooperation. In terms of defense, despite declared non- alignment during the Cold War era, widespread anti-Americanism among citizens and high military spending, the Gulf Council has always relied on the US. Economically, 
228 Abdulla, Abdul Kahleq, "Gulf Cooperation Council: Major Origin and Process," in Hudson, Michael (ed.), Middle East Dilemma, Washington: Taurus and Co. Internet resource: 
www.ciaonet.orglbooklhudsonlhudson07.html 

229 Information about the Gulf Cooperation Council is primarily taken from Karns and Mingst; p. 207-
208. 

although duty-free trade among member states has been established since 1983, a 
customs union has still not been achieved, as the GCC has not yet enacted common external tariffs. Politically, the Council is largely ineffective. Also, policies in which consensus has been reached cannot be impleimented. For instance, although the GCC has established a common citizenship, very numerous populations of foreigners in each country prevent the free movement across borders. 
After examining the GCC's functions and structures, Karns and Mingst conclude: "While the GCC has potential to be a prominent regional actor, and the economic importance of its oil-producing members cannot be overlooked, lack of integration and conflict over the nature of the GCC have caused it to be little more than a convenient label for the six states that are members."230 The Council shows that lack of integration and internal homogeneity can coexist in an international/supranational structure. This example renders arguments that the EU should try to preserve internal homogeneity lo avoid disintegration shaky. Homogeneity among the EC's initial six is often excessively emphasized. Also, Western European countries such as Switzerland and Norway that resembled EC members most refused to join, another indicator that homogeneity does not necessarily coincide with an identity of purposes or harmonious visions of integration. 
Do the EU and the above political entities belong in the same category of IO? This thesis agrees with Archer that the EU is irreducible to an ordinary project of intergovernmental regional organization. Yet, there is a strange denial in I0 scholarship about the special nature of European integration. Karns and Mingst, for instance, describe the EU as "a unique entity, involving much more commitment than 
230 Karns and Mingst; p. 208. 
any other regional organization."231 The fornlulation is ambiguous: are the authors saying that the EU is unique? Or are they presenting it as a regional intergovernmental organization that simply requires more comnlitment from its members? Andrew Moravcsik has defined the EC as "a unique, imultileveled, transnational political system."232 
While presenting the EU as the most developed intergovernmental regional organization, I0 scholars insert in their descriptions a strong discourse of EU exceptionalism that contradicts their initial categorization. I0 approaches to the Union implicitly acknowledge that they cannot encompass this geo-political entity in their categories. The EU does not fit into the 'confederal' model. As a result, I0 scholarship ends up echoing the theme of the EC/EU as an unidentified political object. Some relate European regionalization with globalization, claiming that EU integration is a harbinger of future integratioin at a global scale. Paul Taylor explains the phenomenon: "The extension of competences directly to the global level was a step too far in many contexts: governments thought they were giving too much away at too great a distance. To give the power to be effective to a local agency was more acceptable as it seemed more recoverable."233 
On the centralization continuum, the European Union appears more integrated than any other intergovernmental regional organization (and any other 10, in general). Since the EU does not belong in the I0 category, comparisons between the consequences of European enlargement and the phenomena associated with increases of membership in a typical international organization would not be very relevant or helpful. 
23 1 Karns and Mingst; p. 159. 
232 Moravcsik, Andrew, The Choice for Europe: Sociol Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998; p. 1. 
233 Taylor, International Organization in the Age of Globalization; p. 254. 

Placing the EU at the lower end of thl: integration continuum among 10s is 
inaccurate; thus, this thesis follows Archer's claim that the Union has advanced towards a more centralized model to look for similar geo-political entities at higher levels of integration on the continuum, that is, in the "approximate areas" of confederal and federal arrangements. 
The EU through the Lens of Comparative Federalism 
My attempt to define the European Union as a geo-political entity and to examine the relationship between enlargement and integration in a comparative perspective is connected with the notion of change in the international system. This chapter has already discussed the profound confusion and radical revolution in international organization that the EC's emergence generated after World War 11, as well as the gradual shift of the "ever-closer union" away from the 'confederal' model. Before assuming again the language of the Westphalian state paradigm to assess the EU through the lens of comparative federalism, some observations concerning the limited theoretical possibilities that international relations theory offers for noticing and evaluating change must be made. 
The two leading approaches in twentieth-century international relations, neo- realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, both adopted a state-centric perspective on world politics and "condemned us to a world of power-hungry states which by definition could not change."234 Hence, ende,avors in this subfield cannot explore the transformations of the international political arena. John Ruggie summarized the widespread sense of frustration as follows: 
providing an account of things in contemporary international relations research means specifying their causes. That in turn requires that we have a 
234 Taylor, International Organization in the Age of Globalization; p. 3. 
theory -in this case, a theory of international transformation. But we have no such theory.. . we can barely even describe transformation in the international polity. .. 235 
As the lenses of available approaches are focused on the evolving EU, the absence of a theory capable of explaining change generates a need for increased skepticism and self-criticism. An unidentifiable political obj~ect (or one that is especially difficult to categorize) can indicate either an absence of scholarly interest (clearly not the problem in the EU7s case) or the occurrence of a major modification in the international system, a mutation that cannot be perceived when one is entrapped in a theoretical straightjacket. Ruggie quoted Quentin Skinner on the attitude that enables social scientists to notice such modifications.. Understanding change requires "a willingness to emphasise the local and the contingent, a desire to underline the extent to which our own concepts and attitudes have been shaped by particular historical circumstances, and a correspondingly strong dislike (...) of all overarching theories and singular schemes of explanation."236 
This is to say that the integratiodcentralization continuum proposed as a means to compare the EU with other geo-political entities is inherently entrapped in the Westphalian paradigm. The ends of the scale (international organization and state) are, by definition, linked to the modern concept of state sovereignty. Therefore, while this continuum is useful if the European Union does not constitute a sui generis entity, its advantages are reduced if one eventually reaches the conclusion that the European integration project is unprecedented and announces a radical reconfiguration of the international system. Even if the EU is unique (as the author of this thesis believes), drawing a comparison between it and existin,g political forms renders the Union easier to understand for the analyst born in the Westphalian age. More broadly, comparison 
235 Ruggie, John Gerard, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization, 
London: Routledge, 1998; p. 180. 
236 Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity; p. 10. 

helps social scientists identify the overlap between the obsolescent and emerging 
international systems in the era of globalization. 
John Ruggie identifies the EU as an instance of current change. He argues that it may be the "first multi-perspectival polity to emerge since the advent of the modem policy era"237 because, in this polity, "a collectivity of members as a singularity, in addition to the central institutional apparatus of the EU, [had] become party to the interstate strategic interaction game." Taylor explains Ruggie7s remark: "In other words, the polity of the European Union had two discrete levels, that of the states and that of the collectivity, and elements in each of these interacted directly with each other across national frontiers, and, in turn views about what constituted the state and their society were altered."238 The multilevel ("multi-perspectival") allocation of competences between the European and the state level evokes within the Westphalian paradigm the structure of a federal political arrangement. 
William Riker defines federalism as a "political organization in which the activities of government are divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions."239 Federalism is ofiten seen as a more normative rather than descriptive term, predicated on the principle that union and non-centralization should be reconciled, preserved and pursued at the same time. Ronald Watts explains: "[Federalism] is based on the presumed value and validity of combining unity and diversity and of accommodating, preserving and promoting distinct identities within a larger political union."240 Interestingly, the European Union's motto, In varietate 
237 Ruggie, idem; p. 195. 
238 Taylor; International Organization in the Age of G'lobalization; p. 244. 
239 Riker, William, "Federalism" in Greenstein, Fred, and Nelson Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political 
Science, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975; p. 1011. 
240 Watts, Ronald, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Ontario, Canada: Institute of 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1994;p. 6. 

concordia, translates from Latin as "Unity in diversity," a phrase that synthesizes 
remarkably well the central principle of federalism. 
To discuss the EU through the lens ol' comparative federalism, some preliminary notions are needed. The definition of the "federal political system" indicates where exactly federal entities are located on the integration continuum and what the variations (i.e. species) within this genus can be. Watts defines the federal political system as "a broad category of political systems in which, by contrast to the single central source of authority in unitary systems, there are two (or more) levels of government which combine the elements of shared-rule through common institutions and regional self-rule for the governments of he constituent units."241 Obviously, the federal idea can take and has taken an enormous variety of forms. While the present chapter has used an integration continuum on which both national and international forms of interconnectedness were situated, federalism itself can be perceived as a sub- scale embedded within the integration continuum. Species belonging to this scale range from "quasi-federations" and "federations" to "confederacies." 
Daniel Elazar identifies several speci-fic categories within the genus of federalism.242 Among them, the categories lilsted below are the most relevant for the present analysis: 
Federal Political Svstems (Source: Daniel ~lazurJ~~~ 
9 	Unions = polities compounded in such a way that the constituent units preserve their respective integrities primarily or exclus~~vely 
through the common organs of the general government rather than through dual government structures. Examples: New Zealand and Lebanon; Belgium prior to becoming a federation in 1993 (when central legislators served also with a dual mandate as regional or community councilors). 
9 
Constitutionally decentralized unions =basically unitary in form in the sense that ultimate authority rests with the central government but incorporate constitutionally protected sub-national units of government which have functional autonomy. 
241 Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s; p. 7. 
242 Elazar, Daniel, Federalism: an Overview, Pretoria: HSRC, 1995; p. 19; and Elazar, Daniel, (ed.), 
Federal Systemx of the World, 2ndedition, Harlow: Longman Group Limited, 1994; p. xvi. 
243 The definitions are quoted from Elazar's work. 

Although decentralized, most of them also have some federal features. Examples: 
China, Colombia, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sudan, the United IQngdom, etc. 
e 	Federations = compound polities, combining strong constituent units and a strong general government, each possessing powers delegated to it by the people through a constitution, and each empowered to deal directly with the citizens in the exercise of its legislative, administrative and taxing powers, and each directly elected by the citizens. Currently there are 23 federations in the world. Examples: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Palustan, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, the United States, etc. 
a 	Confederations = occur where several pre-existing polities join together to form a common government for certain limited purposes (for foreign affairs, defense or economic purposes -my emphasis), but the common government is dependent upon the constituent governments, being composed of delegates from the constituent governments and therefore having only zm indirect electoral and fiscal base. Historical examples have been Switzerland betweein 1291 and 1847, and the United States between 1776 and 1789. In the contemporary world, the European Union is primarily a confederation although it htzs increasingly incorporated some features of a federation (my emphasis). Other examples: the Benelux Economic Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
e 	Hybrids = Some political systems combine characteristics of different lunds of political systems. Examples are Canada in 1867 (basically a federation but contained some quasi-unitary elements); more recently, South Africa (1996), a federation retaining some quasi-unitary features; and the European Union after Maastricht, a confederation with some features of ajkderation (my emphasis). Hybrids occur because statesmen are often more interes'ted in pragmatic political solutions than in theoretical purity. 
Elazar initially identifies the EU as confederation at the lowest end of the 
integrationlcentralization continuum. However, from the interviews I have conducted, 
I gathered the impression that the "confederal" label itself is unclear: some scholars 
shared Elazar's opinion that an entity can be considered confederal even if its defense 
is not integrated (see above emphasis in the Elazar's definition), while others argued 
that centralized defense was an essential element of ~onfederation.~~~ 
Archer noticed that the EC surpassed the confederal principles and had already 
acquired some 'federal' attributes. Elazar see:ms hesitant about his categorization too. 
He qualifies it by pointing out that, after its tiransition from Community to Union, the 
European system has acquired federal characteristics. Confirming the existence of a 
244 From interviews with faculty members specializing in American politics and constitutional law, March 2006. 
continuum of centralization, Elazar resorts to the idea of federal hybrid, a category for intermediary federal political systems that reunite features of other species within the genus. Thus, the EU can be conveniently identified as a federal hybrid in a state of modification. 
Most scholars confirm Elazar's ambiguous label, usually replacing it with other phrases that are just as vague; many insist on the EU's uniqueness. David McKay suggests that the EU is a "species of federal state" or a "quasi-federal" geo- political entity.245 John Kincaid associates the Union with a constitutional federal arrangement, claiming that constitutional federalism offers "a way to provide a limited, overarching governmental framework for a common market while still preserving significant powers and functions for the political communities that joined the union."246 Establishing a common free market while accommodating the Member States' cultural and political demands for the relative preservation of their integrity, is precisely the EU's goal since its creation. Kuncaid identifies the "ever-closer union" as a "new model of federation."247 
Riker defines the extreme possibilities for federalism. At a minimum, the central government can only make decisions in one narrowly restricted category of action without obtaining the constituent gove:rnments' approval. The maximum can be imagined as a system where the central government has exclusive competence over all but one narrowly restricted category of action. The federal systems situated in the proximity of the minimum on the continuum are what Riker defines as peripheralized federations; those that are close to the maximum constitute the centralized 
245 McKay, David, Designing Europe: Comparative L,essons from the Federal Experience, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001; p. 8-9. 
246 Gncaid, John, "Economic Policy-Making: Advantages and Disadvantages of the Federal Model," 
International Social Science Journal 53, no. 167, March 2001; p. 85. 
247 Kincaid; p. 89. 

federations.248 Riker identifies pre-1798 Swiltzerland as a peripheralized federation 
and the US as a centralized one. 
Is the EU a peripheralized federal system? When compared with the other political entities situated on the federalism scale, the Union strikes as different. The relationship between enlargement and EU ini~egration does not resemble the process of territorial expansion in typical confederations or federations. Territorial expansion does generally not cause fears about the entity's future in most other federal political systems. Indeed, there seems to be no negative correlation between the number of constituent governments and the degree of centralization (see Appendix 1). Prior to the French invasion and the establishment of the Helvetic Republic, peripheralized Switzerland comprised thirteen cantons. The centralized US consists of fifty states. According to Thorlakson, of the six federations she examines (i.e. the US, Canada, Germany, Austria, Australia and Switzerlancl), Canada is the most decentralized,249 although it has fewer component units than other federations (ten provinces and three territories). Thorlakson and Riker show that lthe number of constituent governments in a federation is not an indicator for measuring federal power in a system. 
In his analysis of American federalism, David McKay does not pay any attention to the US' tersitorial expansion towards the West and the increasing number of states from the thirteen signatories of the Articles of Confederation to the present fifty.250American territorial expansion was not problematic because the process was radically different from that of European enlargement, as Professor Nicole Mellow explains. Americans were leaving the East Coast to advance deeper and deeper into the continent, towards the Pacific Ocean. On their way, they were carving out 
248 Riker, "Federalism"; p. 102. 
249 Thorlakson, Lori, "Comparing Federal Institutions: Power and Representation in Six Federations," 
in West European Politics 26, no. 2, April 2003; p. 121, 14 and 20. 
250 McKay; p. 23-44. 

territorial units and establishing local governments with the express goal of enlarging the In the EU's case, the nature of the union is different: member states had been functioning as unitary and independent entities for long before they started integrating their policies at the supranational level. 
As measures of centralization, social scientists try to identify and concentrate on elements that most accurately reflect the relationship between states and the federal government. Thorlakson, for example, uses the centralization of public finances as an indicator of the allocation of resources between the federal and state levels. She divides it in two dimensions of analysis: the revenue-raising capacity of the central government relative to all levels of government combined (i.e. taxing power) and the total expenditures of the federal government relative to all levels of government combined. On this measure of the allocation of resources, she concludes, Canada and Switzerland are the most decentralized federations, the US and Germany are moderately centralized, while Australia and Austria are the most centralized federal systems.252 
Jonathan Rodden measures fiscal decentralization by expressing state or local expenditures as a percent of the total (state aind federal government) expenditures. He also takes own-source revenues as a measure, expressing state or local revenues as a percent of total (state plus federal government) revenue. David McKay applies the same two measures based on relative expenditures and relative revenues to determine fiscal centralization levels in the European Union. I compile Rodden and McKay's data in one table to make the comparison (see Appendix 2). These measures indicate that, relative to other federations, in Canada and Switzerland, statellocal governments retain an important amount of fiscal power: they are able to spend the highest percent 25 1 Interview with Professor Nicole Mellow, March 2006, Williamstown, MA. Professor Mellow 
teaches American politics at Williams College. 252 Thorlakson; p. 12 and p. 20. 
of money relative to the total combined expenditures of states and the federal government; and they raise important sums as own-resource revenues (money not directly controlled by the federal government). Even when compared with these "champions of decentralization," the EU is much more decentralized: member state governments spend much more than Europeam institutions and retain an almost unchallenged power to raise revenue through taxation. Yet, in terms of central controls over fiscal matters such as minimum value added tax rates and national borrowing, the EU is in fact more centralized than Canada, the US and ~witzerland.'~~ 
McKay argues that measures of centralization must be combined to provide the full picture of a federal entity and compaire it with similar entities. He enumerates three ways in which centralization can be ass,essed, each direction relying on analyzing a different set of factors: (I) constitutional/institutional terms; (2) political, administrative and fiscal; and (3) cultural/comnmercial criteria.254 McKay warns that there may be differences among the elements included in each category, as well as among categories. For instance, Germany is centralized politically, but administratively decentralized; the US is institutionally centralized but fiscally decentralized. The EU is relatively centra1ize:d from the constitutional point of view (due to the informal role of the European treaties as a European constitution); it is also relatively centralized from the institutional aind administrative points of view, and well integrated from the point of view of trade policy. However, it has very low levels of centralization in terms of political and fiscal issues, as well as cultural criteria. 
The structure of the party system provides another measure for determining the degree of federal power. Riker argues tha.t centralized parties reflect a centralized polity where regional loyalties are weaker than national ones. The presence of 
253 McKay; p. 3-4. 254 McKay; p. 3. 
multiple parties that exploit provincial loyalties indicates a decentralized 
configuration of the national political arena. To measure the centralization of the political party system, one needs to consider whether the parties operating at the national and state levels are the same, and asisess the degree of party discipline at the national level.255 Currently in the EU, although the members of the European Parliament are organized in European parties,, they are still directly elected at the national level. Hence, electoral campaigns almost never address pan-European concerns, but rather focus on domestic policy issues. European party politics remains a weaker, much less exciting and much less popular prolongation of domestic party politics. 
Many scholars warn against the dangers of oversimplification that result from treating federal systems as a homogenous cal.egory. Kmcaid, differentiates between liberal individualistic and multinational cominunal federations, the latter being based on multiple communal identities (i.e. nationality, language, religion, tribe andlor race). In a liberal individualistic federal syste:m people have not only the virtually unfettered right, but also opportunities and incentives to move between jurisdictions. In a multinational federation, "even if all individuals in the federation are given an unfettered dejure right to move from one jurisdiction to another, the defacto presence of linguistic, religious, cultural, and. other barriers inhibits mobility."256 In such immobile federal systems, disparities camnot be naturally and effortlessly addressed through inter-jurisdictional mobility and converging market forces, given the fact that many citizens are culturally and/or linguistically trapped in their local market. Hence, economic and fiscal disparities must be addressed through union policies that involve "fiscal equalisation and regional structural development. There is 
'j5 Riker; p. 130-140. 256 Kincaid; p. 91. 
also likely to be a major political dimension to such economic policy-making, namely, 
that policies to address economic and fiscal disparities are necessary to hold the union together."257 
According to fincaid's classification, the EU belongs in the category of multinational communal federal systems; however, its unique links between member state governments and European institutions and its remarkable policy-making distinguish the EU from a typical federation, making it a new model thereof. "Maastricht highlights the distinctiveness of the EU perspective: in Europe policy has typically preceded institutional building; in tlie other federations, institution building preceded 
The processes of centralization and einlargement lasted centuries in many federal states. In their early days, some of today's full-fledged federations were not more centralized than the EU currently is in many respects. Until 18 12, US defense was mainly ensured by state-controlled militjas. Also, no national police authority existed until the creation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the 1920s. States provided transfer payments to the needy until the 1930s, and in some areas they remain so today. As late as 1929, US federal spending was 2.6% of GDP. In Switzerland, many government functions, including social security and the granting of citizenship, are shared between federal, state and even local governments.259 
The following table compares the allocation of policy functions in "typical federations" and the European Union for seventeen policy areas. Scores from 1 to 5 reflect integration levels, with a score of 1inldicating exclusive or near-exclusive statelmember state competence, and a score of 5 indicating exclusive or near- exclusive federalJEuropean competence. The scores for the "typical federation" are 
257 Ibidem. 
258 McKay; p. 130. 
259 Information from McKay. 

computed as an average of the respective scolres obtained in these categories by five 
states: Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the United States. This side-by- 
side comparison reveals many similarities in levels of integrationlcentralization, with 
high levels of federal~European authority for areas such as macroeconomic policy, 
agriculture and commercial policy (international negotiations). 
TABLE 6: Allocation of policy functions in typical federations and the European Union 
Le~end: 
1: Exclusive or near-exclusive state competence 
2: Most policy decisions at the state level with or~ly some decisions at federal level 
3: Policy decisions at both state and national level 
4: Mostly policy decisions at federal level 
5: Exclusive or near-exclusive federal competence 
Typical federations = an approximate average of the allocation of policies in Australia, 

Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the US  
Macroeconomic policy  'I'ypical Federations 5  European Union 5  

Ilealth (hospitals and primary care)  2  1  
Law enforcemen t  2  1  
Elementary and secondary education  1  1  
Adapted chart  

Source: David McKay, Designing Europe: Com,oarative Lessons from the Federal Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 
Comparable levels of centralization can be found in competition policy, 
environmental policy and labor market regulation (most decisions made at the federalEuropean level); universities and research (most policy decisions made at the statelmember state level); and elementary and secondary education (exclusive or near- exclusive competence at the statelmember state level). Scores differ significantly in areas such as defense, international relations, social insurance, welfare and immigration. 
Such a table should not be misleading. These comparisons are drawn within the context of the Westphalian state paradigm, while the EU represents a "new variant in the application of the federal idea" for a "new form of state" for others,261 and the "first multi-perspectival polity to emerge since the advent of the modern policy era77262 
for others. Using the language of the modern state system, some caution that "the EU may expand geographically, reform institutionally, and deepen substantively, but all this will take place largely within existing contours of European institution^."^^^ According to these views, given its unique institutional framework, the extremely limited scope of its policies and its very small and weak government, the EU is extremely unlikely to evolve into anything like a federal nation-state. Moravcsik accentuates: 
The EU is not a superstate in the making [...].Therefore, social scientists should be aware that, unless the Union transforms into a radically different political animal, integration can only proceed at a limited speed and cover a reduced number of policy areas. European Union institutions are tightly constrained, moreover by supermajoritarian decision rules, a tiny administration, radical openness, stringent provisions for subsidiarity, a 
260 Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s; p. 4. 
261 Caporaso,J., "The European Community and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post- 
Modem" in Journal of Common Market Studies, 34, 1996; p. 29-52. 
262 Ruggie; p. 195. 
263 Moravcsik, Andrew, "Federalism in the European Union: Rhetoric and Reality", in Nicolaidis and 
Howse (eds.), The Federal Vision; p. 163. 

distinct professional ethos, and the near-total absence of the power to tax and 
264 
coerce. 
From within the Westphalian paradigm, these observations seem accurate. However, this perspective renders scholars unable to see whether the Union has actually started to transform into a "radically different political animal." Some argue that the EU remains an intergovernmental regional organization or a confederal hybrid with federal characteristics; others follow Skinner's advice and focus on understanding change. As Yves MCny concluded, "an international organization with limited powers [has been gradually transfonned] into a Union.. . with missions and involvements that are almost unlimited."265 
Back to the Future: The Post-Modern EU and...the Twilight of the States? 
A comparative analysis of the EU wit-hin the Westphalian niche has offered only limited insights on the possible consequences of European enlargement on the process of integration. The experience of I0 has shown that homogeneity does not necessarily produce high levels of integration. While the EU could be located somewhere between confederation and feder,ation on the centralization continuum, territorial expansion in the states used as reference points could not be compared with enlargement. The Westphalian paradigm and its categories seem insufficient for the purposes of this thesis. 
How can any contemporary analyst escape from the grip of the Westphalian state paradigm to assess the EU in less rigid terns? The problems associated with current approaches result from the "bias" of the modem perspective in world politics and, more specifically, the perception of the sovereign state as primary actor and landmark in international affairs. Breaking away from the modern state could only 
264 Ibidem. 
265 MCny, Yves, "National Squares and European Circ:le: The Challenge of Adjustment" in Menon, A,, 
and V. Wright (eds.), From the Nation State to Europe? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; p. 30. 

come through a deliberate exercise of thinlumg about the EU differently and in a different context, e.g. by tahng pre-Westphalian geo-political entities as reference points instead of modern nation-states, international organizations, or federal arrangements. This may open new opportuni~ties for analysis and, perhaps, even offer a key to understanding change in international politics. 
At the same time, one must be vigilant when applying this approach because of the difficulties it raises in terms of rigor. Take, for instance, the following prediction about the EU7s future: "Instead of a Westphalian super-state we will probably have a neo-medieval empire characterized by overlapping authorities, divided sovereignty, diversified institutional arrangements and multiple cultural identities."266 The phrase "neo-medieval empire" that Zielonka uses may be helpful in some ways, but may impede understanding in others. It may be an accurate description for EU borders, but it may be nothing but a good-sounding metaphor if used as a general label to define the EU's trajectory. Any one point of reference in history will come with its own package of tinie-dependent restraints and prejudices, while EU enlargement and integration are anchored in contemporary times. 
That being said, the EU itself seems tjo encourage, even require, due to its peculiar political nature, conceptual disengagement from modernity and a post- modern approach to supranational institutions. As Ruggie suggests, "the distinctive feature of the modern system of rule is that it has differentiated its subject collectivity into territorially defined, fixed and mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate domination.77267
The modern state system is intrinsically connected with the notions of territoriality, fixed and impermeable borders, as well as internal homogeneity. With 
266 Zielonka, Jan, (ed.), Europe Unbound: Enlarging und Reshaping the Boundaries of the European 
Union, London and New York: Routledge, 2002; p. 13. 
267 Ruggie, John Gerard, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations," in lnternational Organization, 47:I, Winter 1993; p. 139-179. 

its partially overlapping internal areas corres~ponding to the Schengen zone, the common internal market, the special regimes concerning the newest Union members from Central and Eastern Europe, and the prospect for future enlargements, the European Union has not been built as a "forhress Europe" in the Westphalian sense and from the territorial perspective. Indeed, Ruggie argues that the EU is a champion in "unbundling territoriality."268 Consequentl~y, this chapter continues by attempting to analyze the relationship between enlargement and integration outside the Westphalian paradigm. 
The notion of confederacy links the medieval past with contemporary times, as well as with the future of multi-level governance and emerging structures of power in the era of globalization. According to Elazar's classification of federal systems, confederation is defined as a system formed "where several pre-existing polities join together to form a common government for certain limited purposes" such as foreign affairs, defense or economic cooperation. This definition partially overlaps with that of another federal system that Elazar identifies: the league. Leagues are "linkages of politically independent polities for specific purposes," but, unlike confederations, they are much less institutionalized and "function through a common secretariat rather than a government.77269 he overlap is substantial enough for terns to be used interchangeably, especially in connection with the Middle Ages. For instance, the Hanseatic League is generally described as a commercial and defensive confederation of free cities in northern Germany and surrounding areas that was established in the 13~~ century. The same entity is 
century and reached the apex of its power in the 14~~ alternatively described as an alliance of trading cities that set up and maintained a trade monopoly covering the area of the Baltic Sea and the largest part of Northern 268 Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond; p. 168-170. 269 Elazar, Daniel, Federalism: an Overview, Pretoria: HSRC, 1995; p. 19; and Daniel Elazar (ed.), 
Federal Systems of the World, 2ndedition, Harlow: Lclngman Group Limited, 1994; p. xvi. 
Europe in the later Middle Ages and early Modern period, between the 13'~and the centuries. 
The medieval confederation/league/allliance is weaker than any form of the European Community; yet, political scientists who resorted to history to escape from the Westphalian model have used the idea of medieval state or empire in analyzing the EU. Zielonka explains: 
There is no reason to treat EU borders in state-centric linear terms. The linear concept of a border emerged only sonne 150 years ago, and it is linked to an absolute and now largely outdated notion of sovereignty. More flexible types of border arrangements worked well in various historical contexts, starting with the Roman concept of limes or the French concept of marche, both treating the border more as a geographical zone than a clear line. In fact, for centuries East Central European countries had loose border areas and 'marches' rather than sealed types of borders.270 
For Pierre Hassner, what characterizes the EU is a "fluid, mobile character of relations between the internal and the external, the intergovernmental and the supranational, the political and the functional ." This, in turn, represents "a break with the modern conception of political territoriality." However, Hassner accentuates more than Zielonka the Union's novelty as a geo-political entity: "in the same breath we must also acknowledge that this break represlents a significant move towards the new sociopolitical, national, international and transnational reality into which we are sliding -a reality that could be characterized by the interpenetration of units and issue areas, by the multiplicity of competences, and by their mobility or 
The fact that modernity relied on territoriality as a basis for defining the state was not a matter of option. Geo-politics developed due to a set of interrelated factors that shaped the international system into its FVestphalian configuration. The peace of Westphalia (1648) represented the birth of territorial politics; yet, political space was 
270 Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound; p. 3. 
271 Hassner, Pierre, "Fixed Borders or Moving Borderlands?" in Jan Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound: 
Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union, London and New York: Routledge, 
2002; p. 46. 

"decisively reorganized in the nineteenth century and so was the notion of borders. 
After the mid-1850s in particular, national territories started to be perceived as "spatial domains that could be mastered physically by the railroad and transportation. (...) A new awareness of bounded space, a preoccupation with fixing border lines, with the demarcation of insiders and outsiders, public and private, transformed social c~~sc~~us~~ss.~~~~~ 
In the Middle Ages, borders were not tightly controlled and well-defined because they could not be effectively controlled in practice. States intervened in the affairs of their neighbors; territories could vary with every military intervention. When the borders were far away from the center of political power, insufficient resources did not allow the maintenance of a fortification all around the dominated surface. Population mobility was extremely reduced: only elites (and the military) had the possibility to move from one country to another; hence, the utility of hard borders to keep migrants outside of a state did not exist. 
While the widespread interest in defining borders has not vanished, frontiers have gradually become more permeable in contemporary times due to globalization. Some facets of globalization leading to the relative de- 'territorialization' or "de- borderization" as Christopher Hill calls it,273 were the "development in the technology of travel and communication which (...) led to the compression of time and space"; the "increasing interconnectedness of international economic activities" and the emergence of a global marketplace; the emergence of a global moral community dedicated to the promotion of human rights and peace; the globalization of problems, 
272 Maier, Charles S., "Does Europe Need a Frontier?" in Jan Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound: 
Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union, 2002; p. 27. 
273 Hill, Christopher, "The Geopolitical Implications of Enlargement" in Zielonka (ed.), Europe 
Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union, London and New York: 
Routledge, 2002; p. 95-1 17. 

risks, dangers and catastrophes; as well as the "convergence in lifestyles and cultural values, icons and 
General de-'territorialization' reduce:; the tensions between the simultaneous processes of European integration and enlargement, since countries are increasingly interconnected even in the absence of a regional integration scheme. Also, processes are move controllable within the EU than in the globalizing world. European integration, in this sense, provides countries with a shield that allows them to partially insulate and protect themselves from the pressures of globalization. France may be reluctant to receive Eastern Europeans who work for lower wages and accept the jobs that French workers refuse, but it may prefer them to North African illegal immigrants who work for even less. Also, enlargement alllows the European Union to regulate the freedom of movement of people who are citizens of the newly admitted member states. The structural funds offered by the EU can be used for infrastructure projects that create employment and motivate citizens to remain in their home countries (e.g. building the road and highway network in Portugal). Again, enlargement protects rather than hampers integration, in a world where borders are increasingly weakened by the impact of globalization. 
Does the post-modern EU resemble a medieval empire as Zielonka suggests? The concept of "Charlemagna" related with present ideas about the historical existence of a "core ~uro~e"~~~ 
seems to be the Union's closest equivalent in the pre- Westphalian past. To seek a concrete, historically accurate and non-metaphoric answer to my questions about the value of a comparison between the EU and a 
274 Taylor, International Organization in the Age of Globalization; p. 7-8. 
275 Haseler, Stephen, Super-State: The New Europe an.d its Challenge to America, London and New 
York: I. B. Tauris, 2004; p. 101. 

medieval empire, I resorted to the assistance of a historian specialized in early 
medieval Europe, Professor Eric ~oldber~.~~~ 
The only concrete similarity between the medieval and contemporary versions of the "united Europe" was, ironically, related to borders. Goldberg explains: "The contemporary borders of the EU look like the empire of the Carolingians between roughly 780 and 888. It was during this period," Goldberg added, "that Charlemagne and his family for the first time united the pesoples and territories of Western Europe into a coherent empire." The Carolingian empire spanned from the Pyrenees mountains to the Elba river and the middle Dlanube to the East (the approximate area where Budapest is located today); and from the borders of Denmark in the North to central Italy to the South. It was a massive ernpire of great diversity that incorporated peoples who spoke Romance, Germanic, Slavic and Celtic languages. 
Nothing could be more different from the European Union than the Carolingian project of continental unification. In fact, the Carolingian empire does not contradict the general description of empires, geo-political forms that "have conventionally been defined in narrow terms as the formal annexations of conquered territory.77277
Unlike the EU whose membership is established based on voluntary participation and whose policies result from collective decision-making and pan- European consensus, Charlemagne's empire predicated itself on military conquest and authoritarian domination. It was established on the conquest of numerous principalities in Western Europe. Imperial arimies invaded provinces such as Aquitaine, Bavaria and Saxony; their rulers were deposed and replaced with loyal aristocrats (Frankish counts); and the provinc:es thus became incorporated in the empire. Territorial enlargement was achieved exclusively through military conquest 276 The following quotationsldata come primarily from an interview with Professor Eric Goldberg that I 
conducted in March 2006. Professor Goldberg teaches History at Williams College. 277 Doyle, Michael W., Empires, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986; p. 20. 
and threat. The Frankish and local aristocrats intermarried, forming alliances that 
ensured relative stability. 
While he adopted a policy of assimiZation towards principalities located in the proximity of his center of power, Charlemagine used a different strategy for territories found on the periphery. He made local rulers, such as the Slavic leaders found east of Saxony and Bavaria, his tributaries. Charlemagne installed loyal rulers for peoples like the Bohemians, Moravians and Obodrites, who related to the empire through tributary obligations. They paid tribute by seinding emissaries to the annual assembly. If, during the annual assembly, tribute did not come from a province, this meant that the ruler had rebelled. In that situation, Charlemagne sent his armies into the defiant principality, deposed the disloyal leader and installed a new ruler. Nothing could be further away from these brutal interventions than the post-adjudicatory decisions of the European Court of Justice to apply sanctions against a Member State in the case of severe violations of European law. 
Compliance in the EU is ensured via the concerted legal actions of the European Commission and the Court of Justice. In the case of the Carolingian empire, the compliance of tributaries was secured with a rather different approach, common in multi-national pre-Westphalian entities: the emperor took some of the tributaries' children and held them as hostages in the imperial court. There, the young hostages were treated very well and educated; however, when parents rebelled, their hostage children were all executed. 
Charlemagne left a profound legacy politically, culturally and economically. Contemporaries called him "Pates Europae" --the father of Europe," and this reputation has persisted through the centuries. Most medieval rulers considered him a model they tried to emulate. A dynasty of German emperors, the Ottonians, linked in 
the lothcentury their dominance to Charlema~gne's image. Otto I was crowned at 
Aachen, on Charlemagne's throne. In modern times, Napoleon and Hitler were inspired by Charlemagne in their military projects of European conquest. Currently, a Prix Charlemagne is yearly awarded for contributions to European unity. 
The connection between the Carolingian medieval empire and the contemporary united Europe represents a fascinating, though mostly irrelevant, metaphor. At best, one could argue that a cor~nection between these two entities can be made at a symbolic level, in connection with the European mentale collective. Otherwise, the sole purposes of this association seem to be that of finding a strategy to escape from the Westphalian paradigm and demonstrate that a continental European polity could exist disentangled from the modjern notion of sovereignty. The particle "neo" that Zielonka inserts before"medieva1 empire" cannot annul the substantial differences that separate the Europe of the Middle Ages from Europe in the age of globalization. That a pan-European entity could exist in the past, in an entirely different system and under completely dissimilar geo-political circumstances, was not a point of contention. Consequently, it is more helpful to value the exercise of freeing oneself from the modern state paradigm primarily as a good in itself. Nevertheless, thinking about Europe in different historical frameworks and comparing its political, economic, social and legal characteristics with those of past geo-political entities can provide inspiration for noticing and deciphering the current transformations of the international system. 
"What Kind of Europe Will We End Up with? An Octopus or a ~iraffe?"~~ 
This phrase shows just how far social scientists are ready to go in their attempts to define the EU. The political-zoological association above belongs to Christopher Hill who was trying to make a valid point about the possible structures the EU could develop in response to enlargernent: overbearing and expansionist (the octopus); or overstretched and unwieldy (the giraffe).279 Clarifications aside, this remark proves the generalized bafflement tha.t the EU's emergence as an actor on the international political arena has caused. 
It is time to return to the central question of this chapter: Is the EU an unidentifiable political animal? Surprisingly, there seem to be two correct answers to this yeslno question. 
Yes, the EU can be defined as a political animal within the paradigm of the Westphalian state system. The definition will not perfectly match that of any other geo-political entity, but it can be argued that most political creatures deviate in one way or another from the template-label under which they are generally classified by scholars. The United Nations is, for instance, an international organization; however, Chapter VII of the UN Charter adds a supranational dimension to its otherwise intergovernmental functioning. 
Due to its multi-leveled system of governance, the European Union could be identified as a federal political system. On the centralizationlintegration continuum, one could represent it somewhere between confederation and federation, around the middle point of the scale. Given the fact that it combines confederal and federal characteristics, the EU could represent, as Elazar suggests, a "federal hybrid." 
278 Hill, Christopher, "The Geopolitical Implications of Enlargement"; p. 112. 279 Seriously! 
Adopting the Westphalian perspective in analyzing the effects of enlargement 
on European integration, this thesis did not identify any equivalent of the EU in which a similar relationship between territorial expansion and centralization could be analyzed. However, it did discover evidence that contradicts the widespread idea that homogeneity facilitates integration, while diversity impedes it. In the case of the Gulf Cooperation Council, although member states are very similar economically, politically and even culturally, levels of integration are very low. 
The modem state itself can be explained in a definition that only uses the language of a pre-Westphalian system. This does not make the Peace of Westphalia less of a turning point in international politics. Currently, as Ruggie points out, there is no theory of systemic change in international relations; hence, if we refuse to look outside of our modern niche, we may be entiirely unable to perceive fundamental mutations occurring right in front of us. The EU should not be interpreted exclusively from a Westphalian perspective, but rather in the broader context of the globalization era. Most importantly, one needs to make a conscious effort to remain aware that the international system is currently in a state of flux, and the EU itself is an evolving political creature. 
These observations provide the second answer to our central question: no, the EU cannot be defined set if it is completely detached from the obsolescent Westphalian system of reference. While numerous attempts to escape from the language associated with the modern state have been made in EU scholarship, none of them managed to synthesize the magnitude of the current reconfiguration in world politics. Doubtlessly, this happens partially because we are still at an early stage of systemic transformation, which makes relevant data more difficult to identify and 
analyze. 
Many scholars acknowledge the EU's; sui generis nature and attempted to summarize the Union's uniqueness by coining original terms, hoping to break away from the Westphalian paradigm and point out defining characteristics of the post- modern EU. Some have focused on exploring the unprecedented relationship established in the context of European integration between a group of supranational institutions and European citizens. Kalypso PJicolaidis examines the connection between the individual and European authority, by creating an original concept: the demoicracy, defined as "a union of states ancl peoples (...) in the making.77280 According to Nicolaidis, the EU is a "new political community" defined by the "persistent plurality of its peoples," as opposed to the state that is defined by a homogenous identity (a demos). As such, the European project is not an emerging supranational equivalent of a domestic democracy: the Union is "neither a union of democracies, nor a union as a democracy."28' 
Advocating for an analysis encompassing 'post-sovereign, polycentric, incongruent, neo-medieval' arrangements, Philippe Schmitter claims the most probable trajectory for the EU is one leading to a condominio, a geo-political entity that he characterizes as "the most unprecedented, even unimaginable outcome" for the Euro-polity. Condominio is a political animal1 that differs from the modern state, due to its characteristic "variation in both territorial and functional constituen~ies."~~~ Schmitter explains this distinction: 
Instead of one Europe with recognize'd and contiguous boundaries, there would be many Europes. Instead of a Eurocracy accumulating organizationally distinct but politically coordinated tas8ks around a single centre, there would be multiple regional institutions acting autonomously to solve common problems 
280 Nicolaidis, Kalypso, "We, the Peoples of Europe.. .,"Foreign Affairs, 83, Vol. 6, 
NovemberDecernber 2004; p. 101. 
281 Nicolaidis, ibidem. 
282 Schmitter, Philippe, "Imagining the Future of the Eiuro-Polity with the Help of New Concepts," in 
Marks, G., Scharpf, F.W., Schmitter, P.C., Streeck, W., (eds.) Governance in the European Union, 
London: Sage Publications, 1998; p. 136. 

and produce different public goods. Moreover, their dispersed and overlapping domains -not to mention their incongruent memberships -could result in competitive, even conflictual, situations and would certainly seem inefficient when compared with the clear demarcations of competence and hierarchy of authority that (supposedly) characterize existing national states.283 
The "ever-closer union" still has the only attribute clearly conveyed by this otherwise enigmatic description: it is a geo-political entity in flux. Over the next years, as the consequences of the last enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe become clearer, the EU will consolid,ate its identity as an unprecedented actor in the international arena. Since equivalents cannot be found in either the Westphalian and pre-Westphalian past or the contemporary era, students of European integration who examine the enlargement process will have to follow Skinner's advice and focus their analyses on the "local and the continger~t." The following decade will provide invaluable empirical data for understanding the effects of enlargement on European integration. 
283 Schmitter: ibidem. 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the proverb "the more, the merrier" accurately reflects the relation between enlargement and integration in the evolution of the European unification project from its origins until the present. The conclusions of this thesis should not be interpreted, however, as proclaiming the European Union's capacity to both expand and integrate indefinitely. Excessive heterogeneity could, indeed, produce internal crises in European decision-making, possibly jeopardizing the normal functioning or even the very existence of EU institutions. Undoubtedly, though, a moderate level of diversity among member states has stimulated cooperation in solving common problems at the continental level, and has opened opportunities for reforming institutions and pooling sovereignty in new policy sectors. 
Until now, the EU has successfully controlled and reduced to manageable levels the differences separating joining couritries from existing members, via an increasingly stricter conditionality, meticulous pre-accession negotiations, long transitional periods, as well as technical and financial assistance. At the same time, European institutions have encouraged newcomers to get actively involved in shaping the EU's future and furthering EU empowennent to an extent and in directions that do not substantially conflict with the preferences of older members. These precautions have preserved the equilibrium between the two dimensions of Union development: enlargement and integration. 
Unsurprisingly, the accession of Eastern European countries has necessitated a long adjustment. Similarly, future enlargements will, most likely, require even more protracted negotiation and adaptation periods, since current candidates deviate significantly more than the youngest member states from the EU average and standards. Among the countries knochng on Europe's door, Turkey will certainly need to undergo the most extensive and spectacular of all EU extreme makeovers, as a prerequisite for joining the Union. Since hist~orically Turkey has been regarded as geographically and culturally belonging to the intersection between Europe and Asia, enlargement is not be perceived in this case as an urgent political necessity (the way in which it was viewed for Central and Eastern European countries in the aftermath of the Cold War). Nevertheless, political pressures exist, and the United States strongly supports the Turkish application for membership. Old member states and EU institutions will try to gain as many advantages as possible from negotiating accession with Turkey and reshaping it to match the "E:uropeanW profile as closely as possible. Despite the fact that it does not constitute an urgent political necessity at the moment, accepting Turkey does represent an important economic and geo-strategic temptation for the EU. As a result, although Turkey may take a relatively long time to adopt and implement the acquis communautaire, fulfill the Union's requirements, and adapt to its standards, enlargement is very likely to happen as long as the political will continues to exist on both sides. Also, if the strategies that have counteracted until now the potentially disintegrative consequences of enlargement continue to function effectively, Turkish accession may end up not generating the major disruptions in integration that conventional wisdom would predict. 
* * * 
Historical evidence contradicts the widespread expectation that adding new members to the EU dilutes the substance of integration. Only once did enlargement lead to a slight withdrawal from a previously integrated policy (the common fisheries 
policy altered at the insistence of the UK in 1973). The circumstances were unusual 
(i.e. the policy sector had been integrated exactly prior to British accession, as the initial six had pooled sovereignty only as a strategy to gain full access to British waters). The modification itself did not affect integration in any fundamental way. Otherwise, as the first chapter of the present thesis shows, enlargement and integration have historically proceeded hand in hand, according to the EU7s motto In varietate concordia ("unity in diversity7'). 
Although a prominent presence in pollitical pop-culture, the dark myth of an "EU Generation Gap" that separates integration-consecrated old members from the young and restless non-committed newcornel-s does not hold together when confronted with a rigorous and systematic examination. Old members are just as self- interested as new members, and new membeirs contribute to integration just as substantively and enthusiastically as old members, if not more. Enlargement breaks the status quo in European governance, leading to significant consolidations and expansions of European authority, as well as to EU institutional reform. The second chapter debunks the myth of the "EU Generation Gap" by showing how comparable the respective records of older and newer members are in terms of both supporting and resisting integration. 
The third chapter emphasizes the idea that the process of enlargement itself has evolved together with the Union. Currently, candidates for accession are given extreme political and economic makeovers before joining the EU. New members have to adopt and implement the entire bloc of Community legislation, as well as to satisfy the very strict requirements of European institutions. Taking advantage of the power asymmetries that mark pre-accession negotiations, old member states have developed 
a set of strategies (a "Procrustean bed" of bargaining) that allows them and EU 
institutions to closely monitor and shape the terms of enlargement in even the minutest details. Thus, old member states can effectively protect existing levels of integration from any potential erosive side-effect of enlargement. At the same time, the Procrustean bed enables EU members to prevent excessively rapid integration from occurring post-enlargement (such fluctuations, although leading to European empowerment in the short run, could otherwllse be deleterious and unsustainable in the long run, if they do not benefit older and more powerful states). 
The present thesis has addressed one of the most problematic, intimidating and unexplored topics in contemporary European Union scholarship. It has attempted to determine the effects of European enlargement on the process of integration, challenging the conventional wisdom according to which adding new members to the EU inevitably leads to the dilution of collective policies and overall disintegration of European governance. Given the absence of previous systematic analyses, this thesis has ambitiously engaged upon a difficult and uncharted path. It has adopted a multi- disciplinary and interdisciplinary perspective that combines the subfields of political science (international relations, comparative politics and American politics) with history and legal studies to define the EU as a geo-political entity and analyze the relation between enlargement and integration within the wider framework provided by this definition. 
Unsurprisingly, my attempt to define the European Union by comparing and contrasting it with other geo-political entities, present and past, has a mixed and partially still uncertain record of success. Indleed, within the Westphalian state paradigm, the EU can be defined as a "federal hybrid" -essentially an evolving confederation that has already developed sonne federal characteristics. However, the uniqueness of this geo-political entity is striking. As a result, serious doubts emerge 
about whether or not the EU can be subsumed as a presence to the Westphalian 
international system of modern states. Non-Pu'estphalian points of reference are necessary to understand the Union in its entire complexity. In the fourth chapter, after analyzing the EU within the modern system of nation-states (i.e. taking as points of reference entities such as international organjzations, confederations and federations), I try to break away from the Westphalian paradigm. While useful in understanding certain aspects of the contemporary Union, pre-Westphalian (medieval) polities do not provide good reference points, since the EU emerged from the modern system of states and has been deeply shaped by it. As a result, the only remaining possibility is to understand the EU as an unprecedented post-modern geo-political entity that is currently developing in the era of globalization. 
This conclusion that the EU is a sui generis entity changes the configuration of the analytical framework: in an evolving international system, the European Union itself becomes a point of reference and a harbinger of the post-modern international order. In absence of any point of reference, when disentangled from the Westphalian state paradigm, the EU is a still unidentifiable political object, although the situation is likely to change in the near future. Over the next few years, relevant and priceless empirical data on the impact of Central and Eastern European enlargement on integration will emerge. The EU's structure as a geo-political entity will gradually crystallize. Since the present thesis is merely the first step in a long-term project that the author plans to pursue as a Ph. D. candidate at Harvard University, relevant developments will be included in future versions of this paper. 
Until then, it is interesting to point out that the CIA World Factbook has already included the European Union as an actor with a "special status" in world politics, presenting it at the end of its comprehensive list of existing states. The 2006 World Factbook describes the EU as a supral~ational organization with "nation-like characteristics," many of which are "likely to expand." It goes on to accentuate that the European Union "stands as an unprecedented phenomenon in the annals of history."284 
At this point, it is still unclear how far the sui generis EU will expand through enlargement, how long its empowerment will continue, and how many new directions of integration will emerge and develop in the: future. Yet, one thing is clear: adding new members to the Union does not necessa1:ily dilute the substance of European integration. Indeed, as this thesis has shown, enlargement and the pooling of sovereignty can function as mutually reinforcing processes. 
284 The CIA World Factbook 2006; Internet resource: 
http://www.cia.govlcia~publications/factbooWgeos/ee.html. 

APPENDIX 1:THE DISTRIBUTIONS OF FUNCTIONS IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 

POLITY  Taxation  Defense  Citizenship  Trade and  Transportation  Communications  Agriculture  Education  Health  Social  Police  Environment  
Principal shared-rule  Commerce  and Research  Welfare and  
arrangement  Services  
Principal units  

CANADA  3  5  5  5  3  4  3  1  2  3  3  3  
Federation  
10 provinces  
2 territories  
Clrn.. a .,,,UC~IYIAIYI  4  5  5  3  3  4  3  2  3  3  2  3  
Federation  
16 states  
INDIA  3  5  5  5  4  5  2  3  1  2  3  nla  
Federation  
28 states  
7 union territories  
SWITZERLAND  2  5  5  5  4  5  5  3  2  2  3  3  
Federa tion  
20 full cantons  
6half cantons  
USA  4  3  5  5  4  4  1  3  2  3  3  3  
Federa tlon  
50 states  
EU  3  3  3  4  3  3  4  3  2  2  2  3  
Hybrid - 
confederation with  
federal features  
25 countries  

Legend: 
1: All policy decisions at state level 
2: Mostly policy decisions at state level 
3: Policy decisions at both state and federal level 
4: Mostly policy decisions at federal level 
5: All policy decisions at federal level 
Sources: Watts, Ronald L., comparing Federal Systems, 2"* edition, Montreal & Kingston: Queen's University Press, 1999; p. 125-130 
0 
Elazar, Daniel J., Federal Systems of the World: A Handbook of Federal, Confederal and Autonomy Arrangements, 2nd edition; Harlow, Essex: Longman Current Affairs, 1994; p. 349-354 and 357 
0 
Schmitter, Philippe C., "Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help of New Concepts," in Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), Governance in the European Union, London: Sage Publications, 1996; p. 125-6. David McKay, Designing Europe: Corr~parative Lessons from the Federal Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 CIA, The World Factbook, 2005: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbooM 
APPENDIX 2: Fiscal Decentralization Variables (Averages 
over 1!990s) 
Sources: Jonathan Rodden, "Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and IMeasurement", Internet resource: http://web. mit.edu/irodden/www/pa~ers/html 
For EU data: David McKay, Designing Europe: Comparative Lessons from the Federal Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 
State-local Own-source state- expenditurc:s/Total local expenditures revenuef~otal 
revenue 
Source CFS* and Rodden Koddcn 2002 
AUS1'RALIA 0.50 0.33 

* GFS = IMF's Government .Finance Statistics Yearbook ** Source McKay, data for 1995. 
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