Rex vaincra! LBon Degrelle and the Failure of the Rexist Movement by Mark Esposito '05 A Thesis Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree with Honors in History WILLIAMS COLLEGE Williamstown, Massachusetts April, 2005 Many thanks to Professor Alexandra Garbarini for her invaluable insights and editorial coritributions. Chapter 1-Introduction "l'homme a la fois le plus aime et le plus hai, le plus celebre et le plus calomnik de la Be1gique."-Pierre ~a~e' In 1937, it could be said of Leon Degrelle that he was, in the words of Pierre Daye, one of his supporters, "the man at once the most loved and the most hated, the most famous and the most infamous in all of Belgium." Degrelle's fame, however, proved to be fleeting. Outside of Belgium, Degrelle, a Catholic nationalist politician turned Nazi-collaborator, is a largely unknown figure. Besides rare translations of works by Degrelle himself, there are only a small number of books in English on Degrelle and Rexism, and none of them have attracted wide scholarly interest. There are sources on the internet about Degrelle, but they are not exactly characterized by rigorous scholarship. Judging by internet searches, virtually the only people in the English speaking world who care about Degrelle are Holocaust deniers, neo-Nazis, and white supremacists of various and sundry types. To this small segment of the population, Lkon Degrelle is a hero. Their admiration for Degrelle seems to be founded mainly on Degrelle9s wartime exploits and his admiration for Hitler, rather than on an analysis of Degrelle's political philosophy. . Beyond the socially marginal individuals who are interested in Degrelle, a small number of scholars have written studies on Degrelle and on the political party he founded, the Rex party. Many historians have focused on Degrelle's links with fascism, viewing Rex largely through the prism of other interwar European fascist movements. 1 Pierre Daye, Lion Degrelle et le Rexisme (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 19371,247. Others have approached Rex as a more discrete entity, focusing on the Belgian context rather than broader European trends. The most valuable studies are by two historians: Jean-Michel ~tienne's Le Mouvement Rexiste Jusqu 'en 1940 [The Rexist Movement Until 19401, and Martin Conway's Collaboration in Belgium: Lion Degrelle and the Rexist Movement, 1940-1944. Both of these works focus more on Rex itself than on events outside of Belgium, an approach I find to be more helpful. ~tienne focuses mainly on the beginning of Rex, while Conway deals mainly with its wartime manifestation. I hope to bridge that gap. This thesis is not intended as a biography of Lkon Degrelle. Rather, I seek to provide a coherent narrative of the Rexist political movement throughout much of its existence, treating Degrelle's wartime behavior as having evolved from his prewar experiences. The aim of this study is to explore the reasons behind Rex's increasing radicalization throughout its existence, and Degrelle's decision to collaborate with Nazi Germany. Most Belgian sympathizers toward the Germans were Flemings, not Walloons like Degrelle, and Belgium's most openly fascist party-also a Walloon party-resisted the Nazi occupation. That a nationalist Walloon would aid his country's occupiers is rather curious, though Degrelle did meet with Hitler as early as the summer of 1936. As the Rex party lost electoral support after its height in May 1936, Degrelle seemed to turn more and more to fascism, introducing elements such as heightened anti-Semitism. I explore this connection between electoral failure and political radicalization. To do this, I trace the evolution of the political ideology of Lkon Degrelle and the Rex party, focusing mainly on the years 1932-194 1. I argue that Degrelle ultimately rejected parliamentary democracy and embraced fascism as a result of Rex's electoral failure. Though Degrelle may well have had an ideological affinity with Adolf Hitler all along, this would not have manifested itself without the Rexist marginalization, which began in 1937. In the 1930s and early war years Degrelle was above all an opportunist, strategically couching his public rhetoric in a way that he believed would be most beneficial to Rex. This trend would likely have continued had Degrelle and Rex remained popular. In this chapter, I set out a framework for my treatment in subsequent chapters of ~ebelle and the Rexist movement. First, I explore the intellectual and political antecedents to Rex. Next, I consider the debates surrounding fascism generally and Rex specifically. In so doing, I attempt to show that examining Rex through the prism of fascism is not necessarily the most illuminating approach. Rather, Rex should be discussed on its own terms, while still remaining mindful of the larger political contexts of interwar and wartime Belgium and Europe. Overview At the outset of his career as a political journalist, JRon Degrelle was an avowed Catholic and Catholic Party supporter. As head of the Rex publishing house in Louvain in the early 1930s, Degrelle sought to reform the Belgian Catholic Party from within. Degrelle proved to be more of an annoyance than an aid to the party, and as a result he and his followers were expelled in 1935 for their increasingly critical attacks on party leadership and its alleged corruption. With its expulsion from the Catholic Party's ranks, Rex became a political party in its own right, rather than only a publishing house. The Rex party entered the Belgian political scene in 193511 936, as an energetic, youthful movement with a strange amalgam of different political ideologies. In this respect, Rex was by no means unique in Europe; many groups in this time period had syncretic ideologies. Degrelle grabbed the public spotlight as a reformer who would clean up what he cast as the corruption of Belgian politics, while also making himself known for his superb oratory (in this time period, Degrelle and Rex were interchangeable; the party was indisputably Degrelle's, and he was its sole driving force). Degrelle's mastery of oratory, however, was not the only source of his appeal. During the height of his political career, Degrelle was charismatic and handsome, a dashing young renegade reinvigorating Belgian politics. Degrelle's supporters joked of his "Rex-Appeal"as the source of his great popularity with women2 Rex was strongly Catholic, monarchist, and Belgian nationalist, in addition to being vehemently anti-socialist. Like a number of other nationalist parties from the 1930s, Rex simultaneously took a strongly anti-socialist stance, while adopting the rhetoric of social change and aid to the poor. It called for a non-violent revolution of the soul and society, rather than the class warfare of communism. Yet at the same time that there were elements of fascism in Rexist thought and rhetoric, Rex self-consciously distanced itself from identification with fascism, at least initially. Degrelle and other Rexist writers stated explicitly that Rex was an entirely different phenomenon. The link between Rex and fascism is a highly contentious subject, and will be explored more fully below. Robert Brasillach, Histoire de la Guerre d'Espagne: Mdmoires, suivi de Lkon Degrelle et L 'avenir de "Rex " ([Paris]: Plon, 1969), 475. In a period of months after its founding as an independent party in November 1935, Rex garnered significant support in much of Belgium. The charismatic young Degrelle led Rex to win more than 270,000 votes, 1 1.49% of all votes cast, in the national parliamentary elections of May 1936.3 In the stable political climate of Belgium, such a strong showing by a relatively unknown party represented a significant shakeup. With the success of May 1936 in hand, the future of Rex seemed bright indeed. The first election that Rex competed in, though, proved to be the movement's apex. After electoral disappointment in 1937, Rex became more and more radicalized, losing much of its Catholic component and replacing it with a newfound cynicism and outspoken scorn for democracy, in addition to increasing xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and a neutralist foreign policy. Degrelle's relations with the Catholic Church had long been strained. Early on, before the electoral drubbing of 1937, the Belgian Catholic Church denounced Rexism generally and Degrelle specifically, before finally excommunicating Degrelle in 1943 .5 By 1941, with Belgium occupied by Nazi Germany, Rex had undergone a dramatic evolution, with little resemblance to its original form. By this time, Degrelle was ready to publicly heil Hitler and emulate Nazi racial thinking. Degrelle emulated the Nazis to the extent that after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Degrelle worked to raise a Walloon collaborationist military unit, spending much of the Jean-Michel ~tienne, Le Mouvement Rexiste Jusqu'en 1940 (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1968), 53. Rex was a political party, but to Degrelle the designation of "party" sounded too mundane, too much like politics as usual. As someone who cast himself as a reformer, as a non-politician, he preferred to use a new term. Rather than the term party, Degrelle "preferred that of a rally or a movement or even a 'mystique. "' Luc Schepens, "Fascists and Nationalists in Belgium 1919-1940," in Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet and Jan Petter Myklebust (ed.), Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots ofEuropean Fascism (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), 507. In Rex in February 1933, Degrelle referred to Rex as "avant tout un mouvement, un organisme de combat." ~tienne, Mouvement, 18. In referring to Rex, the terms party and movement both seem appropriate, and both can be used more or less interchangeably. The use of the word "movement"rather than "party" is paralleled in the Nazis' portrayal of themselves. Martin Conway, Collaboration in Belgium: Lkon Degrelle and the Rexist Mov~rneat 1940-1944 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 208. next four years fighting on the Eastern front, first with the Wehrmacht and later with the Waffen-SS. In 1944, Adolf Hitler personally rewarded Degrelle with the Knight's Cross, the highest German military decoration, allegedly remarking "If I had had a son, I would have liked him to be like you."6 Thus, I trace the evolution of Degrelle fi-om Catholic political reformer to Nazi collaborator, arguing that his later overt fascism stemmed largely from Rex's electoral failures. At the conclusion of the war, Degrelle escaped into exile in Spain, where he lived peacefully for nearly fifty years, despite a Belgian death sentence in absentia and attempts at extradition. He finally died of natural causes in 1994, at the age of 87. Had it not been for his wartime actions, Degrelle likely would have been little more than a historical footnote as a young, dynamic politician whose movement seemingly sprang out of nothingness before dissolving back into it. Degrelle's collaborationist activities, though, led him to acquire a significant degree of well-deserved notoriety. It was a long journey from nationalist Catholic monarchist to whole-hearted Hitler supporter, certainly not an obvious progression. One could attempt to impose a teleological framework on Degrelle's life, but it would be an insupportable assumption to claim that his war-time politics and behavior were the only logical outcome of his politics and behavior in the mid-1 930s. I argue that Degrelle's public political pronouncements became increasingly radicalized as Rex's fortunes declined, but that had Rex remained politically viable Degrelle would have continued to support relatively moderate positions. To explain the evolution of Degrelle's political thinking, it is necessary to begin with events well before the founding of the Rexist movement. Degrelle's later thinking "Si j'avais un fils, je l'aurais aime tel que vous." Hitler quoted in ~tienne, Mouvement, 171. was a reaction against principles associated with the French Revolution and reinvigorated by the pro-Republican Dreyfusards during the late nineteenth century in France. These principles included individual liberty, equality, and parliamentary democracy I unhampered by monarchy, all of which were anathema to Degrelle and his followers. To Degrelle, individualism was responsible for the malaise of the 2oth century, and notions of equality were the culprit behind the widespread failure to acknowledge the natural hierarchy of human society. Thus, he argued, everyone has an appropriate role to play, and much strife is caused by the lack of recognition of this fact. To Degrelle the ovdrthrow of the monarchy was perhaps the greatest insult of all. Degrelle found much of his philosophical inspiration in the works of Charles Maurras, a leading French proto-fascist of the early twentieth century and the intellectual heavyweight of the Action franqaise m~vement.~ Maurras hated the French Revolution because, among other things, it overthrew France's monarchy and replaced it with what he viewed as a chaotic, unpredictable system.8 For thinkers like Maurras and Degrelle, democracy in place of monarchy was abhorrent. Maurras's philosophy was that of "integral nationalism," which according to Stanley Payne was "a set of doctrines based not merely on monarchism but on an exclusive and ideologically sophisticated nati~nalism."~ Maurras exalted the concept of the nation, and monarchism was logical to him because he "believed that democracy Degrelle explained in an interview conducted in the late 1930s with Brasillach, a fascist journalist: "Naturellement, nous avons tous lu Maurras. Sans Maurras, la Belgique aurait des rois, par hazard. Elle n'aurait pas idCe de ce qu'est le monarchie."Degrelle quoted in Brasillach, Histoire, 517. Elsewhere, Degrelle said of Maurras that "Maurras, qui fut le plus grand penseus politique de notre siecle ..." Degrelle quoted in Jean-Michel Charlier, Le'on Degrelle: Persiste et Signe (Paris: Editions Jean Picollec, 19851, 33. Despite these strong acclamations, it is important to note that Degrelle believed Maurras to be lacking in social passion. F.L. Carsten, The Rise of Fascism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 14. stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1995), 40. brought the nation to the verge of extinction."1° According to Maurras, the people, lacking a higher authority, could not be trusted to govern themselves and would produce chaos. Maurras's emphasis on a strong monarchy for the proper functioning of a nation was coupled with other, not particularly subtle beliefs; he was strongly anti-Jewish, anti- German, anti-Protestant, anti-Freemason, pro-army, pro-tradition, and pro-Catholicism." Despite Maurras9s strong feelings in favor of the Catholic Church, the church hierarchy was uncomfortable with much of his thinking, and he was excommunicated in 1927.12 This split between the Catholic Church and someone who cast himself as its ardent defender would be repeated in the case of Degrelle. Maurras's Action franqaise was founded in 1899 in the midst of the Dreyfus Affair. The Dreyfus Affair began with the wrongful conviction for treason of a Jewish army officer and grew into a battle between forces of the left and the right in France, dividing the country into these opposing factions. Many of the issues at the heart of the conflict, such as clericalism versus anticlericalism, monarchism versus democracy, and debates over the character of the nation, were central to Rexism over thirty years later. The debates emerging out of the Dreyfus Affair were especially relevant to the Belgian Walloons who shared much of France's cultural heritage. The profound influence of the Dreyfus Affair on Degrelle would later be seen in Degrelle's publication of the pamphlet J'accuse M. Segers (evoking Zola) following the so-called Coup de Courtrai, discussed in chapter three. lo Zeev Sternhell, David Maisel (translator), Neither Right Nor Left (Berkeley: University of California, 1986), 19. " Carsten, Rise ofFascism, 13. l2 Payne, A History ofFascism, 48. 13 Carsten, Rise of Fascism, 12. In Belgium, battles over national identity and the ideal system of government took place within the context of a nation composed of two large ethnicities with often competing interests.14 The Flemings, Flemish speakers closely related to the Dutch and comprising a majority of the Belgian population, often felt themselves to be treated as second-class citizens by the French speaking Walloon elite. After Belgium's independence from the Netherlands in 1830, French was the sole official language for decades, even though Flemish speakers significantly outnumbered French speakers. l5 The language difference was a real barrier to Flemish social advancement, because few Flemings could understand ~rench.'~ Understandably, this and other similar issues were the source of considerable resentment among the Flemings against the Walloons. As a Walloon who sought to appeal to both Walloon and Flemish Belgians, Degrelle always had to tread carefully on questions of ethnic identity within the larger national context. Belgium's geographical location only exacerbated these tensions. Belgium is a small country, with a 1930 population of 8 million, situated between great European powers, and much of its modern history has been defined by conflicts between France and Germany. l7 During World War I, despite its desire for neutrality, Belgium was promptly invaded and harshly occupied by Germany. The Germans intentionally played on Flemish resentment of the Walloons, giving the Flemings preferential treatment in an attempt to curry their favor. After Germany's defeat in WWI, many bitter memories of l4 There is also a small (well under 100,000) ethnically German minority. In the 1930s, the balance was about 4.5 million Flemings to 3.5 million Walloons. Brasillach, Histoire, 506. IS Bernard A. Cook, Belgium: A History (New York: Peter Lang, 2002), 80-81. 88% of Flemings in 1930 were unable to speak French. E.H. Kossman, The Low Countries: 1780-1940 (Oxford: Oxford University, 1978), 630. l7 Herman van der Wusten, "The Low Countries,"in Detlef Miihlberger (ed.), The Social Basis of European Fascist Movements (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 216. '' Cook, Belgium, 104-105. Flemish collaboration persisted. Degrelle later proved that collaboration with the Germans was by no means an exclusively Flemish phenomenon. In the late 1930s, it became clear that there would be another great European war, and it seemed likely that Belgium would once again find itself dragged into the conflict. Belgium desperately wanted to avoid this eventuality, and clung to a policy of neutrality in the hope that this would spare the country from another period of occupation. Despite its best efforts, though, Belgium was unable to avoid being dragged into the war and in 1940 again found itself under German occupation. Belgian resistance fighters waged a fierce campaign of assassinations against collaborators, significantly targeting many Rexists, but were unable to liberate their country without outside help. There was one common thread running through both the Flemish and Walloon communities: Catholicism. In 1940, 98% of Belgium's population was baptized Catholic.19 Nevertheless, there were differences among Catholics. Degrees of belief and practice varied dramatically, and Flemings tended to be significantly more observant believers than the ~alloons." Socioeconomic status also varied along lines of ethnicity, as the Walloons tended to be better off financially than the Flemings. There also existed in Belgium a tiny Jewish minority. Even after a large influx of Eastern European Jewish refugees following the First World War, Jews constituted slightly less than 1 % of the Belgian population.21 Belgium's Jews would receive attention fiom Degrelle disproportionate to their numbers. Degrelle became extremely anti-Semitic over the Martin Conway, "Building the Christian City: Catholics and Politics in Inter-War Francophone Belgium," Past and Present, No. 128 (Aug., 1990), 118. 20 Cook, Belgium, 83. 21 Rudi Van Doorslaer, "Jewish Immigration and Communism in Belgium, 1925-1939," in Dan Michian (ed.), Belgium and the Holocaust: Jews, Belgians, Germans (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1998), 63-64. course of the 1930s, placing the blame for Belgium's woes at the feet of the Jewish population. The system of government dating from Belgium's independence from the Netherlands in 1830 was that of a parliamentary democracy, with a constitutional monarch. The Catholic, Socialist and Liberal parties were the only major parties with a cross-ethnic appeal on the national level during the era of mass politics. Before the mid- 1930s, the political balance between the parties in Belgium was largely static and slow- changing. The Catholic Party dominated from 1884 to 19 17, and competed with the Socialists for power for the next twenty years.22 The Liberals ran a perennial third in national elections. The voting system in Belgium was similar to those in much of the rest of Europe. In response to social pressures and changes, universal (but "weighted according to age, income, education, and marital status") manhood suffrage was granted in 1893, and in 1899 proportional representation was enacted for parliamentary elections.23 In 191 9, the one man, one vote principle was instituted, and women from families whose men had been killed in World War One were also granted suffrage.24 In sum, Belgium in the first half of the twentieth century was divided between two uneasy, occasionally hostile ethnicities. It was overwhelmingly homogeneous in religion, although levels of observance varied. The country was powerless to avoid being swept up in the grand affairs of its neighbors, and suffered under two wars fought on its soil and two periods of German occupation. Before the outbreak of the Second World War the chaotic 1930s were already rife with political change, with competing currents of communism, fascism, and authoritarian Catholicism, all of which also made an impact on 22 Cook, Belgium, 79. 23 Cook, Belgium, 88. 24 Cook, Belgium, 88. public consciousness throughout Europe. Into this mix Lkon Degrelle introduced his formula of Rexism, his vision for the political future of Belgium. The 66F" ~6rd Any discussion of the politics of Lkon Degrelle and Rex must necessarily consider the question of fascism. Much of the current scholarship on Rex is concerned with the movement's fascistic characteristics. Scholars disagree on when, whether, and to what extent Rex could be considered a fascist movement. Some scholars hold that the group wasfascist from its very beginnings, while to others Rex's fascism emerged only in the context of National Socialist domination of Europe. This debate cannot be easily resolved, and before I attempt to answer these questions a consideration of fascism is in order. More than almost any other political ideology, scholars disagree on what exactly fascism means, and what constitutes fascism.25 The topic is the subject of fierce historiographical debate, and at times the debate seems to take on more significance than the phenomenon itself. Many historians feel that there are key moral issues at stake, and that for that reason the debate is absolutely essential. I would argue that while the moral issues involved should certainly be considered, they are not of tantamount importance for understanding Degrelle and Rexism. Part of what complicates the debate about the nature of fascism is the fact that there was no one model for fascism; Mussolini and Italian Fascism represented only one possible manifestation of the fascist phenomenon. Hitler's National Socialism falls under For reasons why fascism is difficult to define, see Robert 0. Paxton, "The Five Stages of Fascism,"The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 70, No. 1 (March 1998), 1-23. the fascist rubric, but so too does the Franco regime in Spain. In this respect, there were numerous variants of fascist parties and regimes. Labeling a movement as "fascist"does not necessarily convey a great deal of insight about a movement in and of itself. Although there were fascist movements of various kinds throughout Europe, there is not always agreement among historians on the question of what characteristics are necessary for a movement to be considered fascist. As the scholar Robert 0. Paxton rightly notes, the concept of fascism is also plagued by "overuse: the word 'fascist' has become the most banal of epithets. Everyone is someone's fas~ist.'"~ Paxton, though, is unwilling to give up on using the term. In an attempt to define fascism, a natural starting point would be Benito Mussolini's explanation of the "Fundamental Ideas"of fascism in the Enciclopedia Italiana of 1932.~~ As Mussolini founded the Italian Fascist party, the first true fascist movement, his definition of fascism helps get to the heart of the issue even though this piece was written a decade after his Fascist party came to power in Italy. Mussolini offered the following: "Like all sound political conceptions, Fascism is action and it is thought; action in which doctrine is immanent, and doctrine arising from a given system of historical forces in which it is inserted, and working on them from within...There can be no conception of the State which is not fundamentally a conception of life."28 Fascism was predisposed to action: "Inactivity is death."29 Stagnancy was the enemy, and actions driven by the doctrine of fascism could and would overcome it. According to Mussolini, fascism offered a formula for the state which was all-encompassing,"a conception of 26 Paxton, "Five Stages,"8. 27 It is not certain that Mussolini actually wrote this article, but he is still listed as the author. 28 Benito Mussolini, Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions (New York: Howard Fertig, 1968), 7. 29 ~ussolini, Fascism, 13. life." His doctrine invested great power in the individual man of action; "by the exercise of his free will, man can and must create his own Mussolini suggested that people could control their own destinies, rather than passively accepting whatever fate awaited them. Men of action were essential to fascism, but there was a quasi-religious component as well. "The Fascist conception of life is a religious one," Mussolini contended, because "Fascism is not only a system of government but also and above all a system of thought."3' The fascist state would become so prominent in people's lives and in the way they saw the world that it would take on religious qualities. The state would become religious because the state would regulate all aspects of the human condition. "The Fascist conception of the State is all-embracing;"wrote Mussolini, "outside of it no human or spiritual values can exist, much less have value ...Fascism is t~talitarian."~~ Fascism was totalitarian in that it was all-encompassing. Everything human existed only within the state. Significantly, to Mussolini, "Fascism is ...opposed to all individualistic abstractions based on eighteenth century materialism; and it is opposed to all Jacobinistic utopias and innovation^."^^ This was a direct renunciation of the currents of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. The Fascist state had to be held above the individual man, so "individualistic abstractions"were wholly inappropriate. The intellectual backlash against the French Revolution and the Enlightenment dating back to the late nineteenth century was essential for the spread of fascism; without these 30 Mussolini, Fascism, 8. Mussolini, Fascism, 9. Mussoli~ii, Fascism, 1 1. 33 Mussolini, Fascism, 10. historical trends toward individualism, an overcorrection into corporatism likely would not have had the same appeal. 34 Mussolini was clear in his denunciation of individualism: "Anti-individualistic, the Fascist conception of life stresses the importance of the State and accepts the individual only in so far as his interests coincide with those of the State, which stands for the conscience and the universal will of man as a historic entity."35 The interests of the state superseded the interests of the individual, but Mussolini claimed that this was actually what would allow individuals to flourish. "Liberalism denied the State in the name of the individual; Fascism reasserts the rights of the State as expressing the real essence of the individ~al."~~ It was only in and through the state that an individual could find his true expression. Mussolini did not permit any expression outside the realm of the state. His view on the supremacy of the state led Mussolini to denigrate democracy, for democracy "which equates a nation to the majority, lowering it to the level of the largest number"was actually a degradation of the noble. 37 Fascism, he wrote, "is the purest form of democracy if the nation be considered ...from the point of view of quality rather than quantity."38 Other doctrines may have recognized the importance of the nation, but their conception of its relationship with the state was backwards. "It is not the nation which generates the State ...Rather is it the State which creates the nation, conferring volition and therefore real life on a people made aware of their moral unity."39 For Mussolini, the nation, a grouping of people with essential common characteristics, could 34 Zeev Sternhell, Mario Sznajder and Maia Asheri, David Maisel (translator), The Birth of Fascist Ideology (Princeton: Princeton University, 1994), 3. Mussolini, Fascism, 10. 36 Mussolini, Fascism, 10-1 1. 37 Mussolini, Fascism, 1 1. 38 Mussolini, Fascism, 12. '9 Mussolini, Fascism, 12. not predate the state. Only the state would allow an awareness of these characteristics to come into being, and thus with them the existence of the nation. Mussolini offered his doctrine of fascism as a "totalitarian"solution to the problems of modernity. At least in theory, the philosophical beliefs contained in Mussolini's definition were the driving force behind the Italian Fascists. Italy, though, was not the only state where fascism played a significant role in public life. In those other countries, fascism often looked different than Mussolini's ideal model. Fascism took on different forms in different parts of Europe (and the rest of the world), but many scholars contend that it is necessary to devise an over-arching definition of fascism which encompasses the various fascist movements. This approach may have to do with the moral opprobrium connoted by the word fascist, an opprobrium which most of these movements wholeheartedly deserve. Robert 0. Paxton defends the use of the concept of fascism for other reasons: A real phenomenon exists. Indeed, fascism is the most original political novelty of the twentieth cen tury... We must be able to examine this phenomenon as a system. It is not enough to treat each national case individually, as if each one constitutes a category in itself. If we cannot examine fascism synthetically, we risk being unable to understand this century, or the next4' The concept of fascism, then, can be analytically helpful if it is used carefully and judiciously. Which movements, however, should be considered fascist? The scholar Stanley Payne has put forth a set of criteria for "generic" fascism. These criteria include the group being anti-communist, anti-liberal, and anti-conservative, while seeking an authoritarian state, an integrated economic structure, greater national standing, mass- mobilization, and heightened militarization. These traits are also accompanied by a 40 Paxton, "Five Stages,"9. strong sense of aesthetics, the importance of youth, charismatic leadership, and a positive view toward ~iolence.~' These characteristics were certainly present in Mussolini's Fascist party, the prototypical fascist movement, but did not all apply to Rex at all times. ' Payne's concept of generic fascism seems useful, but it may also lead to unwarranted assumptions about any movement commonly perceived as fascist. Rex in its early years certainly had some characteristics in common with Italian Fascism, for example, but there were perhaps even more areas where it differed. I argue that such attempts at over-arching definition are not necessarily helpful, and that applying judgment-laden labels to Rex throughout its existence does little to help explain the ideology and activity of the movement. Stanley Payne glibly classifies "early Rex" as a movement of the "conservative right" and "late Rex"as a fascist group.42 How useful, though, are these labels? In the 1930s, Rex called for broad-reaching social changes and the amelioration of the condition of the poor, while railing against the financial system. Degrelle was many things, but "conservative"in the traditional sense of the word was not one of them. In terms reminiscent of Mussolini, Degrelle claimed outright that he wanted a revolution of the soul, a regeneration of the Belgian spirit. Rex was never a "conservative" group, yet neither was it necessarily completely fascist. From its inception as an independent political movement, Rex had numerous characteristics in common with other European fascist movements. It fulfilled all of Payne's criteria for generic fascism at one time or another, but it is difficult to pinpoint when exactly Rex could first be rightly considered a fascist movement. To Martin 41 Stanley G. Payne, "Introduction,"in Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet and Jan Petter Myklebust (ed.), JVho Were the Fascists: Social Roots of European Fascism (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), 419. 42 Payne, A History of Fascism, 15. Conway, perhaps the foremost English language scholar studying Degrelle, "At different stages in their political evolution, the Rexists were Catholic authoritarians, Poujadist populists, and National ~ocialists."~ Most would agree that during the war, when Rex espoused a philosophy of Nazi-style National Socialism, it fit into any reasonable definition of fascism, but the issue is less clear cut at the other stages of Rex's career.44 Some scholars refer to Rex as a fascist party when describing events as early as 1935, but it would be hard to make this case convincingly without the benefit of knowledge of what came later.45 11 may be more useful to describe and attempt to explain the philosophy of Rex at various points in time than to attempt to determine when Rex should be considered fascist. Before the electoral disappointment of 1937, Rex was not an openly fascist movement. Degrelle and some of his followers may well have had fascist inclinations with respect to the value of democracy, but they tried to keep them out of public discourse. Once it became clear that Rex was no longer politically viable, Rex publicly committed itself more and more to fascist tenets. Certainly at the very latest by the beginning of collaboration with the Germans in 1940, Rex could rightly be considered fascist. Rex was not even the first "fascist" party in Belgium. A description of the Legion Nationale, a very different political grouping from Rex, can be helpful in illustrating the wide range of possibilities that fall under the umbrella of fascism. The Legion Nationale, 43 Conway, Collaboration, 4. The Poujadists were a group of 1950s French populists inspired by Pierre Pouj ade. Though National Socialism has a strong racial component that is not necessarily prominent in other variants of fascism, the other essential characteristics of fascism are present in National Socialism. See, for example: Kossman, The Low Countries, 599. founded in 1922 by ex-servicemen, was "totally fascist, without ever growing into a true mass movement." 46 The group was led by M.P. Hoornaert, a World War One veteran.47 In a 1927 sample issue of La Lkgion Nationale Belge, the group's newspaper, the Legion laid out its political philosophy. "Object: Prepare the coming of a regime of order, authority, discipline, hierarchy and social democracy, by the fight against the elements of the dissociation of the Nation and by the suppression of the government of parties.""8 The LBgion sought order above all things, a highly authoritarian desire. In this piece, it was not made explicit what "social democracy"would have entailed, but it certainly would not have consisted of a government of elected officials. The group was highly distrustful of parliamentary democracy and had no pretense of electoral aspirations, but believed that it would win over the bourgeoisie by protecting them from anarchy stemming from the left.49 Against the forces of anarchy were arrayed the Legion's paramilitary black shirts, forceful "men of tomorrow"who defended "our traditions and our work against anarchy from wherever it ~ornes.''~~ A significant portion of the Legion's newspaper was devoted to a discussion of its various enemies. The paper featured an article brimming with anti-Flemish ~entiment,~' possibly stemming from Flemish collaborationism in the First World War, but the strongest criticisms were reserved for Germany and Germans. One story referred to 46 Wusten, "The Low Countries,"214,225,223. Wusten's use of the word "fascism" to describe the Legion seems justified, given its political beliefs and ideology. 47 Hoornaert is certainly not a Walloon name, but the Legion was a Walloon party. 48 "Objet: Preparer l'avbnement d'un regime d'ordre, d'autoritk, de discipline, de hierarchie et de democratie sociale, par la lutte contre les elements de dissociation de la Nation et par la suppression du gouvernement des partis." La Lkgion Nationale Belge (7 August 1927), 1. 49 Victor Lagae, "Les chemises noires," in La Lkgion Nationale Belge (7 August 1927), 2. "Hommes de demain, vous defendez nos traditions et nos travaux contre I'anarchie d'ou qu'elle vienne." Lagae, "Les chemises noires," in La Lkgion Nationale Belge (7 August 1927), 2. Again, compare this to the Italian model. 5' "Gare a l'offensive des demagogues et des flamingants"in La Lkgion Nutionale Belge (7 August 1927), 0 Germans as "boches,"a traditional French anti-German epithet.52 Throughout, the paper was distrustful of Germany's aims. Future events, of course, would prove this distrust to be justified. In the article "Belges, ouvrez les Yeux" [Belgians, open your eyes], one lkgionnaire made a prophetic prediction. "The peace, the precarious peace of Versailles, is threatened: because the German mentality has not changed; because Germany is preparing materially for war; because the German-Soviet collusion threatens Poland, Belgium and Though the Lkgion Nationale was "fascist," it was also extremely patriotic and had no loyiilties to Hitler's National Socialism. When the Germans invaded Belgium in 1940, the Legionnaires put up armed resistance, in stark contrast to many of the other right-wing extremist parties. The Legion's chief, Hoornaert, was captured by the Germans and died in a concentration camp.54 It is important to recognize, though, that this opposition to Hitler was by no means anti-fascist, as nationalism is one of the characteristics of fascism. By contrast, Degrelle showed no such nationalistic qualms about collaborating with Hitler. Was Degrelle, then, less fascist? He was certainly less of a Belgian nationalist. Particularly given the differences in their wartime behavior, it does not seem very useful to categorize both the Legion Nationale and Rex as falling under the same political and philosophical framework. Perhaps Rex was fascist, but so too was the Lkgion. Using the word in the case of these two Belgian political movements can have the effect of concealing more than it reveals. 52 "La controverse belgo-allemande,"in La Ldgion Nationale Belge (7 August 1927), 2. 53 "Le paix, le precaire paix de Versailles, est menacte: Parce que la mentaliti allernand n'a pas chang6; Parce que l'hllemagne se prdpare matiriellement a la guerre; Parce que la collusion germano-soviitique menace la Pologne, la Belgique et la France [emphasis in the original]."Victor Lagae, "Belges, ouvrez les Yeux," in La Ligion Nationale Belge (7 August 1927), 2. 54 Wusten, "The Low Countries,"225. A Note on Sources During his life, Degrelle wrote voluminously on a plethora of topics in books, magazines, and newspapers. He also wrote poetry and gave incredibly extensive interviews to multiple journalists. The transcript of his interviews with French journalist Jean-Michel Charlier in the 1970s, for example, runs to over 400 pages, while a series of interviews with Wim Dannau published in 1973 take up thirteen volumes. Degrelle never ran out of things to say, but his favorite topic later in life seemed to be himself. When reading different pieces by Degrelle, the one commonality that shows through most strongly is Degrelle's incredibly high estimation of his own worth. Unfortunately, Degrelle also had a penchant for taking liberties with numerous facts, making it impossible to take his words at face value. Degrelle always seemed to say what he thought would place him in the best light, rather than feeling bound by what actually happened during a given event. For this reason, despite the fact that the massive amount of written material by Degrelle would seem to be the most obvious source of information about his life and political beliefs, one must be circumspect about relying on such material since it is difficult to determine whether or not he was telling the truth about any particular topic. Degrelle's works, though, are still invaluable. Though they may not be trustworthy as far as accuracy is concerned, they do reveal how Degrelle wished to be perceived at certain moments of his life, and what issues he believed to be important. In addition, Rexist journals are a valuable source of information on the party's philosophy and political ideology. Also helpful in this respect are books written by high-ranking Rexists, like Jean Denis, or Rexist sympathizers, like Robert Brasillach. These works are certainly not even-handed in their approaches, but they are nonetheless excellent indicators of Rexist strategies and priorities. I have used sources from throughout the 1930s and early 1940s to chart the progression of Rex's beliefs. Chapter Outline Chapter two traces the early years of Degrelle and Christus Rex, and the beginning of Degrelle9s reign at the head of the Christus Rex publishing house, continuing until Rex's split with the Association catholique de la jeunesse belge. I argue that this period informed the later development of Rex in profound ways, as could be seen in Rex's evolving relationship with the Catholic Church and the political mainstream, and that for this reason understanding this period is essential to understanding the history of Rex as a whole. In chapter three I examine Degrelle9s push for political independence and the highpoint of the Rexist movement. Degrelle consciously worked to separate Rex from the Catholic Party in the public mind, before finally making the split official during an incident that became known as the Coup de Courtrai. Rex rode this momentum to its surprising performance in its first parliamentary contest. There seemed to be no limit on Rex's future, and Degrelle was careful to use relatively moderate rhetoric in order to maintain his popularity. The confidence that Degrelle drew from Rex's electoral success in 1936, though, led him to make a series of disastrous missteps, which I investigate in chapter four. After his electoral humiliation in 1937, Degrelle turned Rex in an increasingly fascist direction and became openly scornful of electoral democracy. The idealism of Rex's early days was gone, replaced with a newfound cynicism. When Germany invaded Belgium in 1940, the evolution of Degrelle's ideology had made him ready to do business with the Nazis. In chapter five I touch briefly on Degrelle's wartime activities. I also consider the increasingly anti-Semitic character of Rex after 1937, an anti-Semitism which Degrelle may always have felt but was careful to keep relatively veiled when he sought electoral legitimacy. I conclude with brief reflections on Degrelle's political career and the sighificance of Rex. Chapter %-The Birth of Rex Degrelle: Early Life and Background Lkon Degrelle would become an infamous figure in Belgium, notorious for his whole-hearted collaboration with the Nazis. Degrelle the collaborationist, though, did not spring forth out of whole cloth. An examination of his early life can, and hopefully will, prove quite instructive, as certain of Degrelle's themes and patterns, such as political opportunism and an often uneasy relationship with the Catholic Church and the Belgian political elite, were established early on and then repeated again and again. The political and strategic choices that Degrelle made during the Nazi occupation were linked to choices he had made and experiences he had lived earlier in life. In this chapter, I begin by outlining Degrelle's early years, and go on to consider the Christus Rex publishing house and Degrelle's assumption of leadership, continuing through Rex's split with the Association catholique de la jeunesse belge. Degrelle was born in 1906 in the rural Ardennes countryside in the Belgian province of Luxembourg into a comfortably middle class family.' Degrelle's father was of French origin, though this never made Degrelle particularly (or at all) pro-French in his politics. LPon was one of eight children, which, according to Degrelle, was the average number of children in all of the Degrelle families since 1590.~ He himself would 1 F.L. Carsten, The Rise of Fascism (Berkeley: University of California, 1969), 160. 2 Jean-Michel ~tienne, Le Mouvement Rexiste Jusqu 'en 1940 (Paris: Eibrairie Armand Colin, 1968), 108. "can-Michel Charlier, Lion Degrelle: Prrsiste et Signe (Paris: Editions Jean Picollec, 1985), 26. later go on to father six children with his wife.4 The large size of the Degrelle family probably stemmed from a devout Catholicism. Degrelle9s family was deeply Catholic. So many Degrelles joined religious orders that a bishopfriend of the family remarked that "they are Jesuits from father to son."5 In an interview with French journalist Jean-Michel Charlier in the 1970s' Degrelle himself described his family's religious beliefs: "All of the Degrelles have always been profoundly Christian. We are believers down to the marrow ...I am penetrated by the God who lives inside me."6 ~iven Degrelle's professed religious beliefs and his family background, it is not surprising that he started his political life in the Catholic Party. Catholicism had a deep and lasting influence on Degrelle's life, but in his telling, at least, he never considered becoming a Jesuit. When his father asked him as a boy what he would be when he grew up, the ever ambitious Degrelle is purported to have answered "prime mini~ter."~ Despite Degrelle's high hopes, the post of prime minister was one that would always elude him. Lkon was by no means the first politician in the Degrelle family. His father was the permanent deputy of the province of Belgian Luxembourg, and Leon's maternal grandfather was "one of the leaders of the ~i~ht."~ From childhood, then, Degrelle was exposed to Belgian politics. He would chart his own course, though, choosing to support a politics different fiom that of both his father and grandfather. Charlier, Degrelle, 26. "Chez les Degrelle, on est Jesuite de pbre en fils." ~tienne, Mouvement, 9. "TOUS l es Degrelles ont toujours ete profondement chretiens. Nous sommes croyants jusqu'a la moelle...Je suis p6nCtre par ce Dieu qui vit en moi." Degrelle quoted in Charlier, Degrelle, 27-28. Robert Brasillach, Histoire de la Guerre d 'Espagne: Mkmoires, suivi de Lkon Degrelle et L 'avenir de "Rex" ([Paris]: Plon, 1969), 480. "un des leaders de la Droite." Degrelle quoted in Charlier, Degrelle, 27. In various interviews he gave as an adult, Degrelle was highly conscious of the history of his family and his home, and of that history's effect on his political career. In a 1930s interview with Robert Brasillach, a French journalist later executed for colladoration with the Nazis, Degrelle traced his family history for four hundred years, painting an idealized portrait of the decency and moral values of the countryside where he was born. "It was of that that Rex was born, there is no doubt. It is that which I want to rebuild and re~reate."~ Degrelle's positive feelings about his own childhood likely had a significant effect on his politics. At the same time, the way that Degrelle portrayed his childhood in the 1930s was likely also an attempt to cast himself and Rex in a favorable light. Degrelle's love of the countryside surely influenced his politics. According to Alan Cassels, a scholar of fascism, in his political ideology in the 1930s Degrelle yearned to return to a pastoral, idyllic utopia ... Thepourris [rotten ones] were abominated because their wealth came from commerce and manufacturing, but Rexist propaganda made no comparable attack on landed property, for in the countryside and its traditional patterns lay the best hope of national regeneration.I0 It seems reasonable to assume that the "pastoral, idyllic utopia"that Degrelle envisioned would have been remarkably similar to the one that he waxed nostalgic about from his childhood experiences in his home region. A pure countryside could also be presented in opposition to the corruption of modem cities and twentieth century urban life. If modern urbanization was the problem, then a return to the values of the countryside could be the solution. "CC'est de la que Rex est nk, il ne faut pas en douter. C'est cela que je veux refaire et recrier." Degrelle quoted in Brasillach, Histoire, 477. 10 Alan Cassels, Fascism (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975), 247. The Ardennes did not remain peaceful throughout Degrelle's childhood, as war intruded upon the countryside in 1914. Degrelle was still a child when World War One began, and, during the war, he experienced first-hand Germany's occupation of Belgium. Many Belgians were understandably embittered by the harsh German treatment of their country, and had no great love for Germany either during or after the war. Germany had remorselessly plundered Belgium, and Belgium had found itself the site of many of the war's most ferocious battles. Degrelle9s father was decorated with the Lkgion of Honor for his surveillance work on behalf of French forces during the war." Degrelle recognized that the war was incredibly destructive for Belgium, but, unlike many other nationalist Belgians, he never expressed particularly anti-German sentiments. Degrelle seemed to draw different lessons from the experience of German occupation than did most of his compatriots. In his discussions with Robert Brasillach in the 1930s, he was relatively neutral on the subject of Germany and the effects of the war on his home region. While he was not harshly critical, he was also careful not to say anything overly positive about Germany.12 As with many of Degrelle's political opinions, though, as time went on he either changed his viewpoint on this subject or he was simply more willing to voice what he had really thought all along. In his 1970s interviews with Charlier from exile, Degrelle struck a much different note about WWI and the fate of Belgium under the Germans. WWI, according to Degrelle, had...considerable repercussions on my development because we all learned, during those years, to hate the Germans ...that was the case ...in all of the West. That was a horrifying 11 Charlier, Degrelle, 29. l2 Brasillach, Histoire, 479. thing because it was that blind, unreasoning, almost savage hatred which threw Europe in 1939 into a second civil war.13 To the Degrelle of the 1970s, hatred of Germany based on the experience of WWI had been foolish and shortsighted, and had helped to bring about the next war with Germany. This was a German apologist account of the war; Germany had been an incredibly harsh occupying power, and a hatred of it by Belgians was not necessarily "unreasoning." For this reason, Degrelle's sentiment would certainly not have been popular in 1930s Belgium, and he was careful not to appear pro-German or pro-Hitler while he still cared about his electoral viability. In the years after WWI, Degrelle became politically active for the first time as a university student. For a time, he attended the college of Namur, run by ~esuits'~ and considered to be "one of the bastions of the Action Fran~aise in Belgium,"and he started but did not complete his studies at the University of ~0uvain.l~ His intellectual affinity for Charles Mamas emerged while Degrelle was studying at Namur. The periodical Cahiers de la Jeunesse catholique organized a poll to determine who Belgium's young people most looked up to as a philosophical inspiration. Degrelle successfully campaigned for Charles Maurras, who ended up with 66% of the votes. Degrelle, of course, credited Maurras's strong performance to his own efforts at getting out the vote.16 He would later claim that the fact that Mamas won the vote so infuriated the Catholic hierarchy that it led, through a complex series of events, to the Church's condemnation of l3 "WWI "a eu ...une repercussion considerable sur mon dkveloppement parce que nous avons tous appris, pendant des annees, A haTr les Allemands ...ce fut le cas ...de tout ]'Occident. Ce fut une chose effroyable parce que c'est cette haine aveugle, irraisonnee, sauvage presque, qui a prtcipitk l'Europe, en 1939, dans une deuxi6me guerre civile." Degrelle quoted in Charlier, Degrelle, 28. " Charlier, Degrelle, 27. l5 Luc Schepens, "Fascists and Nationalists in Belgium 1919-1940," in Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bemt Hagtvet and Jan Petter Myklebust (ed.), Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots of European Fascism (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), 506. Charlier, Degrelle, 39. Actionfian~aise and Maurras in 1927.17 After the Church exommunicated Maurras, Degrelle and his friends believed that it was their responsibility to save Belgium by taking up Maurras's torch. After moving from Namur to the University of Louvain, Degrelle emerged on the national stage for the first time. He reveled in being the center of attention, and there were few boundaries to what he would do to publicize himself. Degrelle's first real claim to fame was as a practical joker on a grand scale. While at university, he orchestrated a large, incredibly elaborate prank. He published a piece in the school paper using the family nanie Dumas, and then made up a group of fictional descendants of Alexandre Dumas to be offended by this unjust appropriation of the name. He hired a made-up lawyer on their behalf, and proceeded to sue himself. When the case went to trial, Degrelle took the opportunity to speak in open court before revealing that it was all an elaborate hoax.19 The charade seems largely to have been an attempt to increase the circulation of the student newspaper by drawing attention to it.20 Perhaps surprisingly, no one was particularly annoyed by Degrelle's stunt and it was laughed off, which may have had to do with the European tradition of elaborate school pranks. Charlier, Degrelle, 40. This story is related by Degrelle, so it should be taken with a considerable grain of salt. Degrelle's role in the vote calling Maurras the foremost philosopher for Belgium's youth seems entirely plausible, though the claim that Degrelle himself caused the pope to take action seems rather fanciful. l8 "Maurras condamne, les jeunes gens de Louvain et Leon Degrelle penshrent qu'ils devaient d'abord essayer eux-m&mes de sauver leur pays et leur propre humanite." Brasillach, Histoire, 485. One of Degrelle's "jeunes collaborateurs"at this time was Jose Streel, later one of Rex's top theoreticians, who would break with Rex in 1943 over Degrelle's abject collaboration with the Nazis. Martin Conway, Collaboration in Belgium: Ldon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement, 1940-1944 (New Haven: Yale University, 1993), 176. After the Maurras episode, Degrelle flunked his end of year examination in philosophy and letters, a fact which he blamed on a Jesuit professor who had been offended by Degrelle's support of Maurras. He left Namur and continued his studies at the University of Louvain. Charlier, Degrelle, 41. ~tienne, Mouvement, 11-12; Charlier, Degrelle, 44-47. 20 Charlier, Degrelle, 46-47. This entire episode may seem more pointlessly bizarre than particularly noteworthy. A consideration of the prank, however, may help to provide some insights into Degrelle's character. Degrelle had an insatiable need for attention, and such a stunt was ohe way to gain the attention that Degrelle so ardently desired. It is hard for a university student to do something extraordinary and become well known, and perhaps this prank offered a kind of shortcut. Degrelle's self-promotion was a success in so far as he was able to parlay his newfound notoriety into an offer to write for a prominent Catholic newspaper.21 At the age of twenty and still a student, Degrelle accepted the newspaper's offer, eventually leaving the university, and he embarked upon a multi-part expose of life in the slums in order to educate the Belgian public about how the poor lived.22 Looking back on this period of his life, he later contended that he and his like-minded friends were "much more socially conscious than the 'mamamouchis' of the Socialist Party, who had become a bureaucratized part of the bourgeoisie, no longer having guts, almost all of whom are corrupt, having lost faith in their cause."23 Though Degrelle was a fierce opponent of Marxism and bolshevism, he was by no means unconscious of social issues. The problem with socialism to Degrelle was that the Socialist Party had become stagnant and corrupt, not that it had started out with bad intentions. Degrelle would later hammer home these themes of stagnation and corruption in his political campaigns of the 1930s. Degrelle's concern for the socio-economically marginalized extended from the Belgian poor to Mexican Catholics. Not long after he left Louvain, Degrelle traveled to 21 Charlier, Degrelle, 47. 22 Charlier, Degrelle, 47-48. Thus, this must have occurred in 1926 or 1927. 23 "bien plus sociaux que les mamamouchis du Parti Socialiste, embourgeois6s, bureaucratises depuis longtemps, n'ayant plus la tripe populaire, presque tous cormnipus, ayant perdu la foi dans leur cause." Degrelle quoted in Charlier, Degrelle, 48. Mexico to investigate the mistreatment of Catholics by the revolutionary regime there. Degrelle had already established himself as an enemy of the Mexican regime with his comments about the assassination of the anticlerical Mexican president Obreg6n by Torral. About the killing, Degrelle wrote "To each new Torral, we will cry with all of our heart: bravo!"24 Because of this, Degrelle traveled on false papers to avoid trouble with the Mexican a~thorities.~~ He spent three months touring in Mexico, and eventually sold the series of articles that resulted from his travels for a substantial sum of money to an American newspaper.26 ~fter his stay in Mexico, Degrelle attempted to enter the United States but had problems because of his false documentation. With the intercession of a California bishop, Degrelle was eventually able to cross the border into the Unfortunately, details about the links between the American bishop and Degrelle, and about his travels within the US, are not readily available. Even with limited information, Degrelle's Mexican exploits are quite significant for understanding how he saw himself and the world. Clearly, Degrelle was concerned with events outside of his home in Belgium. He would right wrongs the world over, protecting Catholics from a godless, anticlerical revolutionary regime. Degrelle made a link between Catholics at home and Catholics abroad, seeing the need for religious solidarity. To him, a threat to Catholics anywhere was an affront to Catholics everywhere. 24 "A chaque nouveau Torral, nous nous Ccrierons de tout notre coeur: bravo!"Degrelle quoted in ~tienne, Mouvement, 13. 25 Brasillach, Histoire, 487. This inference of a causal link is my own. Degrelle definitely traveled under false papers because he had criticized the Mexican regime, and he definitely made such comments about Torral. Because of this, it seems a reasonable assumption that these were the particular comments that would not have endeared him to the regime had it known of his presence. 26 Degrelle was paid 18,000 francs for his work, after making his first contact with a representative of the newspaper by chance. Brasillach, Histoire, 490. Unfortunately, I do not know to what newspaper Degrelle sold his articles. 27 Brasillach, Histoire, 491. This incident also shows that Degrelle was a risk taker, traveling through Mexico on false papers with little or no care for what would happen to him if he were caught by the regime. Degrelle was equally unconcerned about crossing into the United States under false identification. For the entire Mexican episode, it is not clear where the line between a genuine care for fellow Catholics in need and the desire for the excitement of something new was drawn. It is difficult not to see a parallel between Degrelle's rather cavalier attitude toward his Mexican adventure and the way he later enthusiastically spoke of the war in the Soviet Union as a crusade. Historically, a crusade is not only a religious conflict, but also an opportunity to escape the ordinary, to visit exotic locations while killing the locals. In an interview in the 1970s, Degrelle himself likened his participation in the fighting in the USSR during WWII to the Crusades. Our house ...was across fi-om the enormous feudal castle of Godefroid of Bouillon, the leader of the first Crusade. Thus, from my earliest consciousness, I was immersed in the Crusades! I left for the conquest of Soviet Russia in 1941 like my Bouillonais predecessor assaulted Jerusalem in 1099!'~ Whether or not Degrelle was actually thinking about Godefroid of Bouillon in 1941, which seems highly doubtful, in hindsight the connection was clear to him. For Degrelle, the fight against bolshevism was morally equivalent to a religious war, a defense of Chstianity. The war against the Soviet Union was fought in order to protect Europe kom the expansion of godless communism, with Nazi Germany as the West's savior. It may provide insi&t into Degrelle's priorities to observe that he cast the war in religious terms and himself as a defender of the faith. In 1930 the great Crusade of Degrelle's life 28 "Notre maison ...face a l'tnorme chgteau fkodal de Godefroid de Bouillon, celui-la yui fut le chef de la Premiere Croisade. Ainsi, des mes premiers regards, j'ai Cte en plein dans les Croisades! Je suis parti a la conqu8te de la Russie sovietique en 1941 comme mon devancier bouillonnais avait Ctt prendre d'assaut Jerusalem en 1099!" Degrelle quoted in Charlier, Degrelle,25. still lay in the distant future, but he had already embarked on a crusade to defend oppressed Catholics around the world in traveling to Mexico. The concept of a crusade was by no means the only significant aspect of Degrelle9s time in North America. Degrelle's tour of the United States occurred in the midst of the Great Depression, and although Belgium was never as badly affected by the Depression as was the US, witnessing such a devastating failure of capitalism must have influenced Degrelle's thinking. In 1930, Degrelle saw first hand the results of the Depression, and the lessons he took from it about the fallibility of capitalism seem to have stuck with him. Degrelle returned to Belgium from his American tour in 1930 at the age of 24.29 Degrelle had already learned how to grab the spotlight and had traveled abroad in support of oppressed Catholics. As a young man, Degrelle was also occupied with more artistic endeavors. In 1930, Degrelle published a poem entitled "My country does me wrong," containing the line "I like to crush the hits and trample on the roses."30 Whatever the artistic merits of the piece, it is clear that Degrelle was fond of violent, forceful imagery, perhaps in an attempt to shock the reader's sensibilities. This can also be seen as foreshadowing things to come. Degrelle's life as a public figure was about to truly begin. Ghristus Rex Degrelle's rise to prominence in Belgian politics stemmed from his energetic leadership of the ~ditions Rex (fiom "Christus Rex") publishing house. Before discussing Degrelle's work as a publisher, it is first necessary to consider the scope of 29 Brasillach, Histoire,493,491. 30 "Mon pays me fait ma1 ... J'aime Ccraser les hits et pietiner les roses."Degrelle quoted in ~tienne, ~Wouvement, 12. Catholic political action in Belgium. More generally, it is also essential to examine the phenomenon of Christus Rex itself The term Christus Rex, Latin for "Chst the King,"refers to a religious edict by Pope Pius XI in 1925. Pius wanted to encourage "devotion to the earthly majesty of Christ"in an attempt to produce a "more vibrant Catholicism,"a regeneration of faith and morality. 31 At this time, the Church wanted to become more active in public life, and the effects of this were felt across Europe. According to the historian Martin Conway, "during the inter-war years, almost all of the countries of Catholic Europe witnessed the emergence of a strong intellectual and political current which in the name of the Catholic faith rejected the principles and values of parliamentary liberal democracy."32 This dissatisfaction with the current political system in many European countries seemed to correspond with the Church's relative loss of influence in those same countries. To many Europeans in this period, democracy seemed moribund and decaying. They turned to the revolutionary doctrines of fascism and communism in droves for these dynamic political movements appeared as alternatives to the perceived banality and mundane nature of democratic politics. Christus Rex thus proposed Catholicism as a third alternative to parliamentary liberal democracy, one that was separate from both fascism and communism. In so doing, the Church offered a blueprint for a political life guided by the teachings of the Church. The tension between Catholicism and parliamentary democracy was felt in Belgium as well. King Albert's decision to move to a system of equal, universal manhood suffrage post-World War One had been spurred by heavy pressure from the " Martin Conway, "Building the Christian City: Catholics and Politics in Inter-War Francophone Belgium,"Past and Present, No. 128 (Aug., 1990), 124. 32 Conway, "Building the Christian City," 117. Belgian socialist party, "le Parti ouvrier belge"[Belgian Workers' This move to true universal suffrage had been opposed by the primate of Belgium, Cardinal Mercier, and by much of the traditional Catholic political elite, and there were many-especially among the &ancophone Catholic bourgeoisie-who bitterly regretted the era of mass politics and power-sharing which it had inaugurated.34 The Catholic Party had previously been completely dominant in Belgian politics, but the one man, one vote principle ended its overwhelming preponderance, and the Church could no longer count on the Catholic Party necessarily being able to protect its interests. This transformation of Belgian politics helped augment the popularity of the ideology of Maurras's Action frangaise. Many Belgian Catholics believed that a more authoritarian system of government would be more effective than parliamentary democracy. Despite the fact that the Catholic Party was usually the strongest in Belgium, many Catholics were frustrated with modernity and the perceived decay of Catholic values.35 Alienated Catholics' critique of politics included the belief that "Behind the fagade of parliamentary rule, real power was exercised by the Freemasons, the industrial elite and the political parties who subjected the country to the 'absurdities, falsehoods, deceptions and other perversions of the mind'. ..of election campaigns."36 Despite the popularity of Action frangaise among Belgian Catholics, though, the movement proved to be a cause of concern to the Catholic Church. Possibly in part because of its growing popularity in Belgium, the pope condemned Action frangaise in 1926, and this Jean-Marie Delaunois, De I 'Action catholique ti la collaboration: Jose' Streel (Bourtembourg: editions Legrain, 1993), 17-18. 34 Conway, "Building the Christian City,"120. 35 Pierre-Henri Laurent, "Belgian Rexisnl and Leon Degrelle,"in George L. Mosse, International Fascism: New Thoughts and New Approaches (London: Institute of Contemporary History, 1979), 296. 36 Conway, "Building the Christian City,"121. These ideas will seem highly familiar when discussing Degrelle's political philosophy. It is probably no coincidence that Degrelle hated Freemasons and excoriated political parties and the "hypercapitalists." condemnation"appears to have been widely respected in ~el~ium."'~ Though most Belgians now moved away from Actionfranqaise, Degrelle would prove to be less easily dissuaded than many Belgians from this kind of AF-style authoritarian thinking.38 ~egrLlle also had like-minded pro-authoritarian allies within the Belgian church hierarchy, including, most importantly, Monsignor Louis Picard. Franciscan Monsignor Louis Picard proved to be highly influential in Degrelle's life, an assessment with which Degrelle surely agreed. In a 1982 interview, Degrelle stated that I of all my memories of Belgium, the one that moves me the most, to the bottom of my soul and heart together, is that of Monsignor Picard. For me, he was the man who was both the most modest and the most saintly that I ever knew ...we became close friends, with relations that were like those between father and son. 39 The two men met in 1927, and "Picard, like many ecclesiastics, found himself seduced by the words and the pen of the student Leon ~egrelle."~~ Degrelle had great charisma, and was a highly effective speaker and writer, even at a young age. Nevertheless, in the estimation of scholar Charles d'ydewalle, "without the Franciscan priest who was incapable of lying, Leon Degrelle would not have existed"in the way that he did." To Ydewalle, Picard created Degrelle as a political force. Through his relationship with Monsignor Picard, Degrelle gained his greatest opportunity yet. 37 Conway, "Building the Christian City,"122. 38 Though many other Belgians may still have privately supported the ideas ofdction fmn~aise, I have seen nothing regarding any public acknowledgement of such a fact. 39 "de tous mes souvenirs de la Belgique, celui qui m'tmeut le plus, mais jusqu'au fond de l'brne et du coeur, les deux ensemble, c'est monseigneur Picard. Pour moi, c'est l'homme ?i la fois le plus modeste et le plus saint que j'ai connu ... nous sommes devenus des amis intimes, avec presque des relations de pere a fils."Degrelle quoted in Jean-Marie Frtrotte, Lbon Degrelle, le dernier fasciste (Bruxelles: Paul Eegrain, 1987), 40. 40 "Picard, comme beaucoup d'ecclBsiastiques, se laissa s6duire par le verbe et la plume de cet etudiant qui s'appelait Leon Degrelle."Charles d7Ydewalle, Degrelle ou la triple imposture (Bmxelles: Pierre Be Meykre, 1968), 49. "sans ce prEtre de moeurs franciscaines et incapable de mentir, Lton Degrelle a'ht pas existe." Ydewalle, Degrelle ou la triple imposture, 39. Picard7s cordial feelings for Degrelle alone would not have been particularly significant without Picard's connections. In 192 1, Picard had founded the Association catholique de la jeunesse belge, the Catholic Association of Belgian Youth [ACJB].~~ Following the lead of Pope Pius XI, in the mid-1 920s Picard placed the principles of Christus Rex in the forefront of the ACJB.~~ Traditional youth organizations of the Catholic Party had been prominent before World War One, "but they virtually disappeared after the war as the young preferred to devote themselves to the spiritual crusades of the A.c.J.B."" Post-war Catholic youth in Belgium sought to change the country's political system, to bring about something new and fi-esh, which is what the ACJB promoted. As Conway described, Individual liberty, Picard and others declared, was an outmoded value and the need was for a 'strong power, capable of imposing on selfish interests the stern commands of the common good.' Order, discipline and authority were seen as essential components of the harmoniously constructed state.45 In this instance, this kind of anti-liberal thinking was not mandated by the church hierarchy, but rather arose from common-minded Belgian Catholic intellectuals who were displeased with their country's course. Degrelle became a prominent member in the ACJB movement after forming a relationship with Picard. According to Conway, Degrelle's "irrepressible socjability and exuberance went hand in hand with an enthusiasm for the spiritual ideals of the A.C.J.B.,"and the ACJB was highly influential in Degrelle's life." The platform of the 44 Conway, "Building the Christian City,"128. 45 Conway, "Building the Christian City,"132-133. 46 Conway, "Building the Christian City,"141. ACJB gave Degrelle a chance to get his start in activism, and it was through his work with the ACJB that Degrelle7s relationship with Picard deepened. The ACJB was not controlled by the Catholic Party. It took up causes that were not dictated by the party, but rather were of the ACJB's own choosing. In general, "Catholic Action groups were not intended to act as the adjuncts of Catholic political parties, but to operate in the spiritual sphere where their mission was.. .to strengthen and to deepen the Catholic faith."47 One way that the ACJB sought to accomplish this goal was by gaining influence in the publishing world. According to one historian's rendition, the Editions Rex religious publishing house was established in Louvain in 1926 by the ACJB which, in October 1930, appointed Degrelle to head Editions ex.^^ Rex published weekly magazines like Rex, a literary journal, and Vlan, with commentary on politics and current events.49 Pierre Daye, a close ally of Degrelle, described the aims of Rex, as "a journal which has as its goal the renovation of Christian life."50 Never having graduated from university, Degrelle was nonetheless talented enough that he had been appointed to take on the highly significant task of leading the charge of promoting Catholic action for the ACJB.~' Though Rex was a small publishing house, and its 47 Conway, "Building the Christian City,"123. 48 ~tienne, Mouvement, 14. Ydewalle, though, presents a different timeline of events. According to him, the Editions Rex religious publishing house, affiliated with the ACJB, had been established in 1929, and became a cooperative society in 193 1. Ydewalle, Degrelle ou la triple imposture, 50. he fbll titles of the journals were REX Toute la Vie des Lettres and VLAN: Toute la Vie Politique. In March of 1934, the two journals were amalgamated and Erom that point on were published together. ~tienne, Mouvement, 22. 50 "Rex est un journal qui se donne pour objet de rCnover la vie chr6tienne." Pierre Daye, Lion Degrelle et le Rexisme (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1937), 61. 51 Degrelle would buy Rex in 1933. ~tienne, Mouvement, 1. Laurent reports that Degrelle bought and then named the publishing house, but other sources present the name as predating Degrelle's ownership. It is reasonable to believe that the name probably came first, as Editions Rex was closely connected to the ACJB and Mgr. Picard was a strong proponent of the Christus Rex movement. I do not know why there is so much confbsion in the secondary sources over the chronology of events concerning the founding of Rex Laurent, "Belgian Rexism," 303. financial future was often in jeopardy, this would mark the beginning of Degrelle's grand entrance onto the Belgian political stage.52 During this time, the Catholic Party saw potential in Degrelle and put him in charge of election propaganda ahead of the 1932 electoral contest.53 Degrelle was a rising star, and it seemed highly possible, and perhaps even likely, that he would have a bright future within the Catholic Party. Degrelle represented the youth, and he sought to shift the balance of power within the party away from the entrenched elite. Unlike the leaders of European non-democratic movements such as the Nazi and Fascist parties, had Degrelle simply stayed within the mainstream party he likely would have gone on to have quite a successful career in Belgian politics (albeit a career interrupted by World War 11). It is important to recognize that Degrelle and the other leaders of Rex were not "like the Italian or Nazi leaders, a 'gang7 of social failures and unemployed intellectual^."^^ Much of Degrelle's potential for success stemmed from his incredible charisma. Raphael Sindic, after dropping out of the Rexist movement in the late 1930s, reflected back on Degrelle's ability to keep people loyal to the cause even in times of hardship. It is important to keep in mind that this quote came from a pamphlet meant to discourage support for Rex among the Belgian public after Sindic had become disillusioned with Rex and disgusted with Degrelle's leadership. Sindic's superlative-laden sentiments about Degrelle are worth quoting at length: LCon Degrelle appeared to me, around 1932-1933, like a hero from legends and dreams, powerful and magnificent, very handsome and very pure and my great desire was to be at his side to aid him in his task and to fight alongside him ...I devoted myself body and soul 52 By 1934 Rex suffered from heavy debts, and was at times on the verge of bankruptcy. ~tienne, Mouvement, 22-23. 53 Schepens, 'Tascists and Nationalists," 507. Leaders of Rex "ne sont, commes les dirigeants italiens ou nazis, un 'gang' de rat& sociaux et d'intellectuels en ch6mage." ~tienne, Mouvement, 75. to an ideal in which I believed and which impassioned me, and when, after the second or third bankruptcy of Rex, I again found myself almost without a cent on the pavement of Brussels, my nourishment bread and water and wallung for kilometers on foot to save the price of a tram, I did not have a sole word of reproach for him.55 Degrelle7s energy was infectious, and he was able to keep others motivated even when the future of their endeavor looked bleak. Such was Degrelle7s promise at the beginning of the 1930s as a rising star within a leading Belgian political party and as a prominent Catholic journalist who was seen as speaking for Belgian Catholic youth. The Early Years of Rex The Christus Rex movement provided the context in which Degrelle got his start in politics. Degrelle may or may not have had a heartfelt belief in the principles of Christus Rex, but, either way, he attempted to use those principles to further his own career. Gaining control of a publishing house was an important first step, but Degrelle was far too ambitious to be satisfied with such a minor prize. Degrelle quickly transformed the ~ditions Rex publishing house into the Rexist movement, cementing its place as an independent actor long before it became a political party. Degrelle was a propagandist for the Catholic Party, but what he wanted was to change the party and take it over from within. Degrelle used the platform provided for him by the journals of the Rex publishing house to make this fact abundantly clear, and throughout the early 1930s it became increasingly difficult for his elders and superiors in the party to keep Degrelle in line. Party leadership always had to weigh the benefits that 55 "Leon Degrelle m'est apparu, vers 1932-1933, comme un heros de ligende et de reve, puissant et magnifique, tres beau et tres pur et mon grand desir Ctait d7&tre a ses c6tCs pour l'aider dans sa tbche et combattre avec lui ...Je me dCvouais corps et bme pour un ideal dont je le croyais lui-m&me enflame et quand, apres la deuxieme ou la troisieme faillite de Rex, je me retrouvai presque sans le sou sur le pave de Bruxelles, me nourrissant de pain et d'eau et faisant des kilomktres a pied pour faire 1'Cconomie d'un tram, je n9eus pas pour lui un seul mot de reproche."Sindic quoted in Ydewalle, Degrelle ou la triple imposture, 68. Degrelle provided with his youthful appeal against the trouble which he delighted in stirring up. Degrelle was prominently featured in all of the journals that he published, serving as the director of both Rex and Vlan, and writing many of the most prominent articles. This was a pattern that would continue with the daily newspaper Le Bays Rkel, which will be discussed later, up until the German invasion in 1940, when Degrelle became preoccupied with other matters. Degrelle's refusal to share the spotlight may be indicative of his narcissism and need for the most attention possible. His constant activity and prominence also demonstrates his incredible energy and enthusiasm for his work. To understand Degrelle's politics during the first years that he was an editor, it is most helpful to analyze articles that Degrelle wrote or approved for publication in his journals. Whatever Degrelle may have believed privately, these journals were his public face and therefore reveal the substance of his political campaigns, if not necessarily his deeply felt political convictions. These campaigns included an emphasis on Catholicism in public life and a series of attacks on the perceived corruption of Belgian politics. One strategy Degrelle employed in the Rexist journals in his effort to win away support fi-om the Catholic Party was to appear more Catholic than the Catholic Party itself on certain points where the party appeared vulnerable. Degrelle often relied on such tactics, portraying "himself as more Catholic than the Pope and more royalist than the in^."^^ The trick to such a strategy was to define the terns of the debate. After all, if one side could lay claim to representing the only true Catholic position, then the other side logically had to be less Catholic. Degrelle took pains to cast all of Rex's actions in a 56 Laurent, "Belgian Rexism," 307. Catholic light, implying that those who did not agree with Rex were not acting in the way that Catholics should act. Making use of this strategy, Degrelle pinpointed or fabricated weaknesses in the Catholic Party platform. One such perceived weakness was the question of alcohol. After a socialist move to curb alcohol consumption in 1934, a front page unsigned article in Vlan praised the socialists' courage, and, in so doing, insinuated that the Catholic Party's position on this issue left much to be desired. The piece had a strongly moralist tone, with quotes like "The enemy is In the article, the author criticized liberals and the Catholic party for not going along with socialists on this question. "We were very surprised to see the parliamentary Catholics lined up amongst the 'alcoholics.' They cannot possibly be unaware that drunkenness is forbidden by the fifth commandment. This was a neat rhetorical trick. By the author's logic, parliamentary groups who voted against strictures on alcohol were themselves immoral alcoholics. The author also used his own interpretation of the fifth commandment to create a religious imperative where none existed before. This Vlan editorial implied that the Catholic Party was not being true to the dictates of Catholicism, and thereby not living up to its name. New leadership, then, would not be unjustified, and Degrelle, of course, already had the perfect candidate in mind for the position. The editorial also implied that it was more important to stand up for issues that mattered, even if that meant allying with traditional opponents like the socialists, than it was to play petty party politics, as the Catholic Party was accused of doing, 57 "L'ennemi, c'est l'alcoolisme," in Vlan (13 June 1934), 1. 5s "Nous nous sommes fort Btonn6s de voir des parlementaires catholiques se ranger parmi les 'alcooliques.' 11s ne peuvent cependant ignorer que l'ivrognerie est defendue par le cinqilierne com~aridement. Alors?" "L'e~memi, c'est l'alcoolisme," in Vlan (13 June 1934), I. A Degrelle article entitled "Les socialistes allemands et les nBtres9' [German socialists and ours] appeared in the April 15, 1933 issue of Vlan, and is noteworthy in a number of respects, including for Degrelle's assessments of domestic and international politics, and his treatment of religion. Historians have frequently characterized Rex as having largely avoided anti-Semitism until after its electoral decline in 1937, but, as this article indicates, this was not the case.59 In part historians' perceptions of Rexist anti-Semitism may depend on how they define differing degrees of anti-Semitism. Degrelle and Rex certainly became much more pervasively anti-Semitic later in the 1930s, but anti-Semitism was not entirely absent in the earlier period, as can be seen in this article. In "Les socialistes allemands et les ndtres," Degrelle taunted German socialists for having given up so easily by not opposing Hitler. He wrote that socialists had shown themselves to be cowards in Germany, and that the same was true of socialists in Belgium. One can no longer speak of the power of socialism. That force has nothing at its base besides our own weakness. The day when the real patriots, when all the Catholics have the courage to unite, to organize themselves, socialism will be nothing more than a word. It will collapse miserably.60 Degrelle9s characterization of Belgian socialists as cowards raises the question of whether or not Degrelle fancied himself at this juncture as a Belgian Hitler who would one day be able to cow the socialists." Degrelle's desire for such a position seems entirely likely. At the same time, this quote is significant because in it Degrelle equated "real patriots" with Catholics, raising the question of whether or not it was possible for a See, for example: E.H. Kossman, The Low Countries: 1780-1940 (Oxford: Oxford University, 1978), 629. "Qu'on ne vienne plus nous parler de la force du socialisme. Cette force n'a de base que notre propre faiblesse. Le jour oh les vrais patriotes, oh tous les catholiques auront le courage de s'unir, de s'organiser, le socialisme ne sera plus qu'un mot. I1 s'ecroulera lamentablement." Leon Degrelle, "Les socialistes allemands et les n6tres," in Vlan (15 April 1933), 3. 6 1 A EIitler in the context of 1933, not knowing what came later. non-Catholic to be a Belgian patriot. One thing is clear fiom this piece: to Degrelle, it certainly was not possible for a socialist to be a patriot. To Degrelle, it was a combination of the socialists' cowardice and their highly flawed political views which rendered them unfit to be considered patriotic. Degrelle viewed the Belgian socialists as having turned away from their German "confrkres" by not trying to help them against Hitler. Instead, Degrelle accused Belgian socialists of opportunism in the face of Hitler's taking over the German state. According to Degrelle, their primary goal was to score political points off of Hitler in order to raise their popularity at home, a strategy which led them to exploit the German National Socialists' handling of the "Jewish question." He contended that Belgian socialists did not actually care about Jews in the least. In railing against Belgian socialists on this issue, Degrelle, revealed his own feelings about Jews: Le Peuple [a prominent socialist newspaper] has spoken very gravely of thousands and millions of threatened lives in Germany. It lets out the cries of a polecat to defend Israelites who, evidently, are somewhat sympathetic because they are persecuted, but who nevertheless have in Germany, and elsewhere throughout the entire world, an influence which is frequently very harmful. This is the most intelligent, insidious, and morbid race in the universe. For the past fifty years, everything bad which has sprouted in politics comes to us fiom Jews. Germany, like Poland, is infested by an extremely numerous population of Semites who have a preponderant influence in intellectual and political life. It was time to put a brake on them. Hitler did that with violence. We understand the protests which have gone up around the world, but it appears that Le Peuple goes a bit overboard when it portrays Germany as a country inundated with the blood of massacred ~ews.~~ 62 "Trks gravement Le Peuple a parlt de milliers et de millions de vies menactes en Allemagne. I1 a pousst des cris de putois pour defendre des isratlites qui, tvidemment, sont assez sympathiques puisqu'ils sont persecutts, mais qui neanrnoins ont en Allemagne, et d'ailleurs dans le monde entier, une influence souvent trks nefaste. C'est la race la plus intelligente, la plus insidieuse et la plus morbide de 1'Univers. Depuis cinquante ans tout ce qui a germ6 de mauvais dans la politique nous est venu des Juifs. L'Allemagne comme la Pologne est infestee par une population de Stmites extrzmement nombreuse qui avait une influence preponderante dans la vie intellectuelle et politique. I1 etait temps d'y mettre un frein. Hitler l'a fait avec violence. Nous comprenons les protestations qui se sont tlevtes dans le monde entier, mais il Clearly, Degrelle had very negative feelings towards ~ews.~~ Thus as early as 1933 he expressed his anti-Semitism explicitly, going so far as to say that Germany and Poland were infested with Jews. To Degrelle, all of the problems of modernity could be placed squarely at t6e doorstep of the Jews; they were to blame for any economic or political problems. He regarded Jews as highly intelligent, but also insidious, and believed they would undermine any society where they were allowed to live. Moreover, he suggested that Jews constituted a distinct race, and therefore it would be foolish to expect any kind of assimilation from them. Further, Degrelle seemed to imply that even though Hitler was a bit rbugh with the Jews, he was justified because of the danger they presented. Yet despite Degrelle's reprehensible opinions, he did seem mildly disapproving of Hitler's persecution of Jews during his first months in power. Rexist anti-Semitism in general, and Degrelle's in particular, would later become much more virulent, though it is impossible to say whether this represented a change in Degrelle's thinking or merely that he felt more fiee to express what he had believed all along. Degrelle's anti-Semitic rant was but a diversion fkom the main thrust of his article in this issue of Vlan: his criticisms of socialists. If socialists truly cared about liberty and the lives of individuals, then, he contended, they should be talking about the thousands of Mexican Catholics tortured and murdered by the cruel regime: "Since Nero, never in the world have such abominable spectacles been seen.""" Degrelle asked by what right the socialists could defend Jews, liberties, and the persecuted, when they did nothing for the semble cependant que Le Peuple va un peu fort, quand il represente l7Allemagne come un pays inondk par le sang des Juifs massacres."Degrelle, "kes socialistes allemands et les n8ti-es" in Vlan (15 April 1933), 3. 63 His equation of the Jewish population in Germany with that in Poland is highly flawed. Relative to the sizes of the populations, Germany had about a tenth the number of Jews as Poland. 64 "Depuis Neron, jamais on n'avait vu dans le monde des spectacles aussi aborninables."Degrelle, "Les socialistes allemands et les n8tres," in Vlan (15 April 1933), 3. "thousands of victims who merit all of the pity and love of human hearts."65 Here, Degrelle suggested that German Jews did not merit pity and the love of human hearts any more than did Mexican Catholics, and that the socialists were privileging one group of victims over another with no ju~tification.~~ The message of this piece was that socialism was a completely bankrupt ideology, which in times of trouble would take the cowardly course. Degrelle's critical perspective was hardly reserved for rival political parties. He subjected the Catholic Party to harsh scrutiny as well in a series of Vlan articles from the same period, the last of which appeared in April 1933. These articles were likely an attempt to establish Degrelle as an attractive alternative to the current Catholic Party leadership and as a new source of guidance to the party. His criticisms were that the party was too disorganized, too inactive, too undisciplined, and suffered from weak leadership. Degrelle concluded that in order to survive, the party would need to enact the reforms he suggested. These included better financial organization, the use of specialists, the institution of a tribune system, and one strong leader-"There must be one above Degrelle's authoritarian tendencies were evident in his proposed set of reforms, especially with his insistence on the need for a single strong leader. Nevertheless, what is essential to note is the fact that despite his criticisms, Degrelle still envisioned these reforms as taking place within the framework of the Catholic Party. "In place of fighting 65 "NOUS demandons, aujourd'hui a [les socialistes] de quel droit ils viennent prendre la dCfense des Juifs, la defense des libertes, la defense des persecutCs, eux, qui pendant des annkes ont souill6 des milliers de victimes qui meritaient toute la pitie et tout l'amour des coeurs humains."Degrelle, "Les socialistes allemands et les n6tres," in VZun (15 April 1933), 3. 66 This issue of Vlan also contains an article written by Mgr. Picard, Degrelle's mentor, about anti- clericalism in Mexico. Much like any other Catholic political journal, Vlan was highly aware of religion, but it was much more concerned with real-world politics than with theological debates or the like. 67 "il en faut un partout." ~tienne, Mouvement, 16-17. Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear to me what exactly the tribune system would entail. the Catholic Party, let us serve it, change it, take it: in order to save it."68 At this point, Degrelle still had no immediate plans to break away from the Catholic Party, seeking instead to reform it from within. The bitter split between Degrelle and the party would only come two and a half years later. When it occurred, it was not without warning. Rather, over time Degrelle's verbal attacks on party leadership became more and more outspoken and severe. Along with the heightened attacks on party leadership, Degrelle also sought to establish Rex with its own identity, independent of both the Catholic Party and the ACJB. In the July 1, 1933 issue of Rex, the "Dkfinition de Rex" appeared.69 This is a highly important document, as it states the principles and goals of Degrelle and his followers. Rex is 1). A movement of young people. 2). A movement of Catholic action. Rex wants 1). To give back to Catholics the sense ofpride, of optimism, of intrepidity, of discipline, of organized action. 2). To project into all of modern life an ardent, intelligent, and integral Catholicism ... Rex is characterized 1). By its vigor, its dynamism, its faith, its sense of action. 2). By its apostolic spirit, its intransigence, its mystique, its unity. 3). By its commercial and financial organization, strictly managed like that of a factory. 4). By its audacious objective: all of modern life, the screen, the radio, letters, the souls of today. Rex devotes itself 1). To Belgium, to invigorate its blood thanks to a rejuvenated Catholicism. "Au lieu de combattre le Parti catholique, servons-le, changeons-le, prenons-le: pour le sauver." Degrelle %uoted in ~tienne, Mouvement, 17. A form of this document may also be found in the July 5, 1933 issue of Vlan in ~tienne, Mouvement, 177. 2). To Christ, Christus-Rex, in Him are consecrated all of the efforts of his soldiers, of his apostles.70 This document was not individually signed, but Degrelle must have been involved in its creation. It described Rex as a movement of young Catholics, bursting with energy and seeking to reinvigorate the nation. Catholicism was presented as the most important aspect of Rex, superceding any trivial political concerns. Though Rex constantly described itself as Catholic, there was actually very little in its doctrine that was strictly religious. Many of Rex's members came from the ACJB youth movement, but Rex was much more political than religious in nature. The rhetoric of Catholicism in this document seems to have been more of a pretense than a reflection of reality. Rexists probably did see themselves as devout Catholics, but there was no mention of serving the Church, for example. Rex devoted itself to Christ, but there was no discussion of what exactly that entailed. Emphasizing Catholicism may have been an indirect way to imply a sense of Belgian nationalism. Belgium was overwhelmingly Catholic, unlike the Netherlands and much of Germany. For a country with Protestant neighbors, and which historically derived its independence in the nineteenth century as a result of its religious difference, Catholicism could be used as a unifylng characteristic. Rex made extensive use of religious rhetoric, but it is not always clear what that rhetoric was meant to signify. Equally unclear is the intent behind Rex's goal "to invigorate [Belgium's] blood thanks 70 "Rex est 1). Un mouvement de jeunes. 2). Un mouvement d'action catholique. Rex veut 1). Rendre aux catholiques le sens de la fie&, de l'optimisme, de l7intrCpidite, de la discipline, de 19action organis&. 2). Projeter dans toute la vie moderne un catholicisme ardent, intelligent et integral ...Rex se caractkrise 1). Par son elan, son dynamisme, sa foi, son sens de l'action. 2). Par son esprit apostolique, par son intransigeance, sa mystique, son unite. 3). Par son organisation commerciale et financikre, strictement montee cornme celle d'une usine. 4). Par son objectif audacieux: toute la vie moderne, l'ecran, la radio, les lettres, les lmes d'aujourd'hui. Rex se donne 1). A la Belgique, pour revigorer son sang grlce a un catholicisme rajeuni. 2). Au Christ, Christus-Rex, en Lui consacrent tous les efforts de ses soldats, de ses ap6tres." 'mefinition de Rex," in Re.x (1 July 1933), 5. to a rejuvenated Catholicism." Speaking of the blood of a nation was a highly fascistic style of rhetoric, but Rex claimed that this invigoration would come about through a rejuvenated Catholicism. Despite the strongly religious language of the "Dkfinition de Rex," the Association catholique de lajeunesse belge, with which Degrelle was still formally linked, became more and more fmstrated with the political direction that Degrelle was traveling with the Rex publishing house, whatever the definition claimed to the contrary. The ACJB did not like the overtly political nature of Vlan, and wanted Degrelle to give the journal a more religious emphasis. Degrelle chose not to do so, and the ACJB broke with him in January 1934, though this did not result in a significant drop in Rex's membership.71 This choice between the dictates of his religion and his own political desires was one with which Degrelle would be confronted time and again in the future, and he usually made the same decision, opting to further his political career to the detriment of his religious conformity. Sometimes, though, at least the appearance of religious propriety won out for Degrelle in the years before he split with the Catholic Party (possibly because he thought it would be politically expedient). Degrelle planned a major banquet for the "Congr&s de presse des jeunes catholiques"[Congress of the young Catholic press] in 1934, with an expected 5,000 to 7,000 in attendance. According to ~tienne, this would have been a perfect opportunity for Degrelle to represent himself as the head of young Belgian Catholics, but the bishop of Tournai fi-owned upon such a move. The bishop believed it to be "inopportune,"though he did not formally forbid the banquet. In October 1934, Degrelle issued his response in Rex and Soirkes, under the title "Au service de 1'Eglise" [In service of the Church]. "A Rexist is a soldier,"he declared, "a desire of a bishop is for him an order ...We are here to serve Catholicism. To serve usefully, one most obey ...For Christ! With the pope! With our bishops! Rex will win!"72 At that point in time, with a devoted Catholic following, it would not have been prudent to go against the bishop's wishes. Instead, Degrelle made a very public, grandiloquent display of obeisance. In his highly visible acquiescence to the bishop's wishes, Degrelle likely had his own political future in mind. After Degrelle's split with the ACJB, he continued to develop and refine the Rexist ideology, even though he was still a member of the Catholic Party. In its issue of March 30, 1934, Rex published "Ce que nous voulons pour le pays"[That which we want for the country]. This piece outlined Rex's goals, but remained rather vague about the proper methods to achieve those goals. That which we want for the country I. A strong, stable, directed, and responsible power: direct, frequent and peacehl contact with the masses; aided by a parliamentary consultative organism, strictly and radically modified in its recruitment and in the specialization of its work. 11. A new state of the soul: youthful ideas, courage, audacity, passion for action, sense of responsibilities 111. Radical reforms: of our industrial organization; of our commercial organization; bank decentralization; reorganization and reinvigoration of the administration ... V. New orientation: on the problem of workers; of our foreign 72 "Un rexiste est un soldat ...un dksir d'un kveque est pour lui un ordre ... Nous sommes ici-bas pour servir le catholicisme. Pour servir utilement, il faut obeir ...Pour le Christ! Avec le pape! Avec nos Cveques! Rex vaincra!" Degrelle quoted in ~tienne, Mouvement, 24-25. 73 "Ce que nous voulons pour le pays I. Unpouvoir fort, stable, re'alisateur et responsable: en contact direct, frequent et pacifique avec la masse; aide par un organisme parlementaire consultatif, strictement et radicalement modifie dans son recrutement et dans la specialisation de son travail. 11. Un &tat d'dme nouveau: jeunesse d'idees, courage, audace, passion de l'action, sens des responsabilites. 111. Des riformes radicales: de notre organisation industrielle; de notre organisation commesciale; dkcentralisation bancaire; rkorganisation et rajeunissement de l'administration ... V. Orientation nouvelle: du probleme ouvrier; de notre politique internationale." "Ce que nous voulons pour le pays,"in Rex (30 March 19341, 9. A call for a unifed central state power of a somewhat vague democratic nature appeared again and again in Rexist thinking. This power was to be in contact with the masses, but the masses would not necessarily make important decisions. Instead, representing them would be some kind of parliament, but it would be consultative rather than legislative. Overall, this seemed to be a call for a benign, consensual authoritarianism. Beyond a change in the system of government, Rex was also highly concerned with economic and social problems, and so it is not surprising that the statement called for a dramatic restructuring of the organization of Belgium's financial system. What is clear is that Belgium's current policies with respect to workers and international relations were unsatisfactory to Rex and needed to be reformed. What remains unclear, however, is what form this proposed restructuring would take, be it corporatist, socialist, nationalist, or something else. This vagueness may well have been intentional. By only criticizing, rather than offering a constructive solution, Rex could appeal to anyone dissatisfied with the current order without alienating any potential recruits who might not agree with their proposed solution. Interestingly, the rhetoric of Catholicism, ever present in the "Definition de Rex," was absent here. Though Rex still sought a regeneration of the soul, the word "Catholic" was not mentioned once in this piece. This perhaps had to do with Rex's split away from the ACJB. The "Definition de Rex"was published while Rex still operated under the auspices of the ACJB, and despite Degrelle's political inclinations the emphasis had to be on Catholicism. The Christus Rex movement sought to present Catholicisni as a third-way in politics, but with the emphasis still on Catholicism. No longer bound by the wishes of the ACJB, Degrelle could turn Rex in a more purely political direction. This is not to say that Degrelle was not actually religious to begin with, or that his own religious beliefs underwent a change. Rather, Degrelle was simply freer to concentrate on politics with less emphasis on the propriety of appearances. In this piece and in others, Rex was calIing for radical (if unspecified) change in a number of areas. For this reason, it does not seem to make sense to label the movement in this period as a product of the conservative right, at least by any conventional definition of conservative. The Rexists themselves rejected the label "conservative"as it was normally used, calling themselves "CONSERVATIVES AND MEN OF ORDER, BUT IN OUR MANNER, WHICH IS THE RIGHT MANNER."^^ For Rex, someone who was a true conservative was someone who instilled and upheld "order," rather than someone who slavishly served the current system of "hypercapitalism." If anything, then, Degrelle and his followers were revolutionary conservatives. Rex and Degrelle cast themselves as opponents of both socialism (the goal of the left) and hypercapitalism (that of the right), which in their analysis was the malicious force of high finance. The historian Stanley Payne classifies Rex in this period as a conservative movement. Lkon Degrelle would agree with him, but they would not be using the same word to mean the same thing. A sampling of other newspaper articles from this time period can help to give a sense of the political and philosophical directions then being taken by Degrelle and Rex. During this time period, Degrelle was the unquestioned leader of Rex, and he was largely responsible for the movement's ideological choices. Because of this, it is reasonable to assume that anything printed in one of Degrelle's papers would have Seen in line with his 74 "NOUS SOMMES, PLUS QUE N'IMPORTE QUI, DES CONSERVATEURS ET DES HOMMES D'ORDRE MAIS A NOTRE MANIERE QUI EST LA BONNE MANIEKE" [emphasis in the original] "Qu'est-ce que l'ordre?" in Rex (30 March 1934), 10. own thinking. More prominent and more common than the anti-Semitism seen in articles like "Les socialistes allemands et les n8tresm were broad ranging anti-socialist and anti-Masonic themes. For Degrelle and other Rexists, most of Belgium's problems could be blamed on the two malignant trends of socialism and freemasonry. Later, both socialism and freemasonry would be portrayed as stemming from Judaism, but at this time Degrelle referred to them without reference to Judaism. In a fi-ont page, unsigned article from April 1934, hysterical and rather violent anti-Masonic sentiment was prominently displayed (in bold capitals, presumably for greater dra'matic effect): THE IDEAL POLITICAL SYSTEM FOR MASONRY IS PARLIAMENTARIANISM, AND PARLIAMENTARIANISM IS DECOMPOSING. It is the only regime which easily allows them to attain power, and, by that power, to poison the country with the virus of anticlericali~rn.~~ The problem with freemasonry, then, was the threat that it posed to the Catholic Church. The condemnation of freemasonry was also, of course, part of a larger critique of parliamentary democracy. According to this Rex piece, a different system of government would be better able to prevent this insidious anticlericalism. This distrust of anticlericalism was in line with a fervent sense of Catholicism. Even after the split with the ACJB, then, Rex continued to use religious language when it suited Rex's purposes. Despite Degrelle's professed Catholicism, at moments he claimed to want Rex to be an all-inclusive movement, not discriminatory on the basis of religious beliefs. In "Les Catholiques et la Politique"from January 1934, Degrelle explained his opinions on the interactions between religion and politics: "Our political activity ...draws an absolute 75 "L'IDEAL POLITIQUE DE LA MACONNERIE C'EST LE PARLEMENTARISME, E.T LE PARLEMENTARISME DECOMPOSE. Ce regime seul leur permet d'atteindre au pouvoir facilement, et, par le pouvoir, d'empoisonner le pays du virus anticlerical"[emphasis in the original]. "Que les fiancs- rnagons ne fassent pas les malins chez nous-Sinon ce sera la bataille au couteau,"in Rex (7 April 1934), 1. distinction between national interests and apostolic preoccupations. A country is the country of all, believers and others."76 Rex was strongly Catholic, but Degrelle still recognized that not everyone in Belgium was a believer. Surprisingly, he insisted that Belgium was for everyone. In a rare departure from the norm, this was actually a somewhat tolerant piece, calling for an end to religious conflicts. Degrelle left unsaid that he was also trying to drum up new, more secular supporters for his movement. In addition to religious harmony, Degrelle also called for new leadership in Belgium. He described the country as needing "surgeons with strong souls."77 Belgium's problems would be fixed with a new regime (of course consisting of Degrelle and his followers) and a new soul. "These men and these leaders will come from Rex," he promised, "Our great red flags, marked with the crown of Christ, will preside not only over the conquests of hearts and souls, but also over the righting of the country, the duties of charity and of the nation."78 Nowhere in this is there a mention of the Catholic Party, which Degrelle was still supposed to be serving. A month later, in February 1934, Degrelle published an open letter to the Catholic Party stating his thoughts on the relationship between him, his followers, and the party superiors. Published in Degrelle's journal Vlan, the letter directly addressed the party leadership about conflicts between Degrelle and the party. "Do not trouble yourselves at all. You are our fathers. That gives you the right to [make decisions] without detours, "Notre activitd politique...aura une tactique absolument distincte, degageant nettement les inter& nationaux des preoccupations apostoliques. Un pays est le pays de tous, des croyants et des autres." Leon Degrelle, "Les Catholiques et la Politique,"in Vlan (18 January 1934), 3. 77 "des chirurgiens a l'lme forte."Degrelle, "Les Catholiques et la Politique,"in Vlan (18 January 1934), 3. 78 "Ces hommes et ces chefs [needed to save the country] viendront de Rex. Nos grands drapeaux rouges, marques de la couronne du Christ, abriteront non seulement les conqu6tes des coeurs et des lmes, mais aussi le redressement du pays, devoir de charit6 et devoir national." Degrelle, "Les Catholiques et la Politique,"in VZun (18 January 1934), 3. and that gives us the duty to receive them with serenity and even with optimism."79 Though Degrelle in this passage bowed to the authority of his elders, the letter seemed to be Degrelle's way of saying that even though his outspokenness was an annoyance for the party, he $till felt that he was doing what was best for the party. Because of this belief, he would continue to speak his mind. Despite Degrelle's claim to serenely accept decisions, serenity was never one of Degrelle's traits. The tone of the letter was rather mocking and condescending, with Degrelle advising that those offended by his verbal attacks should "Take your handkerchief and wipe off your sweat, if not your tears."80 Degrelle cbncluded by warning the party that he and Rex were prepared to move ahead with their plans, with or without official party support. From comfortable beginnings in the Ardennes countryside, Degrelle had shown his intellectual precocity by the prominence he achieved during his university years. After becoming involved with Mgr. Picard's ACJB, Degrelle had been thrust into heading the ~ditions Rex publishing house. In this position, Degrelle soon charted an independent course, using religious rhetoric when convenient to set Rex up as an entity distinct fi-om the Catholic Party. Degrelle had split with the Association catholique de la jeunesse belge in January 1934, and his relations with the Catholic Party became more and more adversarial thereafter. What was becoming clear was that Degrelle had the highest ambitions. He portrayed himself as the true defender of the Church, Belgium, and the monarchy in an effort to situate himself as the true representative of Catholics in Belgium. Degrelle worked hard to cultivate an image as an outsider to the status quo of 79 "Ne vous g8nez point. Vous 8tes nos pbres. Ca vous donne le droit d'y aller sans dCtours, qa nous donne le devoir d'encaisser avec serCnitC et meme avec optimisme." LCon Degrelle, "Lettre Ouverte au Parti Catholique, "in VZun (15 February 1934), 1. "Prenez votre mouchoir et recueillez votre sueur, sinon vos lames." Degrelle, "Lettre Ouverte au Parti Catholique,"in Vlan (15 February 1934), 1. the pal-ty system, and would soon be ready to position himself to enter Belgium's political contests in his own right. Chapter 3-The Sueeess of 1936 Severing of Ties After assuming control of the gditions Rex publishing house, Leon Degrelle had worked to fashion Rex into a popular political grouping. Degrelle became increasingly difficult for his elders to control, and had had a falling out with his sponsors in the ACJB. Degrelle had not yet fulfilled his ambitions, and showed no signs of slowing down in his efforts to publicize both himself and Rex, launching an anti-corruption campaign to highlight the misdeeds of the Catholic Party. Degrelle charted his own course, incorporating elements of nationalism, socialism, and Catholicism into his rhetoric in an attempt to gain a large base of support for Rex in the Belgian population. Soon he would decide that Rex no longer needed to operate within the auspices of the Catholic Party, and would finally launch Rex as a political party in its own right. This chapter traces this stage of Degrelle's career, picking up on the theme from the previous chapter of Degrelle's shift away from political Catholicism and toward a more independent policy. Throughout 1935, Degrelle continued to raise public awareness of himself and of his Rexist movement through speeches and publications, despite the fact that the group still technically fell under the umbrella of the Catholic Party. Rex's slogan, coined at a time when Rex was in dire financial straits, was "Rex vaincra,"or "Rex will win."' The slogan was irrepressibly optimistic, even when the situation did not seem to justify such a high level of confidence. As Robert Brasillach put it, "One would need a lot of good will Brasillach, Histoire de la Guerre d'Espagne: Mimoires, suivi de Lion Degrelle et L'avenir de "Rex'" ([Paris]: Plon, 1969), 495. [toward Rex] to believe that."2 Degrelle and his followers, though, were never ones to be hampered by realistic expectations. In 1934 and 1935, Degrelle's Rex movement became more active in Belgian political life. ' After severing ties with the Association catholique de la jeunesse belge, the ~ditions Rex publishing house stepped up its rhetorical attacks on the Catholic Party, becoming an even bigger thorn in the side of the party. Degrelle began to believe that he would soon be able to take on Belgium's entrenched political parties and win. The Rex journals were not profitable, and as a result the publishing house needed to raise furids above and beyond subscription fees. Degrelle's wife's family was wealthy, but could not or would not subsidize the entire Rexist endeavore3 committed Rexists made up more of the difference with voluntary donations, but this still was not sufficient to keep the publishing house afl~at.~ Nevertheless, this financial quagmire proved no problem for the ever resourceful Degrelle. He discovered new sources of revenue in 1936 and 1937, but before then he raised money in other ways. Opponents accused Degrelle of smuggling alcohol in 1934, but there is no real evidence for this accusation, and the accusation seems as outlandish as many of Degrelle's own spurious ~laims.~ One moneymaking strategy that Degrelle definitely did pursue was to give public lectures for money, which also allowed him to hone his rhetorical skills, providing valuable experience which would serve him well in the years to come. In his 1970s Charlier interviews, Degrelle claimed that in the 1930s he went to socialist speeches and stood in the crowd among the common laborers, listening to what "I1 fallait beaucoup de bonne volontk pour y croire."Brasillach, Histoire, 495. Pierre Daye, Leon Degrelle et le Rexisme (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1937), 60; Jean-Michel ~tienne, Le Mouvement Rexiste Jusqu 'en 1940 (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1968), 84. ~tienne, Mouvement, 83-84. Pierre Daye, Leon Degrelle et le Rexisme, 65. the speaker had to say. At the conclusion of a speech, Degrelle would then deliver an impromptu speech of his own. This was very popular with the socialist crowds (according to Degrelle), and he often won over converts to the Rexist cause.6 Degrelle's tale of success at winning new converts does not seem very likely, as Degrelle was never particularly popular among laborers, but if he did actually give such speeches they at least gave him a chance to practice his oratory and to publicize himself. After following this strategy for a time, Degrelle moved onto scheduling his own meetings, featuring himself as the main speaker. These speeches proved quite lucrative, as bany people proved willing to pay the admission fee (a minimum of 5 francs, 40 times the price of a daily newspaper) to hear Degrelle speak.7 Once inside, there were further appeals for donation^.^ The description of the atmosphere inside these meetings seems reminiscent of a church tent revival, with Degrelle as the preacher-entertainer. He explained the fees this way: "One pays well to go to the cinema ...one can pay well to listen to me."9 Degrelle liked to believe that his speeches were as much of a spectacle as any movie. Many accounts attest to the fact that Degrelle was a master orator. He explained his strategy for winning over crowds in a rather unusual way: "A conqueror of people must be an enchanter. One must enchant crowds like one enchants a woman. It is Jean-Michel Charlier, Le'on Degrelle: Persiste et Signe (Paris: Editions Jean Picollec, 1985), 87-93. Charlier, Degrelle, 87-93. ~tienne, Mouvement, 82-83. "On paye bien pour aller au cinema.. .On peut bien payer pour m'entendre." Rrasillach, Histoire, 496. 'O See, for example, the discussion of Robert Poulet in Charlier, Degrelle, 6. Poulet "avait eu l'occasion d'entendre les plus grands tribuns du XXe sikcle ... mais qu'aucun ne lui avait fait autant d'impression que Degrelle, qu'aucun ne l'egalait en magnetisme, en pouvoir de conviction, et de seduction sur les foules, a l'exception peut-&tre d'Hitler." of the same order. It is like a great act of seduction."" Degrelle used his Rex-Appeal to great effect, seducing crowds with his charisma as much as with the power of his words. As Degrelle became more confident in his oratory, his public appearances expanded in scope. Rex held its first mass meeting on May 1, 1935 in ~russels.'~ This date, surely not coincidentally, was also the day of the annual May Day celebration, symbolically important to socialists. Degrelle had always cast himself as a defender of all Belgians, including the lower classes, and as evidence for this he could point to his expos6 of slum life, written while he was still a student. In this respect, the choice of such an evocative day seems to suggest his refusal to concede to the left a monopoly on representing the interests of labor. For Rex to be a truly successfil party, which Degrelle already seemed to have in mind, it would need to appeal to a wide segment of the Belgian population. The Rexist flag, which predated Degrelle's association with the publishing house, also signaled concern with social issues along with Rex's other aims. l3 The flag consisted of an intertwined cross and crown with a red background. The cross and crown represented Christ the King, but it could also be taken to represent Rex's support for the earthly Catholic Church and the Belgian monarchy. The red field behind the insignia could have conceivably meant any number of things, though it was certainly a provocative choice of color. The color could have been chosen simply because it was one of the colors of the Belgian national flag. Other meanings, however, could be ascribed to red as well. Red is the color of blood, perhaps signifying the blood of the 11 "Un conqudrant de peuples doit &re un enchanteur. I1 faut enchanter les foules conlme on enchante une femme. C'est du m&me ordre. C'est une espece d'immense acte de ~Cduction." Degrelle quoted in Charlier, Degrelle, 82. 12 Charlier, Degrelle, 93. ~tienne, Mouvement, 14. 62 nation. Red, though, is also the traditional color of the left, an association of which the Rexists were certainly not unaware. At this time, Degrelle presented himself as an ardent nationalist, but he also attempted to reach out and appeal to the socialist base. This was all a part of Degrelle's effort to establish Rex as a viable political party with a platform attractive to a wide- ranging constituency. In 1935, though, Degrelle and Rex were not National Socialists in the Nazi mold. At that point in time Rexists were publicly hostile to Nazism, both because of Nazi anti-Catholicism and the widespread prevalence of Belgian anti-German sentiment.14 Degrelle may well have felt some private admiration for Hitler, but any admission of such publicly would have ruined Degrelle, as it would have been completely unacceptable both to other Rexists and to the Belgian public at large. Degrelle was still on his way up, and he had to take care not to offend his potential bases of support. Degrelle had no such fear as far as the entrenched political and financial elites were concerned. Perceived corruption among the Belgian elite was a tempting target for Degrelle's criticisms. In 1933 in the Vlan journal, Degrelle had initiated his "campagne des pourris."15 here is no exact translation for "pourris," but it means roughly "the rotten ones," or "the corrupt." The campaign of the rotten ones was intended to sweep the Belgian political and financial systems free of corruption, in order to allow for moral regeneration. In 1935, Degrelle made it abundantly clear that the first people he intended to sweep away were the leaders of the Catholic Party. Rather than targeting "hypercapitalists"and socialists, Degrelle was now targeting the Catholic Party itself as he prepared to launch Rex as an independent political party. l4 ~tienne, Mouvement, 40-41. l5 Brasillach, Histoire, 494-495. As Degrelle sharpened his rhetorical campaign, his criticisms soon became intolerable to the Catholic Party. Minister Paul Segers was a successful businessman, active on any number of boards and a member of the Catholic Party government. To Degrelle, segers was the number onepourri, and the first target. Segers was also the head of a Catholic business group, and at a November 1935 meeting of these political and business elites in the city of Courtrai, Degrelle launched a carefully planned rhetorical ambush. Degrelle had loyal Rexists block the exits of the building where the meeting was being held as he prepared to begin his verbal assault.16 During Segers' speech, Degrelle iriterrupted, allegedly exclaiming You are too old! Away with you! Do not speak of discipline and authority. You do not know what that is ...You always speak of your heart. This is the moment to show it. Show that you have a heart by going away from here. Leave! Yes, leave! That is the best which one can hope for Gom you.17 This harangue continued in the same vein for quite some time, and when one senator tried to interrupt, Degrelle shouted him down in no uncertain terms: "I have the floor. I am keeping it. Shut up, you living piece of e~crernent!"'~ Degrelle no longer showed even a modicum of respect to the party leadership, and unsurprisingly the party soon thereafter broke all remaining relations with Degrelle and the rest of ex.^ This incident was highly significant in that it marked the beginning of Degrelle's independent political career. It is not clear why, if Degrelle had simply wanted to leave l6 ~tienne, Mouvement, 28. "VOUS etes trop vieux! Allez-vous-en! Ne parlez pas de discipline et d'autorite. Vous ne savez pas ce que c'est ...Vous parlez toujours de votre coeur. C'est le moment de le montrer. Montrez que vous avez du coeur en vous en allant. Partez! Oui, partez! C'est ce qu'on peut le mieux attendre de vous." Daye, Lion Degrelle et le Rexisme, 72; F.L. Carsten, The Rise of Fascism, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 213. J 9 ai la parole. Je la garde. Taisez-vous!"Daye, Lion Degrelle et le Rexisme, 72; "Taisez-vous, excrement vivant!" ~tienne, Mouvement, 28. Interestingly, Daye, a prominent Rexist, left out the "excrement vivant" remark in his telling. Carsten, Rise ofFascism, 213. '6 18 the Catholic Party, he did not just quit. Perhaps he had wanted to exit with a flourish. In any event, the Rexists referred to Degrelle's performance that day as the "Coup de Courtrai,"and saw it as a great victory, taking joy in the humiliation of the alleged pourrjs. No longer bound by any form of party authority, Degrelle embarked on a campaign of grandly absurd, and attention-grabbing, political theater, In keeping with Degrelle's promise to sweep away corruption, Rexists would show up outside of conferences or offices of the allegedpourris and start sweeping the sidewalks- literally-in a humorous display, eliciting laughter from the crowd that would inevitably forh20 Obviously this was not a way to effect change directly, but Degrelle was not yet in any kind of position to do so, and this campaign did have the benefit of drawing attention to Rex. Degrelle had a showman's sense of what would entertain crowds. Additionally, and equally significant, the sweeping campaign also ensured that thoughts of corruption stayed prominent in the public's consciousness. In 1937, Pierre Daye wrote knowingly of the significance of the street sweeping campaign. "Our boys would be arrested, but the laughing onlookers, would time and again find themselves on [Rex's] side, and laughter-isn't it, Degrelle?-is a terrible weapon."21 Because the street sweeping seemed so silly and innocent, if the police arrested those doing the sweeping it would look like an overreaction and people would be more likely to sympathize with Rex. If, on the other hand, the police did nothing, Rexists could harrass and humiliate thepourris to their hearts' content. For Rex, this was a win- win strategy. 20 Carsten, Rise of Fascism, 213. 21 "NOS garqons hrent arretCs, mais les rieurs, encore une fois, se trouvaient de leur cGtC, et le rire, n'est-ce pas, Degrelle? est une arme terrible."Daye, Lkon Degrelle et le Rexisme, 76-77. This use of laughter as a weapon could also be seen in the withering political cartoons of Paul Jamin, also known as "Jam," a Rexist and perhaps the most talented cartoonist of 1930s Belgium. This campaign was not the extent of Rexist activities after Degrelle's denunciation of Segers and expulsion from the Catholic Party. Following his Courtrai outburst in November 1935, Degrelle published a pamphlet enumerating his accusations against Minister Segers, "the great vizier of the old party called ~atholic."~~ Degrelle called his tract, published under the auspices of Editions Rex, Jkccuse M Segers [I accuse Mr. Segers]. This title was clearly inspired by mile Zola's 1898 pamphlet J'accuse, written at the height of the Dreyfus Affair in France. Zola's J'accuse had been a liberal indictment of the anti-Dreyfusards, accusing them of unjustly railroading an innocent man. While Degrelle would certainly not have been in agreement with Zola's Republican politics, he nevertheless borrowed the mantle of moral crusader from Zola. Whether Degrelle was trying to suggest that here finally was the anti-liberal response to Zola or whether he merely sought to capitalize on the association of the title J'accuse with a strong moral voice against governmental corruption is unclear. Whatever the motivations underlying the provocative title, J'accuse M. Segers offered a scathing critique of both Segers personally and the political and financial culture in which he operated. To Degrelle, Segers was only a symptom of much greater problems, and being rid of him would only be a first step toward reform. The tone of this piece was strident and sensationalist, as Degrelle used hyperbole about Segers's alleged misdeeds and the violent language of physical struggle to rouse readers about Belgium's current condition. The core of Rexist beliefs about modernity, ecorlomics and politics was represented in this one short piece, allowing it to serve not only as an indictmerit of one man but also as a statement of the newly independent Rex's purpose. 22 "le grand vizir du vieux parti dit catholique."Degrelle quoted in Charlier, Degrelle, 99. Even 40 years after the fact, Degrelle was still scomfbl of M. Segers. Degrelle9s critique of Segers was by no means subtle. J'accuse M. Segers was subtitled, rou&ly, "of being a corrupt, criminal, plundering coward."23 This subtitle is far more vituperative than one would expect on the basis of reading the text's introduction, in which Degrelle claimed that it was incredibly difficult to make the decision to publish the pamphlet, having to weigh his duty to his country versus his pity for a fellow man.24 The decision was difficult because "it is normal to hesitate before crushing a man."25 Characteristically, Degrelle was fully confident that his one small text would be enough to completely destroy Segers. Degrelle's charges against Segers were numerous but most had to do with alleged financial malfeasance. Degrelle took issue with the fact that as President of the Catholic Federation, over the years Segers had collected "a series of mandates as disparate as they are remunerative,"heading up numerous councils and business groups for which he had no real qualifications.26 ~e~relle saw these financial interests as necessarily compromising Segers's leadership within the Catholic Party, and asked rhetorically: "How can you give a doctrine, a discipline, a plan of action to the party when you are wrestling with yourself' over competing financial interests?27 It is surely noteworthy that Degrelle saw the goals of leadership to be the instilling in the party of "a doctrine, a discipline, a plan of action." 23 Lton Degrelle, J'accuse M. Segers (Bruxelles: [Rex, 19351). 24 rc J avais a choisir entre la charitt envers le pays et la pitie envers un homme." Degrelle, J'accuse, 3. 25 "il est normal d'htsiter avant d'kcraser un homme."Degrelle, J'accuse, 3. 26 "une strie de mandats aussi disparates que rtmuntrateurs."Degrelle, J'accuse, 5. 27 -<' Comment auriez-vous pu donner au parti une doctrine, une discipline, un plan d'action quand vous ttiez a vsus dtbattre." Degrelle, J'accuse, 6. To Degrelle, politics should be completely separate from financial concerns. "From the day you sank into [business] affairs, the Catholic Party was 10~1.'"~ Degrelle believed that business had no place in politics, as it was sure to wield a corrupting influence.29 The implications of such a belief were that politicians should not be involved with the running of businesses, and that businessmen should not attempt to use their money to influence politicians. The corrupting influence of money could be seen particularly strongly in the case of Segers. Most of Segers' wrongdoings stemmed from simple greed, an overriding personal flaw which Degrelle believed to be endemic among much of Bklgium's elite. In criticizing Segers, Degrelle was also delivering a slightly veiled criticism of the entire Belgian political system. Degrelle accused Segers of raking in hundreds of thousands of francs per year from his various board positions rather than retaining his impartiality as head of the Catholic Federation, even though he was already quite comfortable fiom his career as a senator and a lawyer.30 He suggested that Segers had acquired his various positions through corruption and political connections, but had no competence for his required duties: "You are so possessed by that passion for money, which for ten years has corrupted so many Catholics, that you dive headfirst in all of the Greed was not necessarily a Catholic characteristic. Combined with Degrelle's critique of corruption was a rhetorical barb aimed at Belgium's small Jewish population. 28 "D&s ce jour-la oh vous avez sombrC dans les affaires, le parti catholique Ctait perdu."Degrelle, J'accuse, 7. 29 Degrelle, of course, would show no such qualms about later accepting political donations fiom large industries. 30 Degrelle, J'accuse, 8. 3' "VOUS etes tellement possCdC par cette passion de I'argent, qui depuis dix ans a corrompu tant de catholiques, que vous plongiez t&te baisske dans tous les fromages." Degrelle, J'accuse, 8. With no clear basis in fact, Degrelle in an off-handed way referred to Segers as a Jew: "Despite the Jewish blood you have in your veins, you were about as fit to be a banker as you were to be a ta~i-girl!"~~ Degrelle suggested that not only was Segers involved in corrupt financial practices, but that he was not even adept at them, a fact which was especially surprising given that he was a "Jew." Clearly, Degrelle's thoughts on Jews were not particularly flattering. Saying that someone had Jewish blood was a shorthand way for Degrelle to describe that person's personality negatively. In addition to his alleged Jewishness, Segers was also characterized by a "diabolic rapaciousness;"he was "rapacious like vermin."33 The Jewish remark, though, only appears once in the text, and is a one-liner rather than an overriding theme. While Degrelle was clearly anti-Semitic in 1935, it is important to note the relatively limited nature of his anti-Semitic public statements, at least in this one document.34 Making one isolated insulting remark about Jews and money is a far cry from speaking of Germany and Poland being infested by insidious Jews, as Degrelle did in 1933. Though anti-Semitism was fairly widespread in 1930s Europe, Degrelle may have believed that too vocal a display of it would have impeded his electoral hopes. In 1933, writing solely for other Rexists, Degrelle could say whatever he wanted to say. In late 1935, however, he had to concern himself with the opinions of the greater Belgian public who may not have been open to overt anti-Semitism. It seems more likely that Degrelle made a conscious choice to moderate his public tone than that he actually moderated his feelings about Jews. Instead of focusing his rhetoric around an attack on 32 "Malgrb le sang juif que vous avez dans les veines, vous Ctiez aussi peu fait pour &tre banquier que pour &re taxi-girl!" Degrelle, J'accuse, 10. 33 "une rapacite diabolique" ; "rapace comme un pou." Degrelle, J'accuse, 7, 12. 34 There are many publications by Degrelle from 1935 that I have not read, but I have never seen Degrelle referred to as particularly anti-Semitic in this period. Jews, Degrelle focused on corruption, as few members of the Belgian public would be offended by an anti-comption stance. To Degrelle, the cleaning up of corruption was akin to a surgical procedure: "It is necessary to strike today. And to strike hard. Because the corruption of our political regime is such that without a vigorous blow of the lancet the entire country will be infected."j5 Corruption was by no means limited to Segers; rather, Degrelle claimed, it was endemic to all of Belgium's political parties, which would only reform in the face of strong outside pressure fi-om "independent and vigorous corn bat ant^.^' "The parties ...will not cleanse themselves: they are too profoundly enmeshed in the political/financial scandals."36 If the parties were too hopelessly corrupt to change on their own, Degrelle reasoned, the people should look to Degrelle and his Rexist followers, relative political newcomers, for reform. Segers was only the immediate target of Degrelle's accusations. Beyond Segers and Belgium's political parties, it was the politicaVfinancia1 system as a whole with which Degrelle took issue. Degrelle claimed, "in unmasking the veritable political banking mafias which exercise a dictatorship as abominable as it is anonymous over all the forces of the country"that he would prove Segers was only a symptom of much wider problems.37 Degrelle seemed to be writing from a conspiratorial worldview, believing that some malignant syndicate acted as the power behind the scenes in Belgium, and perhaps in Europe more generally. 35 "il faut aujourd'hui frapper. Et kapper avec force. Car la corruption de notre regime politique est telle que sans de vigoureux coups de bistouri tout le pays finira par &re infect&." Degrelle, J'accuse, 3. 36 "lutteurs indkpendants et vigoureux";"Les Partis ...ne se purifieront pas eux-msmes: ils sont trop profondement enlises dans les scandales politico-bancaires."Degrelle, J'accuse, 3. 37 "en demasquant les veritables maffias politico-bancaires qui exercent une dictature aussi abominable qu'anonyme sure toutes les forces du pays."Degrelle, J'accuse, 4. Claims about "political banking mafias" may themselves have had covertly anti-Semitic undertones. In J'accuse M. Segers, Degrelle used imagery that came up again and again in Rexist rhetoric. The most obvious example of this was the recurring use of the metaphor of cleaning or sweeping away corruption, an idea which Rexists had physically acted out in their street demonstrations. While using this imagery, Degrelle also explained why he first attacked the Catholic Party, of which he was still a member, rather than the socialists or some other opponent. "We are tracking down Catholics first because we are Catholics ourselves. We do not want to be hypocrites. We clean our doorstep before crossing over to our neighbors' doorstep."38 According to Degrelle, after ridding the Catholic Party of cohption, Rex could and would turn to the liberals and socialists. "They don 't have the courage to use the broom on themselves, like we are doing. We will do the sweeping in their place."39 The goal of Rex was not confined to the reform of one political party; rather, it was to bring about the overhaul of Belgian society in general. Degrelle used populist rhetoric to describe a world in which honest common men were ground down by the malignant forces of high finance. His critique of high finance, though, by no means stemmed from leftist or socialist thinking. He described a bank as "the hypercapitalist monster of the bourgeois socialists,"40 but his populism seemed to be firmly in the rightist camp. Degrelle lambasted Segers for indulging in decadent corruption while so many other Belgians were suffering economically. After recounting an episode in which Segers secured yet another 10 million francs in a dubious way, Degrelle launched a stinging rebuke: "Ten million thrown in the fire when our 38 -